A PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CASEBOOK

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A Psychological Warfare Casebook

by

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PREFACE

The preparation of this casebook was undertaken by the Operations Research Office as the third in a series of three manuals (other two: ORO-T-214, "The Nature of Psychological Warfare," and ORO-T-222, "Target Analysis and Media in Propaganda to Audiences Abroad") designed to serve as training guides and reference sources for personnel assigned to or interested in psychological warfare planning and operations. Although this casebook was prepared primarily to meet the particular needs of Army personnel, it early became evident that it would be impracticable to dissociate the foreign propaganda activities of psychological warfare personnel in the Army from those in the Navy and Air Force and from such civilian agencies as the World War II Office of War Information (OWI) or the present-day US Information Agency (USIA). Thus "psychological warfare," as defined and used in this study, is an all-inclusive term. As used in this casebook the term encompasses both peacetime and wartime activities and is designed to support both military and political operations. Thus, it is believed that this study may prove useful to more than the limited number of individuals within the Army who may be assigned psychological warfare responsibilities.

It was indicated in the preface of the first two manuals of this series on psychological warfare that the Operations Research Office undertook the preparation of these training guides and reference works when the need for them first became apparent and at a time when only ORO was actively engaged in a research effort designed to support the Army psychological warfare program. However, the preparation of manuals such as this casebook is not considered to be the normal function of an operations research agency.

It is believed that the large fund of knowledge of past psychological warfare operations — the methods, techniques, and achievements — that is the heritage of World War II and earlier struggles, when considered along with the generally disorganized state of this knowledge and the various theories as to the nature of psychological warfare, makes a case-study approach to the subject a useful one for training and reference purposes.

The compilation of case materials presented in this study is not put forth with any sense of finality. The contents reflect the considered judgments of those responsible for its preparation. It is recognized that the casebook is restricted in scope owing to the limited horizons and experiences of the authors and the inadequacies of the reporting system for past actions.

It is believed, however, that the preparation of this casebook will have been justified if it serves to induce participants and observers of past and current actions to record their experiences more adequately for possible inclusion in later revisions or in new approaches to works of this kind. It is hoped that the volume will be of real value in itself; and in addition, through use and critical review, that it may serve to focus further thought on the subject of psychological warfare and how it may be utilized more effectively in the future as a supporting weapon in our nation's political and military establishments for the attainment of national objectives.

WILLIAM E. DAUGHERTY

BETHESDA, MD.
November 1957

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This casebook is truly the result of the inspiration, ideas, and painstaking work of a host of friends and acquaintances. Without the assistance of these friends in the government service, in private communications media, on the university campuses, and within the Operations Research Office this study could not have been brought to a successful conclusion. To all who in any way have contributed to this study the authors are grateful.

Listing individuals and organizations for particular recognition is always risky, for in doing so there is the danger that a dimmed memory may cause the omission of a particular individual or organization whose contribution may have been as significant as any listed. In this instance the danger is especially great because the preparation of this work has extended over a period of many months. If there are any whose contributions to this casebook are not properly recognized the senior author can only express his sincere regrets for the oversight.

The authors and contributors of case studies, journal accounts, and original memoranda are recognized in bylines and footnotes throughout the study. It is to be understood that the thanks of the Operations Research Office is extended to each person and publishing firm that has so graciously permitted the reproduction of copyrighted and original material; no separate listing of publishers is made.

Throughout the many months it has taken to collect, organize, and tailor the accounts appearing in this casebook the Office of the Chief of Special Warfare (previously named the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare), US Army, has frequently and continuously expressed an interest in the early completion of the work. The initial planning for this casebook was undertaken during the period that the late Maj Gen Robert A. McClure served as Chief of Psychological Warfare (1951–1953). This work was brought to a conclusion during the tour of duty of Brig Gen William C. Bullock as Chief of Psychological Warfare (1953–1956). The patient and continuing interest of both General McClure and General Bullock in the completion of this work sustained the senior author during periods frequently characterized by varying degrees of frustration associated with bringing a study of this length and diversity of subject matter to an early end, notwithstanding long periods of time when personal commitments

and administrative decisions made the continuous processing of material all but impossible.

Others to whom the authors are indebted for ideas, criticisms of draft manuscripts, and for help in tracking down illusive case material include the following:

Department of the Army: Col P. J. Black and Drs. Paul Blackstock, C. D. Leatherman, and W. J. Morgan, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare; Col Edson D. Raff, Psychological Warfare School, Fort Bragg, N.C.; and Lt Col Wallace L. Clement, Operations Research Division, Office of the Chief of Research and Development.

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Others: Dr. Thomas Andrews, University of Maryland; Dr. Alfred di Grazia, Stanford University; Dr. Paul M. A. Linebarger, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; Dr. Louis Nemzer, Ohio State University; Dr. Lucian Pye, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dr. Wilbur Schramm, Stanford University; and Dr. Douglas Waples, University of Chicago.

In addition to the many to whom personal recognition can be extended for contributions, criticisms of early drafts, etc., there are a number who of necessity remain anonymous. Typescripts of lectures, journal articles of unknown authorship, and unsigned memoranda have been located in archival deposits in both the Pentagon and the National Archives. Some

of these were thought worthy of reproduction, but in a few instances it was found to be impossible to identify the author of the account. Also, the references cited in some contributions are incomplete. Although great effort was made to complete these references, in a few instances it could not be accomplished. In such cases the reference is reproduced exactly as it appeared in the original publication.

The authors of this casebook are also in debt to the library staff of the Office of the Chief of Special Warfare and to the archivists in the National Archives. Through interlibrary loan facilities the ORO Library has made available the rich collections of the Army Library and the Library of Congress. Without the cooperation and assistance of many librarians, most of whom labor in anonymity, this work would not be so complete.

The one to whom the senior author perhaps owes more than to any other is Morris Janowitz. It was Dr. Janowitz who first suggested the compilation of a casebook as a training medium for individuals assigned to the field of international communications and psychological warfare. He helped in the drafting of the original outline for the study and provided many of the contributions (identified by the initials M. J.) out of his rich store of knowledge and experience. If it were not for the time that it has taken to process material for the book and to pretest a draft version on many interested and critical reviewers, and for Dr. Janowitz's prior commitments to other government agencies and his university teaching career, this work might well have appeared with him as the senior author. To him must go much of the credit for many of the ideas and innovations that appear in the study. However, it is only fair to say that he should not be held responsible for any of the imperfections or errors of omission or commission that may mar the end product because he has seen none but early drafts of this casebook.

One final note of acknowledgment needs to be added. Several accounts included in this casebook involve personal experiences of the writer during World War II and during a part of the armed conflict in Korea. (All accounts prepared by the senior author are identified by the initials W. E. D.) It is to be hoped that these personal accounts are not out of keeping with the general tone and contents of the volume. Without the happy circumstance that superiors within the Intelligence Section of a US Marine division in World War II made the writer responsible for the *ad hoc* improvisations in psychological warfare within the division's zone of action on Okinawa in 1945, and the fact that the Director of the Operations Research Office assigned him to assist the Eighth US Army in implementing a revitalized and expanded psychological warfare program in Korea in the early months of 1951, the writer's contribution to this casebook might have been far less.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Nature and Scope of Psychological Warfare

There is a growing body of literature — books, journal articles, and monographs — devoted to the principal subject of this casebook. Each successive year, during the past decade, new and valuable additions have been made to the expanding bookshelf set apart for books on this subject. However, when one closely examines these books he discovers there is anything but unanimity of view on what to call the general subject matter discussed.*

Writers have been more successful in describing the activities that are encompassed by the subjects variously described by such terms as "psychological warfare," "political warfare," "foreign information," "propaganda," "mass communications," "international communications," "overseas information," "war of wits," "the battle for men's minds," "ideological warfare," etc., than in gaining any widespread acceptance for the use of any term that either they or others have proposed for adoption and use.

The editors of this casebook realize that all these terms have their proponents, that the use of any one term confers certain advantages, but that all have their limitations in revealing the range of activities covered or that may be covered by personnel assigned to work in this field of human endeavor. In Chap. 2 the attempt is made to describe the dynamic character of the subject and the wide range of thought relating to it, including suggestions of alternative names to label the activity.

It matters little which term is used so long as there is understanding between the writer and the reader. It is the desire of the editors to avoid entering into a debate with others on the general subject matter whether this study should have been called a casebook in political warfare, propaganda warfare, international communications, or foreign information, rather than one in psychological warfare.

As the term is employed in this work, psychological warfare may be used interchangeably with many of the others suggested. For purposes of

* See the list of references at the end of this chapter for the names of a few of the books dealing with the subject of psychological warfare and foreign information operations, published during the past decade.

clarity in presentation, however, psychological warfare may be defined as the *planned* use of *propaganda* and *other actions* designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of enemy, neutral, and friendly foreign groups in such a way as to support the accomplishment of national aims and objectives.

The attention of the reader should be directed to the italicized words in this definition. First there is the word *planned*. It is the contention of the editors that for any act to be described as falling within the purview of psychological warfare the action undertaken should have been planned and not the result of some accidental occurrence. To be sure the point may be raised by readers of this casebook that many of the actions described herein were not actually preplanned. This may very well be true, for the intentions of participants of past actions are not always evident to the readers of historical records. This is especially true in the field of psychological warfare, where so much of our past activity has been improvised and inadequately reported.

Because it is not possible in many instances to assess accurately what a planner intended, the editors have taken the position that for purposes of this casebook an undertaking may be described as an act of psychological warfare if the action could have been the result of some prior planning. In this connection it should be pointed out that psychological warfare actions may be, and frequently are, the result of the planning and operational activities of officers and officials who do not look upon themselves as in any way involved in anything that could conceivably be described as psychological warfare. The action of Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson in writing an open letter to Senator Borah in February 1932, described in Chap. 3, is an excellent illustration of this.

Propaganda is the second word in the definition that should be given close scrutiny. Among the many definitions of propaganda, the following will suffice for purposes of this volume. It may be defined as the planned dissemination of news, information, special arguments, and appeals designed to influence the beliefs, thoughts, and actions of a specific group. Propaganda is often classified in accordance with what appears to be its source as either overt (white) or covert (black).

Overt propaganda is that whose true source is clearly acknowledged. Covert propaganda is that which appears to originate from a source other than the true one. Some writers describe still a third class of propaganda — gray, or that which avoids identification either as of friendly or of enemy origin. Still others maintain that gray propaganda is nothing more than poorly disguised covert, or black, propaganda.

A third concept in the definition that should receive the reader's attention is the phrase *other actions*. Acts can, and often appear to, play as important a role in opinion and attitude formation as propaganda. Thus throughout this casebook numerous acts have been characterized as psychological warfare even though they do not involve the use of propaganda.

Psychological warfare activities, as envisaged by the editors of this volume, are not to be identified exclusively as the acts of either military or civilian officials. A psychological warfare planner and/or operator may find himself serving within a civilian agency such as the Department of State, the USIA, or some other nonmilitary establishment, or he or she may be concerned more directly with the more limited military aspects of the use of psychological warfare, in which case he or she may be either a military or civilian official in one of the three military services. Regardless of his organizational affiliation, the operator may be addressing his psychological warfare output to one or more of the following: allied, neutral, or enemy target groups; and the activity may take place either before, during, or after the end of hostilities. Such a scope and definition of psychological warfare implies that this casebook will treat military psychological warfare and cold war or peacetime informational activities as involving similar problems.

In collecting illustrative case material for inclusion in this work psychological warfare operations are viewed as a rational continuous process involving a number of separate and distinct phases, each one of which is thought to be a suitable topic for separate chapter treatment. Chapters 4 to 9 discuss many of these processes in the normal chronological order in which these phases are likely to enter into the propaganda administrator's consciousness. These are, namely, organization and personnel requirements for psychological warfare; policy goals and planning; operational objectives; intelligence support, research, and analyses; media, methods, and techniques; and finally, evaluation of effectiveness.

In addition to these six chapters there are two added preliminary chapters and one final chapter containing selected cases on Soviet uses of psychological warfare. The two preliminary chapters describe the dynamic character of American thought concerning psychological warfare and provide illustrative examples drawn from history of American employment of psychological warfare techniques from the Revolutionary War period to the very eve of World War II. No example of psychological warfare usage in American history for any period more recent than the 1930's is included in Chap. 3 since most of the illustrations given in the later chapters are drawn from World War II and post-World War II experiences.

Casebook Approach to the Study of Psychological Warfare

This volume is not intended as a technical manual in psychological warfare, nor is it intended to provide the uninitiated a complete course of instruction in the subject. Instead it seeks to bring together a number of cases illustrating important aspects and principles of psychological warfare usage. As such it may serve as a training aid and reference volume for policy makers, planners, operators, teachers, and students of the subject. The volume may also be relevant to civilian and military officers who although not primarily responsible for psychological warfare operations may nevertheless come into close contact with psychological warfare operators in the course of their normal duties.

Since this volume employs the casebook approach to psychological warfare, it is necessary to answer the question what do the editors mean by a "case" and on what basis did they select their "cases." A psychological warfare case includes a report of either a specific operation or an entire campaign that is illustrative of a central problem in psychological warfare. The range of problems treated is limited by the outline, which in turn is conditioned by the extent and nature of the editors' experience and contacts with planners and operators who were or are engaged in past or current psychological warfare operations. Materials for this volume were drawn not only from the experiences of US psychological warfare efforts before, during, and after World War II, but also from those of our Allies and enemies.

The editors in undertaking to prepare a work of this magnitude and degree of comprehensiveness faced many difficulties, not the least of which was the inadequacy or unsatisfactory condition of the archival records of the past experience. Few historical, military, or general social science texts, etc., devoted any space to the discussion of propaganda, psychological warfare, or international communications, with the exception of diplomacy, prior to World War II. Few books printed during the war mention the subject. Actually it has only been within the past 5 to 10 years that writers discussing military or international subjects have given sufficient attention to any aspect of this subject to warrant any listings of psychological warfare, propaganda, etc., in the index.

It was only during World War II and afterward that special military units and civilian agencies were provided on a quasi-permanent basis to wage the propaganda battles of the country. Many of those who participated in the activity have had little time to write books and monographs on the subject. Those who have had the opportunity to write books all too frequently have had to rely on the most meager of official documentation.

Psychological warfare units of the past were seldom in a position to prepare well-documented histories or after-action reports of their activities, as was the standard procedure for more orthodox military units. Thus, in preparing material for inclusion in this casebook, widespread use has been made of personal interviews with participant-observers of past operations. Accounts of events and activities, wherever possible and feasible, have been reconstructed from such relevant records and personal memoirs as have been located.

However, it should be pointed out that even documentary reconstruction is difficult since in the speed and pressure of events a great deal of vital information concerning planning and operations never was recorded. In particular it was impossible to gather information on the effectiveness of many psychological warfare campaigns since information on such matters as what happened in response to a particular action all too frequently was never collected and recorded by the personnel involved.

On the other hand, where evidence exists concerning the impact particular actions had on a target, vital data concerning background planning or details of the operational history of a campaign are limited or lacking. Thus, instead of choosing a few campaigns and describing the various chronological phases and factors that influenced the outcome, an altogether desirable goal, the editors set as their objective the description of the crucial aspects of a much wider sample of psychological warfare experience. A crucial problem thought likely to be encountered repeatedly in future actions was the first criterion utilized in selecting cases for inclusion in this volume.

The scarcity of adequate original material complicated the application of the second criterion, namely, that a case should be concrete and detailed in every respect possible. Clearly one of the basic objectives of the casebook is to supply the reader with a "feel" for the realities of a psychological warfare operation, and thus through such means to enrich his experience directly without exposing him to the events themselves.

The collection of material on which to base or to construct many of the cases given in this work required prolonged efforts at documentation. Official histories, classified original documents in archives and record sections, personal memoirs, newspaper accounts, trade, professional and academic journals, and other such materials were exploited. Every reasonable effort was made to check the accuracy of the evidence and the veracity of the conclusions.

In seeking to increase the accuracy of the case material collected and used in this work, individual accounts and draft versions of the over-all manuscript were circulated to personnel known or believed to have been

participant-observers in the actions described. This is believed to have reduced the margin of error, but even here no claim is made that the problems of documentation have been adequately solved.

One of the most difficult problems to resolve in collecting case material was to what degree credence was to be given to first-person accounts, largely taken from memoirs, when there appeared to be an undue expression of optimism, if not outright exaggeration, of the degree of success obtained. Ego involvement in events appears to occasionally lead one to overstate the importance of his own contribution to the outcome of a particular campaign or event. Such accounts are included in this volume.

Some critical reviewers of a draft version of this study proposed that the reader be cautioned concerning the accuracy of certain observations made in particular case studies. After careful deliberation this was not thought to be feasible for reasons stated in the following paragraph.

It would obviously be an impossible task to vouchsafe the complete accuracy of each fact and each conclusion in every case in the volume. To attempt to implement such an objective would obviously involve the editors in censorship operations more dangerous to scholarship than the inclusion of an inadvertent misstatement of fact, no matter how crucial to a particular case.

It should be stated, however, that no hypothetical cases or cases manufactured without a firm basis of known facts have been included in this study. By the same token no case, from whatever source, has been included if the facts given were believed to be lacking in essential accuracy.

Principles Applicable to Psychological Warfare Operations

The selection and preparation of case material was oriented to the objective of emphasizing crucial problems which appear to highlight principles believed to be generally, if not universally, applicable to future psychological warfare operations. It is abundantly clear to the editors that there exists at present no code or set of principles widely accepted as currently applicable. It is likewise clear that current research, as well as current efforts to understand our past experiences, will not of itself produce in the near future a universally recognized body of such principles. In fact extreme care will have to be exercised in order to ascertain whether a set of principles that appear to be evolving will, in fact, be applicable in such new situations as American psychological warfare personnel may in the future have to operate.

The lack of agreement concerning the full contents of a code of principles should not imply that there is a lack of substantial agreement with respect to any one phase of psychological warfare operations. Those who object to the codification and the organization of such knowledge as we now

possess of past psychological warfare operations are probably as greatly in error as those who believe that psychological warfare operations can readily be transformed into an exact science. The task facing publicists in this field is therefore to extend the frontiers of agreement to include the acceptance of such principles as may be generally, even if only tentatively, accepted by the practitioners of the art of psychological warfare operations. The editors of this casebook have not been unaware that they may have chosen cases implying the existence of principles on which there may not now be any full measure of agreement. However, it is thought that the focusing of attention on these aspects of problems and the encouragement of free discussion may induce further research and/or observation, thus in the end permitting an extension of the frontiers of knowledge or areas of agreement on such matters.

In the introduction of each chapter and subsection of the chapters the editors have attempted to present a very brief but accurate summary of the case material that follows. Where it was feasible and appropriate, an attempt was also made to derive and state such principles applicable to psychological warfare operations as the case material suggests.

Daniel Lerner, Daniel Katz, and Wilbur Schramm have each compiled and edited an excellent volume of readings dealing with the general subject of propaganda and psychological warfare, all within the past 5 years.* Every attempt has been made in the present work not to duplicate needlessly any of the material found in their books. A careful examination of the three volumes indicates that each of the three editors operated under one rather serious limitation; i.e., it was necessary for each to tailor the outline of his volume to fit the material unearthed through scholarly excursions in public libraries. With few notable exceptions, it was not possible to extend the limits of discussion far beyond the material already published, either in academic journals or more formal books.

This work varies markedly from the others. Because of this major difference it may have deficiencies and limitations not readily apparent in the others. A reverse procedure was followed in the construction of the outline of this casebook. Before any case material was collected and edited, an outline was made of those aspects of psychological warfare operations believed to be crucial to the success of any campaign or effort. Important elements were discussed, discarded, or adopted for inclusion in a table of contents irrespective of whether or not suitable case material could be located and tailored to illustrate and supplement the outline.

In the task of searching for material to supplement and illustrate the outline it is possible that preoccupation may have caused the editors to

* See the list of references at end of this chapter.

overlook material pertinent to the subject, which if collected and used would have provided valuable extensions to the outline. A more serious difficulty encountered, however, was the inability to locate suitable case material to illustrate certain key problems and conclusions in the original outline.

It is thought that the casebook approach to the study of psychological warfare is especially appropriate at this state of development in the so-called "science of international communications." There is far from a unanimity of view as to what the principles applicable to sound operations are. The editors believe that even if they should overstate a principle or discover later that principles emphasized were reversed in the light of additional experience, the casebook approach would still have considerable validity, for an attempt has been made to identify the central issues involved in various situations in which a future planner or operator may some day find himself.

It is the hope of the editors that prescriptive admonitions, etc., which are implicit in the reproduction of certain material, will not stand in the way of a resourceful operator using his creative imagination and flexibility of mind to find adequate solutions to meet new problems as these arise. It is especially the hope of the editors that they may have produced a study that provides the uninitiated with possible solutions to guide their thinking constructively as they prepare for service in a highly important and growing field of endeavor, since both military and civilian agencies are becoming increasingly concerned with present-day international communications.

Some claim that, since so little knowledge about psychological warfare can be usefully codified at this time, even tentative guiding principles cannot be illustrated by the case-study method. Those who hold to such a point of view seldom voice the next equally logical conclusion that there is little that can be taught about psychological warfare through any other method or approach.

There are also those who object to stating even tentative principles concerning psychological warfare because many appear to be so obvious to the reader. Such a point of view avoids the basic issue. Many of the crucial issues in psychological warfare involve the selection of operational guideposts from what might appear to be two obviously contradictory principles. The line of reasoning that leads to the selection of one rather than the other may be the basic matter. Moreover, it is striking that again where obvious principles ought to have guided action, circumstances prevented their appropriate line of development. Here the issue is how such principles were disregarded. It is the hope of the editors that the

cases included in this volume may shed some light on these questions for the guidance of future planners and operators in the field of foreign information and psychological warfare operations.

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and agencies climbing on the small band wagon. There was quite a boomlet for a while until it was recognized that the top administration had no particular plans for channeling large funds and energies into this field. Psychological warfare then went into one of its recurrent slumps and again became an easy mark for the hatchetmen.

A third difficulty with the term "psychological warfare" is that the logic of the situation leads to responsibilities, action, and requirements beyond the natural connotations of the term, and hence it has to cover too much for precise communication. Thus, while you wish to use communicational means to confuse the enemy and undermine his will to fight, you also wish to use the same kind of capabilities to reassure and strengthen your friends. It is a bit awkward to talk about psychological warfare targets in referring to those you hope will remain your allies.

Now let me assure you the problem is something more than a matter of esthetics and public relations. The natural foci of attention indicated by the term are enemies, and the natural unconscious research tendency is toward a preoccupation with problems of communicating with a resistant target. Unless one is constantly on his guard he may easily neglect the problem of communicating with allegedly friendly targets. I need not remind you that this sometimes requires a great deal of knowledge and skill and is far more than a problem of mere access to mass media channels. Even when we are dealing with a combat target, only a part of the psychological warfare effort is directed toward creating confusion, fear, panic, and similar negative conditions. Quite as much, if not more, effort is made to communicate credible news, to reason with, to persuade, to convince the enemy you regard him as an intelligent reasonable human being who, given half a chance, would clean house and establish a decent government for his country, and so on.

Political Communications — A Suggested Name

To be sure all of this may be trite, obvious, and therefore boring. Nevertheless it suggests the possibility that by giving this rose another name we make it smell a lot sweeter to scientific noses. Furthermore, we can expect the inhalations to stimulate and enrich the scientific imaginations far beyond that evoked by the present label. But now that we propose to give psychological warfare "the deep six" what shall we put in its place? I have no sure-fire, super-concept to unveil at this point, but my own thinking about making more adequate use of social science in this field is greatly facilitated by regarding this area as political communications. I should indeed be surprised and a little disappointed if you could not quickly supply a more efficient designation. But at least it will serve to indicate a direction I believe our thinking might take with some profit. And before you toss this one out as another case of operation mountain and mouse, I might point to some gains, should it prove possible to take seriously the shift in orientation implied and to follow its implications.

1. Quite apart from the stimulus to a broader research perspective, some such term underscores the fact that a large proportion of that which we label psychological warfare falls well within what democratic cultures guarantee as an inalienable right — namely to convince other people that you are right and that they are wrong. Indeed, we are committed to the technique of the free-for-all competition of ideas as a way of crystallizing our opinions on public issues. The kind of reciprocity implied in this concept might well make the Politburo nervous.

2. It places psychology as a contributing discipline instead of sole proprietor and thus relieves it of the burden of an inappropriate role. At the same time, with due

care, we should, I hope, be able to prevent the illusion that the field now belongs to the political scientists, though this might be quite acceptable if that discipline should become more of a behavioral science.

3. It should help to dissipate any remaining implicit assumptions of magic and hocus-pocus.

4. It explicitly includes friends as well as foes, self as well as others as objects of interest and effort.

5. More relevant to our concern for the research implications is the fact that it designates a field which social scientists can get hold of in terms of current theories and methods; and, what is more, they can work at this — mobilizing present knowledge, developing new theory, and doing new basic research without the hampering effects of security regulations.

6. All of this would seem possible and at the same time permit or indeed facilitate the recognition of a substantial residue of operations and attendant research problems which can properly be treated as psychological warfare in a stricter and more precise sense instead of having them confused by the broader operations and problems of political communications. There is potentially, if not actually, a body of doctrine and tactics for the military use of nonlethal weapons of light, sound, smell, taste, as well as of symbolic communication in either white (overt) or black (covert) operations to induce neutralization, defection, and surrender of enemy populations. Special research support of these operations is necessary, and most of it is and should be done under secure conditions just as any weapons research is.

To be sure, war is politics, and moreover today it is total. Thus psychological warfare in the more limited sense in which I have just used it can and probably should be regarded as a special division of a more general area of political communications. Actually there are no sharp boundary lines here. But these considerations should on no account be allowed to obscure my main argument, that under cold war conditions and to a substantial degree under hot war conditions, what has been called psychological warfare is better described as political communications; that the relevant research problems are better structured in that orientation; and that the major tasks of conceptualization and of basic research can better be done outside the handicapping context in which we are now working.

POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE*

By Harold D. Lasswell

Psychological warfare — a new name for an old idea — uses mass communications to destroy the enemy's will to resist. Political warfare covers more than the use of mass communications.

Psychological Warfare is a recent name for an old idea about how to wage successful war. The idea is found in the oldest manuals of military strategy. Sun Tzu's *The Book of War*, written in China in the fifth century B.C., stressed the importance of destroying the enemy's will to fight through such means as surprise and noise. "In night fighting," Sun Tzu wrote, "beacons and drums are largely used; in day fighting, a great number of banners and flags, and the enemy's eyes and ears are confounded." The same aim could be accomplished by spreading tales of the treachery of trusted leaders and of the overwhelming forces at the

*From Daniel Lerner's *Propaganda in War and Crisis*, George W. Stewart, Publisher, Inc., 1951, pp 261–66. Reprinted with permission of Dr. Lasswell and George W. Stewart, Publisher, Inc., the copyright holder.

command of the enemy. *The Book of War* also advised the assassination of enemy leaders in order to create panic. Another suggestion made by Sun Tzu was that a commander should avoid struggle to the bitter end and gain victory at a minimum cost.

Essentially the same guiding principles can be found in the military literature or the prevailing maxims of the ancient empires of India and the Near East. The East Indian political classic, Kautilya's *Arthasastra*, for example, contains advice on how to destroy enemy morale and build up one's own. Secret agents, it suggests, should circulate among the enemy soldiers and spread rumors of their certain defeat. As for one's own forces, "Astrologers and other followers of the king should infuse spirit into the army by pointing out [its] impregnable nature."

The basic idea is that the best success in war is achieved by the destruction of the enemy's will to resist, and with a minimum annihilation of fighting capacity. The political aim is limited destruction. Neither the enemy's armed forces nor the whole population nor the physical facilities should be totally obliterated. On the contrary, the political goals are limited. Usually the purpose is to see that in the enemy country there be installed a leadership that will turn it into an ally, or at least into a non-hostile power.

In the case of our own wars with Germany, at no time was it our serious policy to destroy the whole German people. In World War II, the destruction of German lives and property through bombing was intended to bring the conflict to the quickest possible conclusion. The ultimate object was the substitution for the Nazi regime of leaders and forms of government willing to support the sort of national structure and international order in which we have confidence.

In World War II, strategic air power was clearly not a "psychological" instrument in the same sense that radio broadcasts to the German people were. Yet in war, all strategy and tactics aim at *an economy of means in the accomplishment of its objectives*. How, then, can we distinguish Psychological Warfare from other forms of warfare?

The most distinctive act of Psychological Warfare is this: — *it uses the means of mass communication in order to destroy the enemy's will to fight.* When the old Chinese armies went into battle with an array of musical instruments and a forest of banners to impress the enemy soldiers, they were relying upon the use of means which are ordinarily specialized for the communication of emotion or information. The same was true of the use of tale-bearers to undermine the unity of the enemy by exaggerating the strength of the forces on the other side or by stirring up sedition against the leaders.

Mass communication, it should be stressed, is not exclusively a matter of the word, spoken or printed, or picture. It uses other media also, such as physical acts and material devices. This is notably true of assassination. While the act of killing cannot be considered a conventional method of communication, yet it has been used often to affect political attitudes. *The act of assassination was expected to have an impact upon the intention of the enemy to fight that would be far out of proportion to the physical damage done to his capacity, or to the physical capacity made use of in the killing.* We are looking at the conduct of war in the perspective of psychology when we are seeking to widen the gap between the physical destruction of capabilities on both sides and the magnitude of the impact upon the enemy's intention to resist.

By this time it should be obvious that Psychological Warfare is a reminder of the fundamental conception of all strategy rather than a specific technique. Why, then, do we speak of it at all?

The fact is that fundamental principles of warfare are continually falling into neglect from which it is necessary to rescue them. Generals and admirals are always caught between two opposing tendencies in using their tools of war. One tendency is to magnify the specific importance of the physical and personnel instruments; the other is to subordinate these instruments to a larger plan in which they may be economized, and hence cut down somewhat in apparent importance. This means that men who specialize on ships become devoted to every detail of how the ship can be built, supplied, and handled in war. Artillery specialists are absorbed in the designing, building, and tactical application of guns. Regardless of the physical weapon, or of the personnel devoted to the weapon, there is a vast concentration of understanding and loyalty, the result of which is to magnify the visible role of the weapon in the conduct of war. "Gadget love" is a snare for the unwary in the same way that love of the horse, or the camel, or the elephant appealed to the cavalryman of the past.

A term like Psychological Warfare comes into vogue when circumstances appear to confer some new importance upon economy in the use of physical weapons as a means of destroying the enemy's will to fight. In World War I the word that performed this task was "propaganda." That, too, was not a conception limited to the printing of newspapers or of leaflets for clandestine circulation among enemy soldiers and civilians. There was "propaganda of the deed," a term borrowed from social revolutionaries, which emphasized the importance of assassinating or the taking of emotionally significant cities or the importance of surprise and the cultivation of revolutionary aims against enemy governments.

World War II saw the term Psychological Warfare performing the function that had been performed by propaganda in World War II. The word originated and gained significance in Germany as the Germans who were defeated in World War I began to look into the causes of that "collapse." The experts for the German General Staff believed that they had been bested in the use of the instruments of mass communication (often referred to by the term "propaganda"), and also by the failure to exploit all of their weapons with the maximum impact upon the enemy's will as the chief criterion.

The vogue of the expression "Psychological Warfare" came in part from the rapid expansion of specialized psychologists in Germany, the United States, and in other Western countries. The psychologists wanted "a place in the sun;" that is, they were eager to demonstrate that their skills could be used for the national defense in time of war. Early in the Second World War a group of Americans translated some of the important German literature into English for the purpose of opening the eyes of the military to the usefulness of psychology, not only in testing for specific aptitudes, or in propaganda, but in considering every phase of the conduct of war under modern conditions.

When we say, therefore, that Psychological Warfare is a new name for an old idea, and for an idea that is continually growing dim, we are in no way detracting from the importance of the term. Although the Russians paid little attention to the expression, they were even more completely aware of the essential idea than the Germans. For the leaders of the Soviet Union had seized power largely by

combining propaganda with other acts upon tottering governments and upon discontented masses. The vocabulary of the Soviet leaders did not have to be refreshed by another word for conceptions thoroughly understood and applied.

Actually, the idea of Psychological Warfare is somewhat less comprehensive than other terms with which it is closely linked. The more inclusive conception is that of "political warfare," which covers the use of more than the means of mass communication or the handling of weapons in order to maximize impact upon the will to resist. Political warfare adds the important idea that all instruments of policy need to be properly correlated in the conduct of war.

Diplomacy, for example, can be used to keep potential enemies neutral, or to detach allies from the enemy. Diplomacy may also be used to bring the war to an early end by making secret arrangements with disaffected elements in the enemy country. When we speak of diplomacy, we have in mind the making of official commitments. Whereas mass communication aims at large audiences, diplomacy proceeds by means of official negotiation. Representatives of various powers deal directly with one another. Often diplomacy can be made most effective when it is properly correlated with Psychological Warfare (in the sense of both symbol propaganda and "propaganda of the deed").

Political warfare also includes the use of economic means besides the instruments which have been enumerated above. In order to preclude the use of minerals or other resources by an enemy, available stocks may be purchased in neutral countries. It may be important to coordinate propaganda with these operations in order to gain the tacit cooperation of officials in neutral countries who might otherwise interfere.

In considering Psychological Warfare and other instruments of policy connected with it, it should be kept in mind that they can be employed in peace as in war, with the necessary change of emphasis. The difference between war and peace is not always sharply defined, as is seen by the current "cold war." War can be said to exist when active hostilities are going on between two powers, or when the resumption of hostilities is expected at any moment.

The chief instruments of policy in war and peace are:

Diplomacy
Propaganda
Economics
Arms

In war the emphasis upon arms is of outstanding importance:

Armed Warfare
  Physical Warfare
  Psychological Warfare
Political Warfare
  Diplomatic Warfare
  Propaganda Warfare
  Economic Warfare

Peacefare and warfare are the two patterns which are assumed in the instruments of total policy at all times.

Political warfare thus includes operations in relation to allies, neutrals and the home audience. Psychological Warfare includes propaganda directed against the enemy, together with the use of arms to create the greatest impact upon the enemy's will to fight at the least cost of capability. Enemy intentions are the target.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE REAPPRAISED*

By Roland I. Perusse

"Psychological warfare" and "cold war" are unfortunate terms that should be discarded in favor of more descriptive terminology.

INTRODUCTION

" 'Cold war' and 'psychological warfare' are unfortunate terms. They do not describe the efforts of our nation and our Allies to build a world of peace and freedom. They should be discarded in favor of others that describe our true goals."[21]

This pronouncement, made in June 1953 at the highest level by a group of the nation's foremost authorities in foreign affairs (The President's Committee on International Information Activities), fell like a bombshell on the elaborate structure of "psychological strategy" theory that had been erected during the preceding decade. The result has been a year of rethinking, reappraisal, and reevaluation of the general technique of influencing foreign peoples. This process of reappraisal is by no means complete; indeed, it is and should be a continuing one. However, a number of significant trends and new philosophies have already emerged, and it may be useful at this time to analyze some of the changes that have taken place in psychological warfare theory and practice since the revolutionary pronouncement of a year ago.

THE SETTING

For those to whom the subject of psychological warfare is new or who have been confused by the multitude of popular and professional writing and commentary on the subject in recent years, a brief survey of the evolution of psychological warfare as a force in international relations may be helpful as background for understanding the June 1953 pronouncement and the developments that followed. Especially useful, it seems, is some indication as to just exactly what is meant by the term "psychological warfare," and a brief analysis of developments in this field over the years.

Definitions and Scope

It is absolutely necessary, prior to any discussion or assessment of psychological warfare as an instrument of national policy, to agree on terms of reference. Most of the misunderstandings that have arisen during the past few years as to the proper role of psychological warfare in a democratic society, and as to its capabilities and limitations in helping attain foreign policy objectives, have arisen as a result of confusion over terminology. Interpretations have varied as to the scope of the field covered by psychological warfare and as to the relation of this particular discipline to the other, more firmly established fields of foreign affairs activity and knowledge.

The difficulty of defining psychological warfare can be appreciated from the great variety of terms that have come into common usage to characterize the peculiar international crisis in which the US finds itself today, and the more unconventional policies that have been adopted to meet this crisis. A few of the more common terms are:

1. Cold war
2. War of ideas
3. Struggle for the minds and wills of men

*From an original manuscript previously unpublished, prepared in June 1954. Reproduced with permission of author.

4. War for the minds of men
5. Thought war
6. Ideological warfare
7. Nerve warfare
8. Political warfare
9. International information
10. Overseas information
11. Campaign of truth
12. Propaganda
13. International propaganda
14. Propaganda warfare
15. War of words
16. Indirect aggression
17. Agitation
18. International communication

Some of these terms have actually been used as synonyms for psychological warfare by writers on the subject, as for example, equation of psychological warfare with propaganda.

A further difficulty arises from the fact that generally accepted official usage of the term "psychological warfare," in the US underwent rapid evolution and expansion during the 5 years 1948 to 1953, whereas many nongovernmental specialists clung to narrower definitions. The term is not defined in the dictionary,[1] and meanings vary from expert to expert.

Definitions of psychological warfare vary from narrow usage during World Wars I and II as an adjunct to military force in time of war, to the broad concepts underlying establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board by President Truman in 1951, and President Eisenhower's appointment of C. D. Jackson as his psychological warfare adviser early in 1953.

Perhaps one of the best definitions of military psychological warfare has been formulated by Paul M. A. Linebarger, a pioneer in systematizing knowledge on the subject. In his well-known text, *Psychological Warfare*, published in 1948, (2d ed 1954)[20] Professor Linebarger defines psychological warfare in the narrow sense of "the use of propaganda against an enemy, together with such other operational measures of a military, economic, or political nature as may be required to supplement propaganda."(p 40)[20] Military propaganda he defines in turn as "planned use of any form of communication designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given enemy, neutral, or friendly group for a specific strategic or tactical purpose."(p 39)

It was at about this time that the term "psychological warfare," was borrowed from the military by civilian proponents for a vigorous peacetime overseas information program by the Department of State. In the years 1945 to 1948, the US had undergone a period of psychological disarmament comparable only to the disarmament that had taken place at the same time with respect to conventional weapons and military manpower. It was an act of overcompensation on the part of civilian information specialists that led to the borrowing of this term from the US military vocabulary and, incidentally, to many of the difficulties that ensued. For purposes of definition, "psychological warfare," as "civilianized," came to take on some such

meaning as "the employment of modern media of communications for the purpose of reaching mass audiences in order to persuade them to accept certain beliefs or ideas."(p 6)[22]

It was not long, however, before "psychological warfare" assumed an even more exalted position. In the broad sense, Linebarger had defined psychological warfare as "the application of parts of the science of psychology to further the efforts of political, economic, or military actions." (p 25)[20] Authorities such as Harold D. Lasswell and Edward W. Barrett began to speak of the four arms of US foreign policy (diplomacy, military, economy and propaganda). (p 265)[23] A "psychological strategy board" was established in the US, directly under the National Security Council, top policy organ of our government, for the purpose of coordinating the policies of the Departments of State and Defense and of the Mutual Security Agency for maximum psychological impact abroad.

Finally, psychological warfare was given the meaning of "the struggle for the minds and wills of men" by no less of an authority than President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his famous 8 October 1952 campaign speech in San Francisco. Said General Eisenhower:

> "We must adapt our foreign policy to a 'cold war' strategy that is unified and coherent. . . . In spirit and resolve, we should see in this 'cold war' a chance to gain a victory without casualties, to win a contest that can quite literally save peace. . . ."[24]

Thus, by 1953, psychological warfare had been closely identified with the cold war, i.e., the global struggle between Communism and the Free World. Its supreme status as the governing factor in US foreign policy was exemplified by President Eisenhower's appointment of a personal adviser on psychological warfare matters in the person of C. D. Jackson, publisher of *Fortune* magazine and a "psychological warrior" of renown as Deputy Chief of Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF, during World War II.

Because of the wide variety of meanings that the term has assumed, as well as changes in thinking that have occurred in the past year (discussed in the next section), no attempt will be made to assign a specific definition to the concept of psychological warfare in this paper. Rather, the term will be placed in context each time it is used, so that the reader may know the particular meaning that is intended in each case.

Before dismissing the question of definition, it may be well to refer once more to the 18 terms listed above and to explore their meanings.

The first five terms (cold war, war of ideas, struggle for the minds and wills of men, war for the minds of men, and thought war) are situational; they describe psychological processes in international relations and very dynamic ones indeed. Cold war would seem to encompass the widest field; presumably, cold war is being waged today by all means short of outright mass military offensive action. The other four terms are descriptive of the ideological part of this struggle.

Ideological warfare, nerve warfare, and political warfare can have both situational meanings, i.e., definition of the existing crisis between Communism and the Free World, and a methodological meaning, i.e., description of the techniques being used to meet the crisis. Political warfare is a distinctively British term, used to

convey the idea of co-relation of all instruments of policy (diplomacy, economics, arms, etc.) in time of war. (p 264)[23] It comes closest to the meaning of psychological warfare in the broad sense. Nerve warfare is a more strictly psychological term, and because it entails purposeful heightening of tensions, is usually reserved for operations against an enemy in time of outright hostilities.

The terms "international information" and "overseas information" are applied in the US to the process of distributing facts and knowledge that would help offset misinformation about the US being circulated by hostile groups. Propaganda is defined by Lasswell as "the calculated selection and circulation of symbols with a view to influencing mass behavior."[25] Accordingly, international propaganda can be defined as "the calculated selection and circulation of symbols with a view to influencing mass behavior on controversial *international* issues."[26] Propaganda warfare is merely a more dramatic term for the same process, while war of words would pertain to the selection and circulation of word symbols only.

Indirect aggression is a broad term that embraces concepts of sabotage and subversion as well as the use of information and propaganda for offensive purposes. Agitation is a peculiarly Soviet term, used to describe propaganda conducted among the masses as contrasted to the elite.[27] International communication, aside from its purely technical meaning, is used to characterize *who says what to whom, when, and with what effect* in international relations.[28]

There has been an element of each of the foregoing concepts (depending on the definition of psychological warfare that one accepts) in psychological warfare as waged in the past, and/or psychological warfare has constituted an element of each of the concepts.

Background of Psychological Warfare

Whether considered in the narrow military sense, or in the widest possible strategic sense, psychological warfare, in fact if not in name, has been practiced by man since the earliest records of civilization. Linebarger cites the use of panic by Gideon in his battles against the Midianites about 1245 B.C.(pp 3–5)[20] One of the best-known historical examples is use of the Trojan Horse by the Greeks to capture the city of Troy.[29]

Propaganda was never used on a broad scale, however, until World War I. The first organized effort by the US was the Committee on Public Information (better known as the Creel Committee), which had the sympathetic interest of President Wilson and did an acceptable job from 1917–1919 in rallying morale on the home front and exploiting the Fourteen Points in Europe.[30,31]

The term "psychological warfare," had its origins in World War II. German psychologists, anxious to rationalize Germany's defeat in World War I, seized on the Allied psychological attack as an excuse for the military collapse.(p 264)[23] The Germans proceeded to forge the most terrifying psychological weapons of all time, combining propaganda, fifth-column terrorism, and violence with *blitzkrieg* military action.[32]

The US itself engaged in an extensive program of psychological warfare, principally through the Office of War Information[33] and the Psychological Warfare Division of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Europe (SHAEF). The British program was carried on through three agencies: the Political Warfare Executive, a secret organization for propaganda to enemy and enemy-occupied countries; the Ministry of Information, which dealt with the British public and Allied and neutral countries; and the Overseas Services of the British Broadcasting Corporation, which broadcast to all countries, receiving guidance from the Political Warfare Executive and the Ministry of Information. (p 16)[33] Psychological warfare was recognized and accepted as a military instrument, sharing honors, powers, and responsibilities with the military, economic, and diplomatic agencies of modern war. (p 11)[22]

The period 1945 to 1948 marked the virtual psychological disarmament of the US. The American people and Congress failed to appreciate the menace of Communist propaganda to American security and to grasp the possibilities inherent in the psychological approach. The value of propaganda as a wartime instrument was admitted, but its potentialities as an instrument of national policy during time of peace were not generally recognized. There was wide opposition from US commercial press, radio, and film media, which feared government competition abroad. Many of the most able and skilled personnel in the fields of information and psychological warfare left government service. Their loss was tragic and irreplacable. During this period, the US information program was reduced to little more than educational exchange under the Fulbright Act and cultural exchange with Latin American through the Pan-American Union. The low point was reached in the spring of 1947, when Soviet propaganda was at an all-time postwar high and US world prestige at an all-time postwar low.

The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 (Public Law 402) gave first Congressional authorization for a world-wide US international informational and cultural program in time of peace. US objectives were to be "to promote better understanding of the US in other countries and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the US and other countries." It remains the basic legislation for the conduct of the US information program today.

By 1950 the US had thoroughly awakened to the Soviet threat. There was no longer any disagreement on the need for a program, and President Truman was given a record appropriation of $121,000,000 to carry on a "Campaign of Truth" against Communism.[34] An official peacetime role, in name, was assigned to psychological warfare with the creation of the Interdepartmental Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee in the Department of State.

On 20 June 1951, psychological warfare was placed on an even higher plane with the creation, by Presidential directive, of the Psychological Strategy Board, responsible to the National Security Council, the nation's top policy-making body. Its mission was to plan long-term psychological approaches to the nation's problems and to help influence opinions, attitudes, and behavior abroad in support of national objectives.[35] Regular members were the Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Other agencies, such as the Mutual Security Administration, participated as needed. A representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was principal adviser, and the Board's director was appointed by the President.*,[36]

Dwight D. Eisenhower, as Presidential candidate, gave his views on the scope of psychological warfare in the San Francisco address previously cited:

> "Many people think 'psychological warfare' means just the use of propaganda like the controversial 'Voice of America.' Certainly the use of prop-

* The organization, mission, and operation of the Psychological Strategy Board and related US Agencies in the field of psychological warfare is discussed in a series of articles by Anthony Leviero; included in which is an elaborate chart depicting the entire US national psychological warfare organization as of December 51.[36]

aganda, the written and spoken word, of every means known to transmit ideas, is an essential part of winning other people to your side. But propaganda is not the most important part of this struggle. . . . There are many peaceful tools that must be used through every medium of communication, mutual economic assistance, trade and barter, friendly contacts through travel, and correspondence and sports — these represent some of the political means to support essential programs for mutual military assistance and collective security. . . ."[24]

During the 1952 campaign the Republican party strongly attacked the policy of containment of Communism inaugurated by the Democratic Administration and pledged a "roll-back" of Communist influence and peaceful liberation of peoples enslaved by Soviet Communism.[37]

On 16 February 1953, President Eisenhower appointed C. D. Jackson as his personal adviser on psychological warfare, thereby placing the coordinated direction of psychological factors in US foreign affairs on the highest level of government.

REAPPRAISALS, 1953–1954

One of President Eisenhower's first acts as Chief Executive was to appoint an eight-man committee to study the problem of psychological warfare.[38] Called the President's Committee on International Information Activities, this group, headed by W. H. Jackson, New York attorney, interviewed over 250 witnesses in the 5-month period, 30 January to 30 June 1953.

The committee's startling conclusion has been cited in the introduction to this paper. In addition, the committee had this to say about "psychological strategy":

> ". . . the existing Psychological Strategy Board, established in 1951, does not meet the real need which exists in Government and should be abolished. It is founded on the misconception that "psychological strategy" somehow exists apart from official policies and actions and can be dealt with independently by experts in this field.
>
> "In reality, there is a 'psychological' aspect or implication to every diplomatic, economic or military policy and action. This implication should receive more careful attention, both in the planning and execution stage of policy, but not to the exclusion of other factors.
>
> "Except for propaganda, there are no 'psychological warfare' instruments distinct from traditional instruments of policy. Every significant act of virtually every department and agency of government has its effect, either positively or negatively, in the global struggle for freedom. The important task is to build awareness throughout the entire Government of the impact of day-to-day governmental actions and to coordinate and time such actions so as to derive from them the maximum advantages. . . .
>
> "The primary and overriding purposes of the information program should be to submit evidence to the peoples of other nations that their own aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace are supported and advanced by the objectives and policies of the US.
>
> "The efforts of all media — radio, press, and publications, motion pictures, exchange of persons, and libraries and information centers — should be directed to this end: to show the identity of our goals with those of other peoples. These goals and desires, which we hold in common, must be explained in ways that will cause others to join with us in achieving them.
>
> "In carrying out this purpose, American broadcasts and printed materials should concentrate on objective, factual news reporting, with particular selection and treatment of news designed to present a full exposition of US actions and policies, especially as they affect the particular country addressed.
>
> "The tone and content should be forceful and direct, but a propagandistic note should be avoided. The information services should not, however, be precluded from making forceful and factual refutation of false Soviet accusations. . . .
>
> "New terms are needed (instead of 'psychological warfare' and 'cold war') to express the solidarity of freedom-loving men and women everywhere."[38]

The announcement should not have come as a complete surprise. There had been earlier indications of such trends in thinking about propaganda and psychological warfare. In fact, as early as 1948, Carroll had used practically the same words as did the committee in presenting his views of what the US overseas information objective should be: "American foreign policy will be successful only to the extent that it can convince the peoples that American aims are in harmony with their aspirations for peace and freedom and personal liberty." (p 192)[33]

Edward W. Barrett, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from 1950–1952, had recommended that our information program be persuasive but not propagandistic in tone; that all arguments be supported by facts.[39]

Reports had come in from foreign countries that campaign talk, pro and con, about "psychological warfare," "liberation," and "roll-back" had excited apprehensions abroad.[40] In some places it was feared that President Eisenhower, as a former general, would be overly concerned with military matters; and would want to launch another "Crusade in Europe," dragging the Free World into a needless war.

There had already been at least one bit of evidence of changed practices: President Eisenhower's 16 April 1953 speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. This speech, in which President Eisenhower called for atomic disarmament and use of funds saved thereby for technical assistance to underdeveloped areas, had profound psychological impact in countries around the world. Yet it was not termed "psychological warfare" except by the enemies of the US, who hoped thereby to distort US intentions.

The findings of the W. H. Jackson committee had far-reaching effects on the reorganization of US "psychological" strategy. Presidential Reorganization Plan 8, approved by the 83d Congress, and made effective 1 August 1953, took the overseas information function out of the Department of State and assigned it to a new and autonomous US Information Agency (USIA). The Director of the Agency was made directly responsible to the President through the National Security Council, and he received foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. The information responsibilities of the Foreign Operations Administration and Technical Cooperation Administration were taken over by USIA, although the exchange-of-persons program was left in the Department of State.[41]

President Eisenhower, on recommendation of the National Security Council, issued a directive dated 22 October establishing the basic mission of the Agency as

follows: "To submit evidence of peoples of other nations by means of communication techniques that the objectives and policies of the US are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace."

This mission was to be accomplished by:

1. "Explaining and interpreting to foreign peoples the objectives and policies of the United States Government;
2. "Depicting imaginatively the correlation between US policies and the legitimate aspirations of other peoples of the world;
3. "By unmasking and countering hostile attempts to distort or to frustrate the objectives and policies of the Government of the US;
4. "By delineating those important aspects of the life and culture of the people of the United States which facilitate understanding of the policies and objectives of the Government of the United States."[42]

Under the new mission, the agency was to concentrate on objective, factual news reporting, with appropriate commentaries, designed to present a full exposition of important US actions and policies, especially as they affect individual countries and areas. Tone and content of material was to be forceful and direct, but a strident or antagonistic tone was to be avoided.[43]

At the same time the Psychological Strategy Board was dissolved and an Operations Coordinating Board was established. The function of OCB is to coordinate the broad foreign policy of the US in all its aspects — economic, military, and political — with psychological factors being considered in the formulation of all policies.

On 8 December 1953, President Eisenhower made a second major policy speech in keeping with the new concepts of US "psychological" relations with foreign peoples — the famous "Atom Pool" address before the United Nations. Peoples of the world were quick to identify "their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace" with the President's proposal — so quick, in fact, that the Soviet Union was obliged to reverse its initial position branding the offer a mere propaganda stunt and at least to go through the motions of entering into negotiations with the US on the matter.

On 1 April 1954, C. D. Jackson resigned as the President's adviser on psychological warfare, having played a vital part in formulating new concepts of the place of psychological factors in international relations.* The position, as carried out by Jackson, was not filled, pointing up once more the readjustment that has taken place: psychological factors are no longer considered in isolation and superior to other elements in foreign policy formulation and execution but are considered a vital and integral part of every action.

CONCLUSIONS

The principal lesson to be derived from the reappraisal of psychological warfare that has taken place over the past year is that the term itself had best be avoided in any characterization of either our informational output or our foreign relations generally. The term has decided negative connotations, both at home and abroad, and warfare of all kinds had best be left to the military. It is no exaggeration to say that the US, by announcing to the world that its policies were governed or would be governed by "psychological strategy" and "psychological warfare,"

* C. D. Jackson served as a member of the W. H. Jackson Committee and had a hand in the preparation of both of the President's atomic energy speeches.

raised unnecessary fears among peoples abroad and gave grist to the Communist propaganda claim of US warmongering. On the other hand, Soviet propaganda claiming Communist monopoly of peaceful intentions, though transparently fraudulent as evidenced by Soviet actions in Korea, the United Nations and elsewhere, made headway as a result of the failure of the US to identify itself more fully with the universal desire of mankind for peace.

The term "psychological warfare" never did set well with the American people. Military personnel have always been annoyed at the "theft" of this term by civilians in government. Much confusion resulted from the attempt to transfer the concept from its wartime setting to applications of national strategy in time of peace. Political officers of the Department of State resented what they regarded as invasion of a field that has been traditionally their domain. Many persons in and out of government found it difficult to understand how "psychological warfare" could be conducted in time of peace, particularly against neutrals and friendly countries. Foreign countries, in turn, did not enjoy being the object of any kind of "warfare," especially when initiated by a supposedly friendly power.

All these difficulties arose, of course, either through genuine misunderstandings of the concept of "psychological warfare" by friends of US policy or as a result of purposeful distortions by hostile groups. It did not help to explain to people at home or our friends abroad that psychological warfare meant essentially the taking of psychological factors into consideration in dealing with foreign peoples — an objective that the most vehement of critics could hardly condemn. However, the fact remains that words are words, that people are naturally inclined to consider words first and foremost according to their primary meanings, that we have not always had the opportunity to explain that by "warfare" we have meant "peacefare," and we have necessarily assumed a ridiculous posture (something akin to Communist corruption of word meanings) every time that we have made the attempt. In brief, those in the business of explaining US policies abroad through a judicious choice of word symbols had failed to choose an appropriate word symbol to characterize their own operations. To try to confine the term of official usage, "within the family" of persons who do "appreciate" the "true" meaning of the word, did not help; not only did interpretations vary between experts but official terminology inevitably crept into popular usage.

Abandonment of the term, however, should by no means result in the abandonment of any of the processes involved in what has been known professionally as "psychological warfare." There will always be a need for "psychological intelligence," i.e., the kind of information on foreign societies that anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and area specialists can provide. It will always be necessary to take psychological factors into consideration in shaping policies toward foreign nations. Those persons having specialized knowledge about dealing with foreign populations, whether called "psychological strategists," "psychological operators," "psychological warriors," or just plain cultural anthropologists, social psychologists, or foreign information and area specialists, will always play a vital role in the conduct of foreign policy in this era of popular government. Even the twentieth century dictator makes no pretense at absolute rule; he is anxious to give his government an aura of "popularity" and so keeps his ear tuned to public opinion, if not to be guided by it, then in order to "correct" it where he deems it necessary. It is the duty of persons cognizant of psychological factors to keep diplomats, political and military officers, economic experts, and others who have dealings with foreign peoples and foreign governments informed of the climate

of and changes in public opinion in foreign countries and to let such persons know of the probable public reaction to policies contemplated. In this way, many moves that could cause resentment can be avoided, or if they must be taken, regardless of probable adverse public opinion, because of the other overriding factors, the psychological specialist, if we want to call him that, can offer suggestions as to how effects may be mitigated or cushioned. Such a specialist also has a duty to come up with suggestions for actions that will create favorable public reaction abroad.

Propaganda is another term that is best avoided, again because of negative connotations at home and abroad. Many Americans were shocked when they learned to what extent British propaganda activities in the US during World War I had pushed the US into the war on the Allied side.

Communist world revolutionary propaganda in the US following World War I,[44] together with the activities of Dr. Goebbels and Japanese propagandists, helped reinforce American suspicion and abhorrence of propaganda and propaganda techniques, and to associate propaganda with dictatorship. The use of propaganda by the Communists in the post-World War II period has seemed to confirm the deepest distrust of propaganda and propaganda operations as something basically and intrinsically evil.

It has helped little to point out that propaganda, technically speaking, is essentially a neutral term, that one can have both good and bad propaganda, that the word actually has a religious origin (from propagation of the Catholic faith during Counter Reformation), and that "to propagate" means little more than "to disseminate." (And who is against diffusion of knowledge?) Popular conception has converted "propaganda" from a positive, or essentially neutral, to a negative word, and rather than try to reverse the process, it is better to let the term ride as a proper definition for totalitarian efforts and to characterize the activities of democratic societies as "information." From a strictly academic point of view, the distinction is not valid; but from a practical and public relations point of view, the entire task of dealing with foreign peoples will be made easier if we go along with the tide of public opinion, at home and abroad, and drop the word completely from descriptions of our own efforts.

The expressions, "psychological strategy," "psychological operations," and "target" should also be avoided. US observers can vouch for the discomfiture of foreign peoples at being considered by us as a fitting subject for manipulation in the interest of achieving certain of our strategic objectives vis-à-vis the USSR. The terms, "foreign policy," "foreign relations," and "foreign peoples" have much longer standing and much more positive connotations.

The announced purpose of the US information program (as seeking to show that the objectives and policies of the US are in harmony with and will advance the legitimate aspirations of foreign peoples for freedom, progress, and peace) should offer further suggestions for substitute terminology. It would seem that such terms as "peace," "security," "prosperity," "solidarity," and "cooperation," when properly compounded with such concepts as "mutuality," "reciprocity," and "collective" or "united action," should provide a more fitting description of what we as a nation are striving for in our relations with other countries.

In summary, then, the conduct of foreign affairs today demands identification and consideration of psychological processes in international relations. USIA, having, as its principal objective, identification of US policies with the legitimate aspirations of foreign peoples, must necessarily be able to identify and assess these aspirations. It must know which psychological approach is most likely to achieve

the desired result and to act accordingly. From a strictly professional viewpoint, this is "psychological warfare," pure and simple, as everyone who has engaged in any aspect of such activity will recognize, but for the better chances of its success, it would appear wise not to call it that, but rather, as recommended by the President's Committee, to concentrate on finding other terms that describe our true goals.

THE CREED OF A MODERN PROPAGANDIST*

By W. E. D.

A statement of the views of a leading British propagandist on how and when to employ psychological warfare.

A survey made during 1950 among a limited number of American World War II propagandists resulted in the finding that more of them believed that Richard H. S. Crossman possessed outstanding qualities as a successful propagandist than any other person of their acquaintance. Dick Crossman, as he was known to his World War II colleagues, is a Britisher. He was the Deputy Director of PWD/SHAEF, a prewar Oxford professor, and a postwar Labor Party member of the British House of Commons.

Britishers as well as Americans viewed Crossman as one of the outstanding if not the leading propagandist of World War II. One writer listed his outstanding trait as the possession of an "imagination to see the machinations of the enemy," whereas another American who knew Crossman has pointed to the fact that his strength as a propagandist stemmed from his "intimate knowledge of German and of the German character."

A British colleague of Crossman in World War II, Sir Robert H. Bruce Lockhart, has gone on record as saying that ". . . he has had more experience of the practical application of psychological warfare than probably anybody else in the World. . . . I would say that most, if not all, of what the Americans learned about psychological warfare they learned from Mr. Crossman."

In February 1952 Mr. Crossman addressed the British Royal United Service Institution on the topic of "Psychological Warfare." From this account principles of propaganda have been deduced and are stated below as positive propositions. Most of what follows remains in Crossman's own words, and largely in the order in which he placed them.

1. Many objectives may be sought through the employment of psychological warfare.

   a) ". . . the object of psychological warfare is to do certain things to the enemy: first to demoralize him; secondly, . . . to exdoctrinate him, to undermine his belief in the totalitarian doctrine he has been given; and thirdly, to begin the process of indoctrination.

   b) ". . . on the other side of the enemy lines you have not only the enemy . . . you have also friends who are behind the enemy lines, not because they

*Adapted from "Psychological Warfare," by Richard H. S. Crossman, a lecture presented to the British Royal United Service Institution, reported in *The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, 97: 319–32 (1952). Excerpts reprinted with the permission of Mr. Crossman and the publishers of *The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution.*

are on his side but because they are compelled to serve him. You can assume that they are on your side; your job is first to keep them on your side, and second, to keep them quiet. It is not the job of psychological warfare to organize their resistance; that is the job of other subversive operations. The job of psychological warfare is to keep them quiet until such time as their activities might be useful to us, and not suicidal to them.

c) ". . . in peace-time, the task [of psychological warfare] is extremely limited. . . . It is limited to the job of building up credibility, studying the enemy, getting the organization set up so that, if the day comes for a more positive propaganda, it can be carried out effectively.

"Anybody who believes that it is our job to cause trouble behind the Iron Curtain in a period of peace has learned absolutely nothing from the lessons of war. You have no right to put your friends in danger of death when you will not rescue them in time."

2. There are three stages of a successful psychological warfare campaign against an enemy.

"We went through three stages during the war: first, the defensive stage, when we had not much to say to the Germans except that we were not going to give in; secondly, the offensive stage, when we had sufficient military power for our words to be listened to with some respect; and thirdly, the occupation stage, when the military job was over and the political job began of winning the fruits of war; if we were competent to win them."

3. Psychological warfare possesses important limitations that must be understood by personnel assigned to it.

a) "There is no such thing as operational psychological warfare. Operations must be left to the Services responsible for operations. If psychological warfare gets itself mixed up with, or thinks that it is undertaking, operations, then it will get in the most grievous trouble.

b) ". . . psychological warfare may do more harm than good unless it is strictly coordinated with diplomatic and military activity.

"Almost by mistake, the BBC, in 1941, started the V Campaign — the V sign for victory — and this spread like wildfire over the Continent, which was hoping for a second front. So successful was the campaign that it created the impression in Western Europe that the invasion of Europe was imminent. It created false hopes among our friends; it made many of them do risky things and pay the penalty.

". . . A lot of Frenchmen lost their lives as the result of the elaborate propaganda campaign to suggest that we were going to have a second front in 1943. It was a very cold-blooded attempt by propaganda and other means, physical as well as by propaganda, to make it appear that this was the beginning of the real show. A number of German divisions stayed in the West which would otherwise have moved."

4. The psychological warrior must regard himself as a part of the military organization, and all that he does must be fitted carefully and meticulously into the over-all strategy of the war.

a) "Unfortunately, soldiers, sailors, and airmen usually resort to psychological warfare when they are in a fix and can think of nothing else to do.

b) "Psychological warfare is not an independent arm; it is not something which can do miracles on its own. . . . The greatest mistake of the psychological warrior is to suggest that he has a mysterious substitute for military action, a way out of military difficulties. If the psychological warrior ever 'sells' himself in this way, he has destroyed his profession.

c) "Psychological warfare must remain strictly subordinated to Foreign Office policy and military strategy. . . . It can be successful only if it is the advanced guard of policy which is clearly defined and if it times its activities in relation to existing operations, whether of the Foreign Office or of the Chiefs of Staff."

5. The employment of white or overt propaganda, under ordinary circumstances, is to be preferred over the use of black or covert propaganda.

"Looking back and reflecting a great deal on my job (in World War II) . . . all I would say about the 'black' is that, on the whole although we found [its] activities enormous fun, although a vast amount of talent went into them, although I am sure they entertained the *Gestapo*, I have grave doubts whether 'black' propaganda had an effect in any way commensurate with that of ordinary straightforward propaganda from the enemy to the enemy.

". . . put your best talent on to the 'white' propaganda; do not be diverted into the vastly entertaining and endless delicacies of the 'black' varieties (for which, I must say, soldiers had a strange addiction when they were told anything about them!)."

6. In psychological warfare it is important to select the proper media of dissemination in order to reach desired targets and to accomplish declared objectives.

a) "Radio is an instrument ill adapted for tactical use, because there is no way of preventing people who are not meant to hear it from hearing it.

"By tactical . . . , I mean propaganda addressed to a specific group . . . a division in a predicament . . . an encircled garrison . . . a narrow group of people at high level within, shall we say, the *Gestapo*. . . .

b) "It was discovered . . . that radio was an instrument of strategic propaganda with very few tactical applications. . . .

"By strategic propaganda I mean propaganda which is spread to the whole of the enemy nation. . . .

c) "Radio *can* however be used tactically in dealing with totalitarian countries where radio listening is forbidden, where it is a high privilege to read monitored reports of enemy radio.

"If you want to get a rumor read by important generals, admirals, and air marshals, there is nothing like getting included in a report marked 'secret'. . . .

"A monitored report, typed out and circulated secretly, has a great effect in spreading a particular rumor that you want to spread.

d) "The leaflet is essentially a tactical weapon.

"In the last war we wasted a great deal of paper on strategic leaflets. . . . It was a very wasteful way of getting information to the enemy when the radio could do it much better. I am doubtful therefore whether, in dealing with a large country, strategic leaflets are a very effective form of propaganda.

[In World War II] "the real importance of the leaflet was evolved only when leaflets were dropped tactically on a particular unit to which we wanted to give a particular message.

". . . the drafting of tactical leaflets requires the greatest skill and cannot be left in the hands of the average local commander. He does not know the nuances of the enemy's psychology, and if he drafts the leaflet it will almost certainly be dismissed as propaganda.

"The whole art of the leaflet is to appear as a simple, honorable offer by one honorable soldier to another. . . . The job of [drafting leaflets] . . . is not usually a job for the fighting soldier; he is unlikely to understand the enemy's peculiar psychology, the peculiar sense of honor which each army has and which differs in each army with which one has to deal."

7. In propaganda truth pays.

"It is a complete delusion to think of the brilliant propagandist as being a professional liar. The brilliant propagandist is the man who tells the truth, or that selection of the truth which is requisite for his purpose, and tells it in such a way that the recipient does not think that he is receiving any propaganda.

"The art of the propagandist is never to be thought a propagandist, but seem to be a bluff, simple, honorable enemy who would never think of descending to the level of propaganda."

8. One must hate propaganda to do it well.

". . . in the last war the British did better propaganda than any other nation in the world.

"We British were ashamed of our propaganda and therefore took more trouble to conceal what we were doing.

"The Russians undoubtedly did the *worst* propaganda [during World War II]. The Americans in many ways had the failings of the Russians in the propaganda field.

"The Germans, because they *loved* propaganda could not do it. Lord Haw-Haw was a disaster to the Germans because he was obviously a propagandist. Anybody who listened to his voice knew that he was."

9. The central substance of propaganda is hard, correct information.

"If you give a man the correct information for seven years, he may believe the incorrect information on the first day of the eighth year when it is necessary, from your point of view, that he should do so. Your first job is to build the credibility and the authenticity of your propaganda, and persuade the enemy to trust you although you are his enemy."

10. Many of the techniques employed by journalists and advertisers are not applicable to propaganda operations.

a) [It was a mistake] "to believe that propaganda had something to do with exhortation. . . . Exhorting an enemy to desert stiffens his morale. . . . Nor is it any good pouring out the most moving exhortations to become a democrat because the enemy knows that this comes from the enemy, and writes it off as propaganda.

b) ". . . it is no good giving the enemy soldier the most soothing entertainment . . . do not think that you will buy the enemy with jazz . . . nor with brilliant descriptions of British [or American] culture. The enemy knows enough not to be taken in by that sort of thing.

". . . you must remember that the enemy listener is listening under grave danger of his life. There is risk attached to listening to foreign stations in totalitarian countries . . . propaganda to the enemy, listening under risk and physical inconvenience, has to be as concentrated and as apparently objective, informative, and concise as possible. You must not disguise that it is coming from the enemy.

"We drew our propaganda technicians chiefly from two groups, the advertising profession and the journalists. [Although] they were the most proficient people at the job, each had grave deficiencies.

"The advertiser believed that somehow one could get people to surrender by giving them sales talk. . . . That sort of thing does not work; it is too obvious . . . the usual advertising methods are not efficacious in propaganda and have to be drastically modified.

"The advertiser was correct, however, in one respect; he understood that you have to go on saying the same thing, however boring it is to you.

"The journalist . . . hated the advertiser and his slogans. The journalist said that the thing to do was give hot news, and to make every effort to get the news as hot as possible . . . he forgot [however, that] hot news is a journalists' . . . fiction . . , that it does not matter to the enemy listener whether the news is hot or cold, so long as it is new."

11. The art of propaganda is not telling lies, but rather selecting the truth you require and giving it mixed up with some truths the audience wants to hear.

[In writing news bulletins and news leaflets] "we had to order our journalists (it was agony to them!) to repeat the same news day after day in forms in which it did not look the same. . . . 'News creation' does not mean invention; it means looking through all intelligence reports, looking through all the . . . newspapers and selecting true items from them, . . . [for example] assume that you have been instructed to create the impression that typhus is prevalent in the enemy army. If you see that the fourth item in each news bulletin (not too high up, because if you put it as No. 1 item it is obviously propaganda) is about a case of typhus, . . . if you see that over three weeks the bulletin never lacks one true item about typhus, if . . . your leaflet newspaper [reports] a new case of typhus each day — and if they are all true — then you are doing good psychological warfare. . . .

"The art of propaganda was to make the journalist form his newspaper or his news bulletin or his radio broadcast according to a strict directive which told him the kinds of news he had to use and the weight he had to give each kind. . . . Our leaflet newspapers and radio news-casts had to be designed to keep certain themes *constantly* to the fore, whether or not there was any news about them in the daily newspaper. . . ."

12. The most successful propagandist is the person who cares about education.

"The job of propaganda is not merely to enter into some arid debate with the Government of the other side; it is to stimulate in people of the country thought for themselves, to make them begin to be, not cogs in a machine or units of a collective organization, but individuals. Individualism is the first act of disloyalty to a totalitarian government, and every individual who begins to feel he has a right to have a view is already committing an act of disloyalty. . . ."

13. Effective propaganda requires that intensive and continuous research for means of improving propaganda output be undertaken.

"In leaflets, we concentrated on the famous safe-conduct pass. We spent a vast amount of money on research in getting the color right, Eisenhower's signature right, the language right . . . . We discovered that we could estimate the morale of the German Army by the percentage of prisoners who had put a *Passierschein* into their wallet, because the act of picking it up and putting it away was an act of disloyalty."

14. In good, effective propaganda news must take priority over views, facts over preaching, and — above all — one must avoid threats.

"In 1940 and 1941, the only thing we could do was tell the truth, and we got an immense amount of good will in Germany by admitting defeat. . . .

"From the point of view of psychological warfare, a defeat is a great opportunity, especially if you are skillful and say that your defeat is worse than it is. You must be frank about it, franker than the facts. Then you really begin to gain the enemy's confidence. . . .

"It is easier to tell the truth about defeat than about victory . . . the curious fact is that in retreat you know how much ground you have lost, whereas an advancing army is rarely aware of where it has advanced to. . . .

"The first really big raid on Berlin was a terrible disaster owing to conditions of the air, and a great number of planes were lost. We announced the losses of the RAF before the German *communiqué* came out, and our admission of our losses was larger than the German claim. That was the greatest psychological warfare triumph of the year!"

15. When the enemy is doing well the propagandist may be able to "commit" the enemy beyond his resources.

"When the Germans were advancing into Russia, we said, 'If they cannot reach Kiev in 10 days, then the whole campaign will break down.' We calculated that it would take 12 days for the Germans to get to Kiev, and therefore we said 10 days. When it took 12 days, that represented a defeat or, at any rate, it took the edge off the victory by suggesting that it ought

to have been much bigger. If that sort of thing is done effectively, the people in the enemy country can be made to believe that they have done badly in the middle of the glorious victories."

16. It is necessary to make truth sound believable to the enemy.

[If the BBC home bulletin had been put out] "in German, it would have been written off as flagrant propaganda. . . . Our bulletins in German were the most objective sober bulletins of all that were put out by the BBC. . . we could not afford to be caught in any inaccuracy . . . the German listeners would not swallow anything, because they were on the lookout to prove us liars . . . we had to be 101 per cent accurate. We had to claim less than we actually did. There is nothing more effective than saying that there has been a moderately severe raid on Essen, when 2,000 people have actually been killed. That sort of thing gives the enemy cold shivers.

"All British leaflets were classified as 'secret.' Members of Parliament, if they could have discussed in Parliament what we were saying to the Germans, would have complained that the propaganda organization was 'appeasing' the Germans. It was essential to make the leaflets credible *to a German* — not to the House of Commons!

"You have to eliminate a great many things which are true if the enemy will not believe them to be true."

17. The propagandist, or psychological warrior, must have empathy, not sympathy — he must feel himself into the mind of the enemy.

[At PWD/SHAEF] "we had to establish a very large unit called Psychological Warfare Intelligence. This unit's job was that of studying the enemy's mind.

'I think our propaganda to Russia should be done on the supposition that we are talking to Communists. If you talk to the Russian peasant as though he is your friend and is opposed to the [Soviet] regime, he may patriotically turn off his wireless because he is a *patriot* as well as a peasant.

". . . there were many Germans who did not like the [Nazi] regime, but if you appealed to them as *traitors*, they did not take the propaganda. They were much more content to overhear you talking to a Nazi. If a democrat overheard you scoring off a Nazi he could enjoy it without feeling he was a traitor, whereas if he heard you appealing to him direct, he often switched off his set. . . .

". . . you have to over-estimate the patriotism of the enemy in order to do good propaganda. To treat him as a potential traitor before your armies are actually approaching is to court disaster. . . ."

18. Psychological warfare intelligence is necessary in order to provide a number of required services in addition to that of studying the enemy's mind.

"One ancillary task of Psychological Warfare Intelligence was to remind our leading generals and politicians not to believe our own propaganda. . . .

"Propaganda intelligence has [still] another use. As we studied the enemy's propaganda we were able to deduce from it the directive on which it was

based. From that we could deduce the enemy's estimate of his own civilian and soldier morale . . . it is a perfectly simple job to reconstruct the enemy appreciation and directive week by week.

"The work of psychological warfare intelligence is work which should be done in peace-time as well as in war-time."

19. To be effective, propaganda operations must be related to strategic requirements and prepared where policy and higher military strategy are known.

"For the Ardennes counter-offensive we designed four leaflets for the four stages of the advance. We did the work *while the German offensive was still going on* and got the leaflets dead right, because we were given the advance information as to exactly the lines on which the counter-offensive would go. This means that the propagandists must be in on the inmost secrets of Supreme Headquarters. This is the reason why political warfare was a secret department in Britain. . . .

". . . toward the end of the war we found that actual planning of the propaganda had to be done at AFHQ and SHAEF rather than in London, because that was the only point where both Government policy and the higher strategy was known. It was found that SHAEF had to work upward to Governments and downwards to the armies, instructing them on this integrated propaganda policy, because precise timing in relation to the campaign is the vital thing to the success of this particular job. . . ."

20. The propagandist's task is not to make or to question policy but to operate strictly within the terms laid down by his government.

". . . In April 1944, General Eisenhower, as a result of advice by his psychological warfare staff, sent a paper to President Roosevelt which said, 'We accept the policy of unconditional surrender, but we would like to be able to tell a German general in Normandy how he should surrender if he wants to.' There was a curt message back via Stettinius that politics were to be left to the politicians. As a result, as we now know, generals who wanted to surrender were unable to do so. But we [the propagandists] could not do anything about it.

". . . the demand for unconditional surrender set us, as propagandists, a very difficult problem . . . . [However] the more difficult the problem, the more fun it is to solve it. I doubt whether any propagandists were ever set a tougher problem than to make unconditional surrender attractive to the Germans . . . it postponed the end of the war by a year, because it prevented the military conspiracy of 20th July from being a success. But this had nothing to do with propaganda; it had to do with policy. . . . One must therefore distinguish the policy consequences of unconditional surrender from the propaganda consequences. . . .

"From the point of view of propaganda to German soldiers [the unconditional surrender policy] had one advantage. Germans had been told by Goebbels all about President Wilson and his promises. The policy of unconditional surrender prevented us from making any promises, which would not, in any case, have been believed. . . . We had to tell the truth and to issue instructions. . . . Into instructions [to German civilians] we managed to insert a whole mass of propaganda by referring to the restoration of trade

unions and other things that would happen when Eisenhower came. These things were not said as promises but were given in the form of instructions to civilians facing the advancing, unconquerable general. . . . Our propaganda was the propaganda of command and we tried in the course of it to give the impression that we were decent people, but we did not do this by making promises.

"I do not think from the point of view of propaganda we lost; from the point of view of policy — which is a very different question — we lost a great deal [by unconditional surrender]."

The address given by Mr. Crossman on the occasion of his first visit to the Royal United Service Institution was so enthusiastically received by the members and guests that he was again invited to address the organization a year later, in February, 1953. On the second visit he not only elaborated on the remarks given in February 1952, but extended them to include his views as to the role and limitations on the use of psychological warfare under conditions short of widespread armed hostility. The excerpts reproduced below are taken directly from the printed report of his second lecture.*

"The accurate way of defining our problem is this. *What use should we make of propaganda in a period when the great Powers are pursuing their policies by all means short of a general war — including the means of small local wars?* Or put it another way. How far can we use the techniques and the organization that we employed in a general war, at a time when there is not a general war but only a number of small wars plus a struggle for power?

"*I would suggest to you that the whole idea that in such a period we could use psychological warfare is ruled out straightaway for a very simple reason. There is no agreed policy between the democracies.* We could not have had any psychological warfare during the war unless Britain and America had had an agreed policy. We could not have had what is called a Western democratic psychological warfare offensive as long as the various nations of the West had no agreement on that at which they were aiming.

"Of course, our opponents suffer under no such disadvantage! It is the definition of a totalitarian state that it behaves in periods of peace exactly as though it were at war, and it merely eschews the actual fighting for the reason that it thinks it can do better without it. The fact is that the Russian Communist State not only feels itself to be at war with the rest of the world, but its whole organization, internal and external, is that of a nation at war. Therefore, it has a simple overriding purpose — to win the war. The problem of the Western democracies is that one of their purposes at present is to avoid a war, and another is to win a war if it comes. That means in effect not having one overriding purpose, but two conflicting purposes. You cannot conduct a psychological warfare campaign if, not only between two Powers but inside one large Power, there is not a simple overriding aim but a conflict of aims. . . .

*Excerpts from "Psychological Warfare," by Richard H. S. Crossman, a lecture delivered 18 Feb 53 and reported in *The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, 98: 351–61 (1953), reprinted here with the permission of Mr. Crossman and *The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*.

"May I now, in following up that argument, expose yet another cliché. People talk about working a 'strategy of cold war.' But it is only possible to have a strategy of real war, and the 'strategy of cold war' is a very misleading way of talking about diplomacy and propaganda. It is a grave mistake to talk as though we could evolve a strategy when our aim is to prevent the necessity of having to evolve a strategy. I would suggest that instead of talking about the strategy of cold war, we ought to discuss how to conduct diplomacy and propaganda when the great Powers are not in a general war. In that connection I would put forward two suggestions."

"The first is this. We should never use psychological warfare as a substitute for real war. There is, of course, a great sense of frustration among democracies who have set upon themselves quite artificial limitations in respect of their power to hit the enemy. We all feel it about the problem of Korea, where self-imposed limitations seem to thwart victory.

"But there is one rule we observed in actual war. It was that, when the soldier came to us and said, 'I cannot solve my problem by military means; would you please provide me with a psychological warfare substitute?' we always replied, 'No; I cannot, I will not, I must not.' *Psychological warfare is no substitute for action.* It is, at best, an accompaniment to action, something which slightly accelerates the process of military force or the process of diplomacy. It is not some mysterious trick of its own which can be used when you are prevented from using conventional weapons. Those who deceive themselves that it is merely find themselves involved by their psychological warfare in problems which they never expected. . . .

". . . Clever psychological warfare tricks as a substitute for action against the enemy causes far more alarm than they do behind the enemy lines.

"Now let us turn to an example of what can be achieved by propaganda to cause alarm and despondency in the enemy. In the past eight or nine weeks something has occurred in the Balkans of great importance, the understanding between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. Here is something on which propaganda can get to work. It can put over to the other side a solid achievement of Western democracy. Here is a basis for genuine propaganda. Here is something which we ought to be developing day by day in our radio, the solid achievement of that alliance. . . .

"So far as the use of psychological warfare in the cold war is concerned, I suggest that we should never permit it to negate our strategic aims or to come into conflict with our policy. It is one of the problems of being half at peace and half at war. Let me take Malaya as a hypothetical case. We have in Malaya an area where psychological warfare can and should be applied to demoralize the Chinese Communists, etc. What is very creditable is that the quite legitimate use of psychological warfare in the military campaign has not come into conflict with higher strategic and political requirements.

"An example of where conflict has occurred is in Korea. Here you will find a history of confusion — a confusion of motives, a confusion of departments, and a confusion of policies. I suggest that the trouble has been due to lack of coordination between those in charge of prisoner of war policy, those conducting psychological warfare, and those conducting armistice

negotiations. The United Nations might have found itself in a far stronger position if we had in advance seen the complications which would arise from letting them all go their separate ways without coordinating their activities.

"I cannot help repeating that the psychological warfare warrior is a very dangerous sort of person in a cold war. He must be kept under the closest and severest control by the Foreign Office as regards policy and diplomacy, and by the Chiefs of Staff as regards his conformity with their requirements. He must never be allowed to feel that he is on his own winning his own psychological war, as a substitute for winning the real war. He is not there to win his own war. He is there to assist the Foreign Office in putting over foreign policy and to assist the Army in imposing its will on the enemy. Whenever he does fight a psychological war of his own, he creates chaos, and the greater his success the more difficult it is to sort out the muddle after it has taken place.

Conclusions

"Let me now set down my conclusions. My first is that in a cold war, as in a hot war, the major aim of propaganda is to achieve credibility. Long before you try to demoralize, exdoctrinate or indoctrinate, the first job is to be believed. It is no good having a most brilliant 'agitation' if you are not believed. That is the reason why the BBC is still superior to the Voice of America; it confines itself to telling the truth as accurately as it can and thus makes itself a most valuable weapon.

"To make your news credible in a totalitarian country demands a tremendous effort of imagination. For what is credible in America and Britain when translated literally into Russian is often incredible. It has to be re-expressed in terms the enemy will believe. That is why psychological warfare departments should be secret departments. If I write a leaflet which members of Parliament will describe as good propaganda, it will probably read as such crude 'propaganda' that it raises the morale of the enemy. In order to make it really credible to the enemy it must sound a long way off from what most members of Parliament or Congress regard as the 'good tough stuff' to tell the enemy.

"The credibility which the BBC achieved in the 1939–1945 War remains the biggest factor in the conduct of the cold war. To maintain it will demand the construction of a large propaganda intelligence department. This department must think itself into the mind of the Communist, soaking itself in his phrases and clichés until it writes and thinks them naturally. Those who carry out military intelligence always have the tradition of being on the side of the enemy, and the same applies to the propaganda intelligence officer.

"So the way to carry out good propaganda is never to appear to be carrying it out at all. We discovered this in 1940, when we had nothing else to do but tell the truth because we were being defeated so badly. I remember speaking to an American who was in Berlin in 1940 about the news which was being broadcast about the blitz. He said he turned his radio on to a British home station and heard a voice saying, 'And now I will tell you

about a series of talks which we shall be giving next December on the life of Charlotte Bronte'! The American told me that a little thing like that boosted his morale more than all the propaganda in the world. The British BBC was planning a series of talks on the life of Charlotte Bronte when it was due to be wiped out the following week! That proved that Britain had not been defeated.

"A second instance was when Hitler made his last appeal to reason. I happened to be in the BBC at the time when his speech came over. We were listening to it and I said to the head of the BBC service 'Let us put on a reply after he has finished and start writing it now together.' This we did and, sure enough, after the conclusion of his speech we put out a reply. I fear we had not consulted the Foreign Office or the Chiefs of Staff, but you will discover if you read Bill Shirer's *Berlin Diary* that one of the things that impressed Germany was the fact that Churchill only spent 20 minutes before giving his reply! These are things which really matter in propaganda. For it is a combination of candour, integrity, and sympathy which demoralizes a totalitarian state.

"But you may ask, 'What are we to do about our disagreements with the Americans and the continual rows in British party politics?' Handled successfully, our disagreements and divisions can be a positive asset in a period of cold war. We had much evidence in Germany that the more we explained to the Germans how people could get up and criticize Churchill during the war, the more they drew 'operational' conclusions about what they themselves could not do. One can, in fact, by reporting a bitter controversy in the democratic world (it has to be done skillfully), give an example to the enemy which is highly subversive. We have some evidence from Russia that the high-ups who listen to BBC are fascinated by the picture of a society where free discussion can take place. It is something which they have not themselves. So our own disagreements, when skillfully reported, are a weapon of propaganda against a totalitarian state.

"On the other hand, we must exercise great care in respect to stories which we tell the peoples of totalitarian countries about themselves. Ten good truthful news stories about Russia will be cancelled by one mistake. We found this throughout the war with Germany. If one mistake was made about something which Germans could check, they would write off the rest of our propaganda as lies. Therefore, that which is written about what goes on in an enemy country must not only be checked and double checked for fact, but it must be written in such a way that it sounds credible to the enemy and not to us. This requires a combination of self-restraint and imagination of which very few of us are capable.

"This is yet another reason why in the cold war we should take a great deal of trouble to build up our propaganda intelligence sections. It is possible to obtain more knowledge about the Communists from reading their newspapers, by listening to their radio, and by studying their monitoring, than from millions of pounds spent on secret service agents. A totalitarian is methodical; he acts according to principle and according to a rigid table. We discovered, for instance, during the war that it was valid to deduce from a study of German propaganda the morale report given to Goebbels that week; the output of German home propaganda faithfully reflected the

Germans' study of their home morale. And it was therefore possible, by watching the output, to determine the morale. In a cold war you also need to deduce the mood of the men who are in control on the other side. To understand their actions, taken to placate their public opinion, is of enormous value quite apart from any propaganda you may carry out. As for psychological warfare in the narrow sense, there is plenty of it to do in areas where the war is going on. Areas in which we can experiment are Malaya, Indo-China, and Korea. I hope that considerable sums of money and men of good enough calibre are being used in those areas, testing out the well-tried methods under new conditions and with new types of treatment. But let us in a period of cold war confine psychological warfare to these areas, and let us with regard to the remainder of our propaganda understand that unless we ourselves become totalitarian, it will be impossible to reply to Russia's psychological warfare with anything that corresponds to it. All we can do is to tell the truth, to build up credibility, to understand our purpose, and not to try the kind of technique which can only be used when actual fighting has begun."

PROPAGANDA THEORY OF THE GERMAN NAZIS*

By Hideya Kumata and Wilbur Schramm

In a totalitarian society, propaganda is an accepted additional power weapon to be exploited as the objectives of a movement dictate.

Investigators in a democratic atmosphere tend to view propaganda as a separate entity from the other functions of leadership, even as a function to be rather ashamed of and sometimes hidden. Propaganda action in a totalitarian country, on the other hand, is only an additional power weapon. Its ethics are those of the regime, its methods are shaped by the goals of the movement. Such questions as truth and consistency, often immensely important in democratic studies of propaganda, become relatively unimportant in modern totalitarian propaganda. The criterion in regard to truth is simply whether truth at a given time will further the aims of the movement. The criterion in regard to consistency is whether the output remains congruent with basic philosophy and assumptions.

Propaganda in a totalitarian state is an instrument of social control. In Nazi Germany, as in Soviet Russia, it went through the stage of being used as an aid in gaining control, into the stage of being used for maintaining control. In both these stages it was combined naturally and easily with coercion of many kinds and degrees.

In a totalitarian situation, propaganda and ideology, words and action, are inextricably intertwined. At times it becomes almost impossible to separate propaganda from principles, persuasion from coercion. When one looks at Nazi Germany propaganda, one can argue that the whole Nazi program was a system of propaganda, at which point the term propaganda loses meaning. We shall attempt

* Excerpts from "The Propaganda Theory of the German Nazis," pp 37–49 of a monograph, *Four Working Papers on Propaganda Theory*, prepared for the US Information Agency, by University of Illinois, Urbana, Jan 55. Reproduced with the permission of the authors and USIA.

in this brief résumé of German propaganda theory to limit ourselves to a consideration of the Nazi use of symbols as a weapon. It must be remembered, however, that this is an artifice, adopted to delimit the subject. Actually, Nazi words and Nazi deeds blended together, Nazi diplomacy, military action, organization, and propaganda all merged, under the driving force of the ideology of Nazi socialism.

The total impact of Nazi propaganda in Germany was to create a picture of reality shaped according to the wishes of the leaders of the movement. Monopoly control of the mass media dinned this picture incessantly into the German people. Keckskemeti sums this up by remarking that although public opinion as we understand it cannot exist in totalitarian states, its place is taken by an official image of the world expressed through the media of mass communications. The individual may not believe this image to be true, and indeed often tries to look beyond it, since he sees it as an effort of the bureaucracy to control him. Nevertheless, he usually is forced to accept it, partly for want of something better and partly because of the power he knows stands behind it. In the totalitarian state, both safety and advancement depend upon conformity, and the mass media provide a model to which the individual has to conform. . . .[45]

The way Nazism emerged undoubtedly helped to determine the nature of its propaganda. Hitler came to prominence in a country still hurting from defeat and occupation. Like most other Germans, he felt that Germany had really not been beaten on the field of battle, but by other means. Hadamovsky, in one of the first Nazi books addressed to German intellectuals, gave an official explanation: "The German nation lost the war against the entire world not because of inadequate weapons and the weakness of her soldiers, but because of the bureaucratic sterility of her leading statesmen. The German people were not beaten on the battlefield, but were defeated in the war of words and because their spirit was broken. The Germans were sent into this mighty battle with not so much as a single slogan while the enemy nations took up arms 'against the Hun,' 'for world peace,' and 'for the League of Nations.' In politics, those who are fertile and creative will always win over those who are sterile, bureaucratic, or . . . mere diplomats . . . . Today, every school child knows that we did not merely have to fight a military war, but that we were also exposed to economic warfare, and that the latter, coupled with the weapons of propaganda (psychological warfare) finally caused our downfall."[46] In fact, the Nazis gave the Western Allies rather more credit for their World War I propaganda than the Allies are inclined to give themselves. And it is not surprising that Hitler, when he came to building his own movement, should build into it a large component of ideology (nationalism, the Aryan myth, etc.), slogans, and other devices of symbol warfare. . . .

. . . When the Nazis tried to carry their ideology and slogans to the German people, they found the liberal press and the "undisciplined" radio again standing in their way. They were forced to use and develop to a high perfection the weapon of the mass meeting. From this experience they learned to respect the power of the spoken word. Soon after they came to power they "disciplined" and "organized" the radio. They lectured the liberal press on the "false ideals" of freedom and objectivity, established a national news service to feed the press, established official Nazi papers, restrained other papers by economic or political coercion, did their best to keep anti-Nazi messages from getting to the German people. Thus from the very first, they saw the advantages of controlled and consistent media.

And from the first, as we have been trying to suggest, symbol warfare was integrated with organization and the other power weapons. For a while the symbol

weapon was the only effective one the Nazis had. As they combined it with organization, they became able to use action symbols along with verbal and pictorial ones. They came gradually to have significant fire power, and later the police, economic, and diplomatic power of a national government. The importance of the evolution may not be at once apparent, until one remembers that, to most of the western governments, organized propaganda came last of all the power weapons, and was grafted on — rather unwillingly in many cases. With the Nazis, propaganda was *always* a weapon, trusted and used and integrated with the other weapons in the arsenal.

It may well be, as the British are fond of saying, that the Nazis "loved propaganda" too much to use it well. If so, the reason may be in large part in the origin of the movement, and to the extraordinary success which their combination of coercion and persuasion achieved in post-war Germany.

But let us turn now to some of the principles which the Nazis seem to have developed, from doctrine and trial, to guide their propaganda.

1. The Nature of the People

> *The bulk of society is made up of people whose political knowledge is low and whose political decisions can be controlled. The intellect of the people is such that they act through sentiment and emotion rather than through reason. Issues are seen as black or white and any discussion of shades of gray results in confusion rather than clarification. A movement, by the proper use of coercion and persuasion, can sway people into following it.*

One must necessarily turn to *Mein Kampf* for basic Nazi propaganda theory. There Hitler assesses the public in this fashion, ". . . The political understanding of the great masses is not sufficiently developed for them to arrive at certain general political opinions by themselves and to select suitable persons. What we mean by the word 'public opinion' depends only to the smallest extent on the individual's own experiences or knowledge, and largely on an image, frequently created by a penetrating and persistent sort of so-called 'enlightenment."[47] He further states,

> "The people, in an overwhelming majority, are so feminine in their nature and attitude that their activities and thoughts are motivated less by sober consideration than by feeling and sentiment. This sentiment, however, is not complicated but very simple and complete. There are not many differentiations, but rather a positive or negative; love or hate, right or wrong, truth or lie; but never half this and half that, or partially, etc."(p 237)[47]
>
> "The first foundation for forming authority is always offered by popularity . . . . Any supporter of such an authority . . . must endeavor to improve and to safeguard this authority by creating power. In power, therefore, that means in force, we see the second foundation of all authority. . . . If popularity and force unite, and if thus combined they are able to last over a certain period of time, then an authority on an even more solid basis can arise." (pp 764–65)[47]

There is no reason to believe that Hitler's propagandists did not share his point of view. Goebbels is said to have remarked, "Our propaganda is primitive because the people think primitively." Again, "Masses are unformed stuff. Only in the hands of the political artists do the masses become a people and the people a nation."[48]

Hadamovsky[46] says flatly, "There is no such thing as spontaneous public opinion."(p 53) And again, "the slogan of the freedom of public opinion must be buried without tears" (p 50), but it must be buried skillfully by a combined application of "idea, propaganda, and power."

II. The Purpose of Propaganda

> *Propaganda is an instrument of politics, a power weapon, a device for social control. As such, its purpose is identical with the objectives of the movement. The function of propaganda is not essentially to convert. Rather it functions to attract followers and to keep them in line. Membership is the task of organization. The task of propaganda, given suitable avenues, is to blanket every area of human activity so that the environment of the individual is changed to absorb the movement's world-view. Within Germany, the specific task is to create a political type fashioned after the model of the leader.*

Hitler's conception of propaganda was one based on controlling the reins of government. In *Mein Kampf*, he was quite emphatic about the political nature of propaganda. Goebbels' task, once the Nazis were in power, was to see that this power was maintained.

Hitler was specific in stating the roles assigned to members and followers of the party. The acquisition of members was the duty of the party organization, the attraction of followers was the area of propaganda. He said,

> "Every movement, at first, will have to divide the human material it has won into two great groups: into followers and members. The task of propaganda is to attract followers; the task of organization is to win members." (p 849)[47]
>
> "The first task of propaganda is the winning of people for the future organization; the first task of the organization is the winning of people for the continuation of propaganda. The second task of propaganda is the destruction of the existing condition and the permeation of this condition with the new doctrine, while the second task of the organization must be the fight for power, so that by it it will achieve the final success of the doctrine."(p 851)[47]

Niemeyer remarks on this point by noting that propaganda and organization

> ". . . have essentially the same task, namely to win the hearts and minds of men to a common will representing a common set of convictions. Propaganda plays the role of the general premise, an organization that of the conclusion. Or one might say that propaganda furnishes the building material and organization the structure — or even that the two are like thought and action."[49]

It is interesting to compare with this the Soviet distinction between the functions of "symbol warfare" and of their "organizational weapon. . . ."

Finally, let us quote Goebbels again. Nazi propaganda has no basic methods, he said in a speech; rather, "it has only a goal: the conquest of the masses. Every means which can help to achieve this goal is good. Anything which does not hit the target is bad. Success is its only criterion."[50]

III. Relation of Propaganda to Other Activities of the Movement

> *Propaganda must be based in ideology. Although a valuable weapon, propaganda must not be used alone, but rather in conjunction with other force and action, potential or real. By the same token, actions should be coordinated with propaganda and the psychological effects and implications of every action should be considered.*

Hitler maintained that it is common adherence to a "world view" that makes people capable of achieving power. Propaganda is to achieve the victory of this "world view." Propaganda moves the masses emotionally toward action for political unity and sustains this movement.[49] Hitler wrote, "The greater and the more revolutionary, essentially, an idea is, the more active will its members become, since for its supporters the revolutionary force of the doctrine involves a danger; which appears suitable for keeping off small and cowardly petty bourgeois."(p 853)[47]

The managing director of the Hanse Press wrote, "One may say that no historical revolution has taken place without preparation in the shape of propaganda. The propagandist is the herald and, at the same time, the believer in a great idea."[51]

Two German writers once said, "Propaganda alone is not capable of deciding the war, it is designed to prepare the struggle for success, to support and expand it by making use of clever tricks and ruses."(p 56)[50]

Hitler also did not think that propaganda could stand alone. In most Nazi propaganda, some referrable action was presented. Often this action involved the use of force. Goebbels believed that propaganda must not only be supported by force but that the propaganda content itself should include a tone or an urge to violent action.[52] Hadamovsky wrote that "propaganda and terror are not opposites. Violence, in fact, can be an integral part of propaganda."(p 56)[50]

Hitler said, "The victory of an idea will be the more possible the more extensively propaganda works on people in their entirety and the more exclusive, the stricter, and stiffer the organization is which carries out the fight in practice."(p 850)[47]

Goebbels emphasized the importance of propaganda coordination with other activities. "There must be absolute certainty that words are followed up by corresponding events," he once remarked.[48] In practice, this was a difficult thing to do, especially after mounting German losses. German propaganda was so closely tied with German military success that defeat found propaganda in a difficult position.

From 1935 on, German diplomacy was a peculiar combination of military and political operation in which the Germans applied political, economic, and psychological pressure to accomplish their ends without actual warfare in the conventional sense. But at no time did they apply such pressure without the necessary military force kept in readiness to be sent marching if the objectives could not have been achieved by "peaceful" means.(p 47)[50]

Goebbels was an astute hand at surmising the propaganda effect of action. He was not able to coordinate action and propaganda in all instances but made every attempt to do so. He wrote in his diary, "The gentlemen of the Foreign Office busy themselves a lot with propaganda, but have no faculty whatsoever for calculating psychological effects in advance."(p 204)[48] Again, "I believe that when a propaganda ministry is created, all matters affecting propaganda, news, and culture within the Reich and within occupied areas must be subordinated to it."(p 476)[48]

The largest of the sections in the Propaganda Ministry was the Propaganda Coordination Division. There, campaigns were planned to get full effect of timing and to ensure combined propaganda operations.[53]

The fields into which Goebbels extended himself can be surmised from the following excerpt:

> "Embarrassing consequences have resulted from the irresponsible and unpsychological publication of various court decisions. Hereafter I am having all court verdicts of any national importance released jointly by the Ministry of Justice and ourselves. Our courthouse reporters don't have the necessary feel for selecting and publishing verdicts according to psychological considerations."(p 122)[48]

IV. Organization and Control of Propaganda

> *Control of propaganda activities will be centralized under one responsible authority. The propaganda function will be considered as of equal importance with any other government function, and propagandists must be given access to all information and plans of other agencies. Propaganda opportunities will be exploited by the propaganda agency; no other agency should be allowed independent action in this area. Only dedicated and trusted members of the movement, who are also technically competent, will fill propaganda jobs of responsibility. Monopoly control of all media of mass communication within the movement's zone of influence must be accomplished. These include music, art, theater, architecture, books, tourist trade, fairs, exhibitions, and schools, as well as the usual channels. If possible, however, control of communications will be exercised in such a way as not to give an impression of direct manipulation.*

The first week after the Nazis gained power, Hitler got a decree signed by Hindenburg creating a Propaganda Ministry. Under this plan, one man — Josef Goebbels — became the director of all propaganda. As a government minister he was subordinate to no one except Hitler. Thus Goebbels became all-powerful in the three propaganda organizations, the Propaganda Ministry, the Party Propaganda Department and the Reich Chamber of Culture. As head of each of these organs, he was responsible only to Hitler.

The place of Goebbels as the third ranking Nazi meant that his ministry was a powerful force in government. At times it seemed as if the whole German government operated as a subdivision of the ministry. Policies were carried out or discarded, depending on their propagandistic effect. The power of the ministry was the result, not only of Goebbels' direct access to Hitler, but also of knowledge of plans of other government agencies. Goebbels' diary has numerous instances of his manipulation of plans of others. At one point he wrote, "With Gutterer I discuss our tactics with reference to other ministries. I consider it my duty not only to keep my own Ministry in order, but also to proceed generally against the defeatism prevalent in Berlin Government quarters." At a later date, "I am wondering whether I ought not to send Party comrades as observers into the various courts so that they may quietly inform me and enable me to take measures against verdicts that do not correspond to the times."(pp 35, 127)[48]

Confidential and secret reports from other agencies flowed into the ministry. The Propaganda Ministry kept close touch upon the war situation and was fully informed about unfavorable as well as favorable events. The state of public opinion was determined not only by the reports of the various branches of the Propaganda

Ministry but through such agencies as the SD, the security service of the Gestapo, which undertook opinion surveys. Besides these sources, regular intelligence agencies fed basic material to the ministry. Some of the organizations undertaking this work were: the Institute of Political Geography, Bureau Ribbentrop, Foundation of German Activities Abroad, German Academy, Working-Community of Geopolitics, German Academic Exchange Service.(p 50)[50]

The Propaganda Ministry tried to put into effect the principle of sole control of propaganda, but was not wholly successful. At one time, however, the Propaganda Ministry had control of propaganda in diplomacy. Goebbels succeeded in placing propaganda attaches under the control of the Propaganda Ministry into every foreign post. In minor posts, where diplomatic experience and skill were not considered necessary, the minister was the propaganda attache and most likely a propaganda trained rather than a diplomatically trained individual.(p 115)[54] Other agencies of government came to use the propaganda ministry as the vehicle for their publicity. These powers were handed over officially to the propaganda ministry soon after its establishment.

Goebbels organized his Ministry on the basis of a nucleus of elite propagandists. He picked these from among Nazi party propagandists who had proven their ability during the earlier days of struggle. Into purely administrative posts were put experienced civil servants.(p 81)[55] The reason for this can be seen in Goebbels' attitude. In a speech at the Sports Palace he said, "As we National Socialists are convinced that we are right we cannot tolerate anyone besides us who claims he is right too. For if he also is right he must be a National Socialist, but if he is no National Socialist he can't be right."[55] He himself was a fanatic adherent. After a meeting with Hitler, he wrote, "Up in the sky a cloud takes the shape of a swastika. A flickering light shines in the heavens. . . . These days have shown me the way and the direction. . . . Now my last doubts have vanished. Germany shall live. Heil Hitler!"(p 32)[54]

The Propaganda Ministry maintained a political college, *Hochschule für Politik*, to train propagandists. The ministry also took over the German Institute for International Affairs and made it into a training school for Nazis to be assigned abroad.[56] Some idea of the type of training may be seen in the schooling of speakers. Their training was split into ideological and technical parts and the syllabus with which each student had to be familiar included such works as *Mein Kampf*, Rosenberg's *Nature, Principles and Aims of National Socialism*, Goebbels' *Kampf um Berlin*, a book on racial theory by Guenther. The final examination was held before a jury composed of representatives from the Propaganda department, Office of Ideological Training and the Party Training College.(pp 43–44)[53]

The Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, as soon as it was set up, wrested control of all propaganda outlets from other government departments. The divisions of the Ministry are testimony to the extent of control: Foreign, Troops, Entertainment, Film, Music, Theater, Fine Arts, Literature, Broadcasting, Home Press, Foreign Press, and Tourist Traffic plus a Propaganda Coordination division. In addition, Goebbels was head of the Party Propaganda Department and later became president of the Reich Chamber of Culture. This Chamber was created to control the producers of output and was divided into seven parts. These seven parts corresponded to professional guilds of artists and intellectual workers.

The Propaganda Ministry made no overt moves, however, to take over any additional outlets of communications except the radio system which was govern-

ment owned from before. The newspapers and magazines were left in the hands of their former owners, although some periodicals were purchased by the Nazi Party and became Party organs. The main pressure toward a uniform output was exerted through tight control of the sources of information. Since all publicity for the government was handled through the Propaganda Ministry, that became the only place where one could get information. Censorship was applied by a thinly veiled threat of punishment and reprisal. The newspaper editor and the film maker could make public items unfavorable to the regime, but the spectre of the concentration camp and possible confiscation of their enterprises kept these people in line.

The Reich Chamber of Culture provided the necessary pressure in the arts. Since one had to belong to the Chamber if he were in the artistic or intellectual field, the Chamber instead of the Ministry could whip members into line.

The threat of extinction of independent information outlets was great, however. Any newspaper could be eliminated on the basis of its being "unsound competition." Publishers and their wives had to prove Aryan descent back to 1800. This too was made to appear not as a government measure but as a rank and file movement of newspaper readers.[57]

A great deal of Hadamovsky's authoritative *Propaganda und Nationale Macht*[56] is given over to a discussion of how to attain the constant reiteration of "correct" slogans and interpretations which the Nazis insisted upon. He calls for a maximum use of "public organizations, cooperatives, and associations" which may "superficially appear to be complicated, but which in reality only conform to the diverse conditions of life. Their own official propaganda pursues strictly and to the point the aims essential for the life of the whole nation, and the executive power of the state renders impossible any active or passive attempt to cross these aims." (p 54)[56] The message of these organizations will be reinforced by a monopoly of the mass media, and by the full cooperation of the schools. German schools, he said, must abandon their "homage to the principle of liberalism and individualism. . . . In future, the general tasks of nationalist propaganda [must] include the determination of the substantive content of educational institutions," insofar as it pertains to anything political.(p 226)[56] He warns the media of the consequences of failing to cooperate fully with the movement: "If our intellectual elite will *voluntarily* place itself in the service of our nation's mission with passion and devotion, there will be no need to curtail the freedom of the press through censorship or legislation. It will suffice to make it legally possible for the professional associations . . . to purge the undesirable elements of their profession and put a stop to their activities."(pp 186–87)[56]

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Chapter 3

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN AMERICAN HISTORY

The idea that the employment of psychological warfare by the US, either in connection with regular peacetime international relations, or wartime military and diplomatic operations, is a comparatively recent innovation rests on a misunderstanding of the character of psychological warfare and American history. American historical experience from the days of Tom Paine and the Revolutionary War Committees of Correspondence to the very present is replete with examples of American usage of what is today called "psychological warfare." This fact is not too well understood by the great majority of the American people.

As recently as 14 February 1953 a leading American daily newspaper in one of its editorials described psychological warfare as "antithetical to the American way of life" and characterized many of the techniques of psychological warfare as having "been lifted out of the box of tricks in the totalitarian arsenal." The inference was given that its employment today was not consonant with either the past experience or the present-day interests of the nation.

Any objective view of American history and psychological warfare should lead one to the inescapable conclusion that the only thing relatively new about psychological warfare is its name. It is true that the term did not gain currency until World War II and even then much of the activity of military and civilian planners and operators active in the field of propaganda and psychological warfare took place within agencies bearing such innocuous titles as: Coordinator of Information (COI); Office of Strategic Services (OSS); Office of War Information (OWI); and Special Studies Group (SSG) of the War Department General Staff.

It was only in the field and during the course of actual military operations in World War II that the term "psychological warfare" attained a sufficiently high degree of respectability to come into common usage. Thus, there came into being during World War II psychological warfare sections (PWS), psychological warfare divisions (PWD), and psychological warfare branches (PWB), in various military theater headquarters or subordinate

military echelons, depending on the status of the activity in the echelon concerned, and its place in the scheme of things in the minds of the military commanders involved.

Although the name "psychological warfare" is of comparatively recent origin, it does not follow that the US is without experience in its usage. In fact the very document that was to declare the nation's independence as a free state, the Declaration of Independence, was a propaganda document. It was not the document that gave the nation its freedom, but rather the victories of the colonial soldiers on such battlefields as Saratoga and Yorktown.

Although it is true that the Declaration of Independence announced the birth of the nation and laid down a political philosophy that was to become a dynamic force in the entire Western World for the century and one-half that followed, one should not lose sight of the fact that among the reasons given by its authors for its promulgation none appears to be more significant than the statement that "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that . . . [we] should declare the causes which impel . . . [us] to" separate from Great Britain.

On the field of battle between the British and Colonial forces that both preceded and followed the promulgation of the Declaration of Independence, in point of time, there are numerous instances known where psychological warfare practices were attempted with varying degrees of success. Douglas Southall Freeman in his definitive biography of George Washington[1] described a technique utilized by Washington's men to confuse the enemy and to create discontent in their ranks. This

> ". . . was to tie to a rock and then to throw to the redcoats a strip of paper that had been printed to this effect:
>
> | Prospect Hill | Bunker Hill |
> |---|---|
> | I Seven Dollars a Month | I Three pence a day |
> | II Fresh Provisions and in plenty | II Rotten salt pork |
> | III Health | III The Scurvy |
> | IV Freedom, ease, affluence and a good farm | IV Slavery, beggary and want."[1] |

The illustrative examples of the use of psychological warfare in American history that are reproduced in this chapter are included in order to combat the widespread erroneous impression that it is only in recent decades that psychological warfare has been employed to support the achievement of diplomatic, political, and military objectives.

In most of the cases reproduced the individuals involved in the activity described did not believe they were engaged in any sinister or unethical

action. However in the light of our present-day understanding of psychological warfare and from the descriptions gleaned from the historical records of particular objectives sought in the separate cases, it is clear that today the various actions described might well fall under the purview of psychological warfare agencies or advisers assigned the task of coordinating the nation's activity in such fields as diplomatic negotiations, military operations, and economic and political discussions with foreign groups and heads of foreign states.

Eight articles or illustrative case histories, covering American experience from the Revolutionary War period to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese Controversy in 1931 are reproduced in this chapter as representative of American historical experience in psychological warfare. Each case was chosen not alone because of its intrinsic interest, but in addition because it contained some common element crucial for an understanding of the nature of psychological warfare. In every case included in this chapter there is ample evidence that the planners of the action deliberately sought to influence the attitudes and the behavior of one or more target groups in certain desired ways. All cases stress important lessons for those who are interested in widening their knowledge of how to conduct psychological warfare more effectively.

Three of the eight case histories illustrate the employment of psychological warfare by military commands in purely tactical situations. Three may be said to be illustrative of the use of psychological warfare in times of conflict to influence both political and military decisions and thus lead to an end of the conflict. One case history describes the dispatch of the US fleet in 1907–1909 on a world cruise. This case study is included as an example of a series of coordinated acts, other than propaganda, employed as a means of deterring a would-be aggressor from making additional warlike gestures.

The eighth and last case study included in this chapter describes the use of a psychological warfare technique to motivate members of at least five separate target groups. This study describes how a letter written by Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson to Senator Borah, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was released to the general public for the specific purpose of dramatizing the issues of an international conflict in such a way as to stir not alone the American public to action but in addition a number of unnamed foreign addressees: the League of Nations Assembly and the government and peoples of China, Japan, and Great Britain. In drafting the message for one of the groups it was very necessary that the implied message to this group not be canceled out by the implied message to any of the others. Thus great care had to be given to the preparation of the letter.

The account of the Emancipation Proclamation and the 1907–1909 world cruise of the US fleet are other excellent examples of well-planned actions designed to reach more than one specific target group. Several of the case histories illustrate the importance of detailed target analysis, proper timing, and coordination with other services and with events of the day.

Two case histories — "The Jefferson-Franklin Plan to Cause Hessian Desertions" and "Sisson's Account of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points" — illustrate the ever-present requirement for high-level political support if success is to be attained in major psychological warfare ventures. The American Continental Congress in the first instance and the President of the US, who was the recognized political leader of the Allies in World War I, in the second instance, gave this support. Thus, operators on the spot were able to take bold and aggressive propaganda action.

One case — "Psychological Warfare in the Mexican War" — is quite short, and yet it is of sufficient length to illustrate the value of detailed target analysis of the group addressed and the desirability of pinpointing a propaganda assault against known grievances of the foe. The case should also be of interest to those who might have thought that successful appeals for US troop surrenders were first made during the Korean conflict.

The case history of "The Propaganda of the Confederacy" is an abridgement of a chapter appearing in Burton J. Hendrick's *Statesmen of the Lost Cause.*[22] It describes in considerable detail the backgrounds, training, personal characteristics, and problems that faced two Confederate political agents sent to Europe during the Civil War to win French and British support to the Southern cause. The study of the activities of the two agents provides an interesting comparison of personalities, which in the one instance seemed to make for success, and in the other, for failure. In addition, this case history eloquently illustrates the principle that with an unpopular cause to espouse, in this case human slavery, there are limitations to what may be accomplished through the use of propaganda and other forms of psychological warfare.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN 1776: THE JEFFERSON-FRANKLIN PLAN TO CAUSE HESSIAN DESERTIONS*

By Lyman H. Butterfield

Psychological warfare in the form of appealing handbills was instrumental in causing German mercenaries to desert from the British army during the revolutionary war.

From Kew on November 12, 1775, at "2 min. past 7 P.M.," George III addressed Lord North a note saying he had "no objection to the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel

*From *Proceedings of American Philosophical Society*, 94: 233–41 (1950). Reproduced with permission of Dr. Butterfield and the editor of the *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society.*

and the Duke of Brunswick being addressed for troops to serve in America."[3] This was a perfectly natural and even routine decision for His Majesty. The British government had long been accustomed to hiring manpower to fight its wars, and George III's relatives in Germany were accustomed to renting out their troops in order to pay their own debts. But it was a fateful decision, and one fraught with ironies that were apparent as soon as it became known. A few decades earlier the King's own progenitors had been instrumental in sending over whole shiploads of Germans to America — the Palatine redemptioners who settled in New York Province and later elsewhere. Captain James Luttrell, a member of the Whig opposition who had spent some years in America, did not fail to remind ministers of both the danger and the irony of their policy when the treaties with the German princelings were presented for ratification. He named over some of the prosperous German settlements scattered through New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. He did not doubt that the mercenaries about to be sent over to America would enjoy the prospect of settling there, nor did he doubt that inducements would be held out to them to do so. In short, he concluded, "These warlike transports we are to fit out may, then, be considered as good as the Palatine ships for peopling America with Germans." (No. 6, p 283) [45]

The treaties were ratified; the ministers and their royal master breathed with relief, for they were glad to get troops even at the exorbitant prices demanded; and the unfortunate subjects of all this chaffering moved toward northern ports amid difficulties that would have discouraged less avaricious men than their several sovereigns. Thanks to Ralph Izard, Arthur Lee, and other informants in England, news of these events reached America with extraordinary speed *, [6] And it had a profound effect. As early as January 19, 1776, Edward Shippen reported that in Philadelphia, as a result of rumors about the hiring of mercenaries, "Conversions (to the patriot party) have been more rapid than ever under Mr. Whitefield," and that even Mr. Dickinson had been heard to say that he saw no alternative but independence or slavery.[7] The Philadelphia patriots began writing to England that the sending of the mercenaries was really a stroke favoring America, "because we know that the Germans . . . will find it much more preferable for their present comfortable subsistence, as well as a prospect of future happy settlement, to join us."[8, 9] General Washington himself was persuaded likewise. On May 11 he asked President Hancock whether it might not

> ". . . be advisable and good policy, to raise some Companies of our Germans to send among (the mercenaries), when they arrive, for exciting a spirit of disaffection and desertion? If a few trusty, sensible fellows could get with them, I should think they would have great weight and influence with the common Soldiery, who certainly have no enmity toward us, having received no Injury, nor cause of Quarrell from us." (No. 5, p 36)[10]

* On September 8, 1775, Ralph Izard wrote from Weymouth, England, to Thomas Lynch in South Carolina: "The Prince of Hesse, is now in London. I am of opinion that German troops, will be sent to America in the spring. Proper rewards offered to them, would probably, draw them to you. Give my compliments to Dr. Franklin and consult him on this subject. The leading people, among the Germans of Pennsylvania, should likewise be consulted." (No. 1, pp 124–25)[6] Izard told his son in June, 1774, that "The Treaty with the Germans, was the Bill of Divorce between Great Britain and America," and that he had predicted to the British ministers that it would be. (No. 1, p 304)[6]

On the other hand, rumors filled the papers all spring about the enormous numbers of hired troops on their way and the extraordinary skill and ferocity of the Germans as soldiers. The Jagers, it was said, were "amazingly expert" in marksmanship, for they were trained especially to shoot boars in the forests of the German princelings.[11] Was it going to be possible to appeal to the better instincts of these professional killers, or was it not? That remained to be seen.

Authentic news arrived early in May through one George Merchant, who had marched with Arnold to Quebec, had been captured there, taken to England, and then returned to Halifax. Soon afterwards he escaped south and brought with him, sewn in the waistband of his breeches, copies of the British contracts with Brunswick, Hesse-Cassel, and Hesse-Hanau for the total of some 17,000 troops.[12, 13] (No. 5, p 56–57)[10] Congress ordered the treaties published; the citizenry read them and felt a proper indignation at the terms of these bargains in human flesh. Franklin read them on his return trip from Canada and wrote his fellow commissioners, still in Canada: "The German Auxiliaries are certainly coming. It is our Business to prevent their Returning."[14] Franklin's indignation, deep and lasting, eventually produced his celebrated letter on the sale of the Hessians, a hoax so successful that it still deceives twentieth-century readers. (No. 7, p 27–29)[14], *, [15] The direct connection between the hiring of the Germans and American independence is clear. When the Virginia Convention resolved on May 15 to instruct its delegates in Congress to move for independence, it recited among the causes for its action "the aid of foreign troops engaged to assist (the) destructive purposes" of the British king.[16] One of the Virginia delegates in Congress was chosen, as it turned out, to write the paper that declared America independent. Thomas Jefferson did not fail to include among the crimes of George III that "he is, at this time, transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of cruelty and perfidy." The King's routine decision of last November had borne bitter fruit.

Congress on May 21 had read the papers brought by George Merchant and had appointed John Adams, William Livingston, Thomas Jefferson, R. H. Lee, and Roger Sherman a committee "to extract and publish the treaties; . . . to consider of an adequate reward for the person who brought the intelligence; and to prepare an address to the foreign mercenaries who are coming to invade America."(No. 4, p 369)[17] The committee performed two of its assignments, but did not complete the third. One of the members — it might have been any one of them, but it is thought to have been most likely Jefferson — asked George Wythe, who was not a member of the committee, to draft the proposed address. Wythe complied, and his draft is still among Jefferson's papers in the Library of Congress. It was a production very characteristic of Wythe, and, from our point of view, at least, an eloquent appeal. No one knows how well it might have served its purpose for it was never used. It reads:

> "The delegates of the thirteen united colonies of America to the officers and soldiers of. . . .

* Though not included in Ford's *Franklin Bibliography*,[15] this pretended letter from Count von Schaumburg to the Hessian Commander in America, lamenting that the Hessian losses at Trenton were not still greater than they actually were, has long been accepted as Franklin's and is of a piece with other literary-political hoaxes known to be by him. . . . In Germany the letter became known as "Der Uriasbrief" and was learnedly refuted and discredited every few years during the nineteenth century.

"It is with no small pleasure, when in this first address we ever made to you we must call you the enemies, that we can affirm you to be unprovoked enemies. We have not invaded your country, slaughtered wounded or captivated your parents, children, or kinsfolk, burned, plundered, or desolated your towns and villages, wasted your farms and cottages, spoiled you of your goods, or annoyed your trade. On the contrary, all your countrymen who dwell among us, were received as friends, and treated as brethren, participating equally with our selves of all our rights, franchises, and privileges. We have not aided ambitious princes and potentates in subjugating you. We should glory being instrumental in the deliverance of mankind from bondage and oppression. What then induced you to join in this quarrel with our foes, strangers to you, unconnected with you, and at so great a distance from both you and us? Do you think the cause you are engaged in just on your side? To decide that we might safely appeal to the judicious and impartial — but we have appealed to the righteous judge of all the earth, inspired with humble confidence and well-grounded hopes, that the lord of hosts will fight our battles, whilst we are vindicating that inheritance we own ourselves indebted to his bounty alone for [sic]. Were you compelled by your sovereigns to undertake the bloody work of butchering your unoffending fellow-creatures? Disdain the inhuman office, disgraceful to the soldier. Did lust of conquest prompt you? The victory, unattainable by you if heaven war not against us, which we know of no good reason you have to expect, or we to dread, shall cost you more than the benefits derived from it will be equivalent to; since it will be disputed by those who are resolved inflexibly to live no longer than they can enjoy the liberty you are hired to rob them of, and who are conscious of a dignity of character, which a contempt of every danger threatening the loss of that blessing seldom fails to accompany. Were you tempted by the prospect of exchanging the land you left for happier regions, for a land of plenty and abhorrent of despotism? We wish this may be your motive; because we have the means, and want not inclination, to gratify your desires, if they be not hostile, without loss to ourselves, perhaps with less expense, certainly with more honour and with more advantage to you than victory can promise. Numberless Germans and other foreigners, settled in this country, will testify this truth. To give you farther assurance of it, we have resolved.

"Mistake not this for an expedient suggested by fear. In military virtue we doubt not Americans will prove themselves to be second to none; their numbers exceed you and your confederates; in resources they now do or soon will abound. Neither suppose that we would seduce you to a treacherous defection. If you have been persuaded to believe that it is your duty, or will be your interest to assist those who prepare, in vain we trust, to destroy us; go on; and, when you shall fall into our hands, and experience less severity of punishment than ruffians, and savages deserve, attribute it to that lenity, which is never separate from magnanimity. But if, exercising your own judgments, you have spirit enough to assert that freedom which all men are born to, associate yourselves with those who desire, and think they are able to secure it, with all the blessings of peace, to you and your posterity."(No. 1, p 146)[18]

On the day that independence was voted, General Howe arrived from Halifax at Staten Island with a formidable army which, during the next several weeks, was repeatedly reinforced. Against expected British forays along the Jersey coast Washington had worked out with Congress a plan of defense which was given the picturesque name of "the flying camp." An amateur outfit clear through, the flying camp was made up of recruits drawn from a citizenry half thrilled and half terrified by the prospect of a war in its own front yard. The recruits marched and the supply wagons rumbled through the Jerseys to an encampment at Perth Amboy, hardly more than a hundred yards across the narrow sound that separates the foot of Staten Island from the mainland.*, [19, 20] Here the young Pennsylvanians from Bucks, Delaware, and Chester counties could see the British transports arriving in Lower New York Bay and could exchange pot shots with the men cantoned opposite them. On August 12 a British fleet of 107 sail arrived and began unloading troops, among whom were the long-expected Hessians, seven or eight thousand in number.[21] No doubt for the purpose of giving the Americans a good view of them, the Hessians were ordered within a week to take post at Amboy Ferry, immediately across from the American camp.[22]

Now was the time if ever, to see whether the hired troops would be glad to throw down their arms if given a chance to do so. On August 9 Congress resolved

> "That a committee of three be appointed, to devise a plan for encouraging the Hessians, and other foreigners, employed by the King of Great Britain, and sent to America for the purpose of subjugating these states, to quit that iniquitous service: The members chosen, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Jefferson, and Mr. Stockton."(No. 5, p 640)[17]

The committee reported on August 14. Curiously, no copy of the report can be found in either the Papers of the Continental Congress, where it belongs, or in Jefferson's papers, where drafts of scores of committee reports he prepared or assisted in preparing are preserved. In the form of a resolve of Congress it was, however, spread on the Journal and read as follows:

> "Whereas it has been the wise policy of these states to extend the protection of their laws to all those who should settle among them, of whatever nation or religion they might be, and to admit them to a participation of the benefits of civil and religious freedom; and the benevolence of this practice, as well as its salutary effects, have rendered it worthy of being continued in future times.
>
> "And whereas, his Britannic majesty, in order to destroy our freedom and happiness, has commenced against us a cruel and unprovoked war; and, unable to engage Britons sufficient to execute his sanguinary measures, has applied for aid to certain foreign princes, who are in the habit of selling the blood of their people for money, and from them has procured and transported hither considerable numbers of foreigners.
>
> "And it is conceived, that such foreigners, if apprised of the practice of these states, would chuse to accept of lands, liberty, safety and a communion of good laws, and mild government, in a country where many of their friends and relations are already happily settled, rather than continue exposed to the toils and dangers of a long and bloody war, waged against a people, guilty of no other crime, than that of refusing to exchange freedom for slavery; and that they will do this the more especially when they reflect, that after they shall have violated every Christian and moral precept, by invading, and attempting to destroy, those who have never injured them or their country, their only reward, if they escape death and captivity, will be a return to the despotism of their prince, to be by him again sold to do the drudgery of some other enemy to the rights of mankind.
>
> "And whereas, the parliament of Great Britain have thought fit, by a late act, not merely to invite our troops to desert our service, but to direct a compulsion of our people, taken at sea, to serve against their country!
>
> "*Resolved*, Therefore, that these states, will receive all such foreigners who shall leave the armies of his Britannic majesty in America, and shall chuse to become members of any of these states; that they shall be protected in the free exercise of their respective religions, and be invested with the rights, privileges and immunities of natives, as established by the laws of these states; and, moreover, that this Congress will provide, for every such person, 50 acres of unappropriated lands in some of these states, to be held by him and his heirs in absolute property."(No. 5, p 653–55)[17]

There is no proof that this paper came from Jefferson's hand, but the style is perfectly characteristic of him; and, as we shall see, it was he who drew the very similar appeal to the Hessian officers ordered by Congress two weeks later. These are good reasons for assigning the authorship to Jefferson, and there are no good reasons to assign it to any other person. Congress thought it a business-like performance and directed the same committee, augmented by Dr. Franklin, "to take proper measures to have it communicated to the foreign troops." Copies were sent promptly to General Washington at New York, and Washington wrote President Hancock two days later: "The Resolution . . . respecting the Foreign Troops, I am persuaded would produce Salutary Effects, If it can be properly circulated among them; I fear it will be a matter of difficulty: — However I will take every measure that shall appear probable to facilitate the end." (No. 10, p 450–51)[10] Next day he asked for, and received, more copies. . . . (No. 10, p 463–64)[10]

By August 26 Washington was able to announce with satisfaction that "The Papers designed for the foreign Troops, have been put into several Channels, in order that they might be conveyed to them, and from the Information I had yesterday, I have reason to believe many have fallen into their hands." (No. 5, p 491)[10] Washington's "Channels" are not known, but one of them was almost certainly Christopher Ludwick, one of the most engaging adventurers of the eighteenth century. Ludwick was a native of Hesse-Darmstadt, had fought against the Turks, and was shortly to become "Baker General" of the Continental army.[23] Early in August he had volunteered his services gratis as baker to the flying camp at Amboy.[20] He, if anyone, would have heard of the proposal to suborn the Hessians, and he was in fact summoned to Headquarters by Washington on August 18. Moreover, an account of Ludwick's extraordinary career by a contemporary (Benjamin Rush) records the following incident:

> "From a desire to extend the blessings of liberty and independence to his German countrymen, he once exposed his neck to the most imminent danger. He went, with the consent of the commanding officer of the flying camp, among that part of the British army, which was composed of Hessian

* An interesting journal was kept by Captain Benjamin Loxley.[20] For some strictures by a professional soldier on the flying camp see Butterfield's article.[19]

troops; while they were encamped on Staten Island, in the character of a deserter. He opened to them the difference between the privileges and manner of life of an American freeman, and those of a Hessian slave. He gave them the most captivating descriptions of the affluence and independence of their former countrymen in the German counties of Pennsylvania. His exertions were not in vain. They were followed by the gradual desertion of many hundred soldiers, who, now in comfortable freeholds or on valuable farms, with numerous descendents, bless the name of Christopher Ludwick. He escaped from the Hessian camp, without detection or suspicion."[24]

Rush knew or remembered nothing of the address from Congress to the mercenary troops, and perhaps he applied some gilding to the incident here related. But nothing is more plausible than that Ludwick, at Washington's request, performed such a mission in order to convey the handbills prepared by Congress to those for whom they were meant.

Meanwhile in Philadelphia Benjamin Franklin, who had been added to the committee to oversee the distribution of the address, had had a characteristically ingenious idea. On the twenty-fourth he wrote Thomas McKean, then serving as colonel with the volunteer forces at Amboy:

"I heard your letter read in Congress relating to the Disposition of the German Troops; and understanding from Col. Ross that they are canton'd on the Island opposite to the Jersey Shore. I send you herewith some of the Resolutions of the Congress translated into their Language, as possibly you may find some Opportunity of conveying them over the Water, to those People. Some of the Papers have Tobacco Marks on the Back, it being suppos'd by the Committee, that if a little Tobacco were put up in each as the Tobacconists used to do, and a Quantity made to fall into the hands of that Soldiery, by being put into a Drift Canoe among some other little Things, it would be divided among them as Plunder before the Officers could know the Contents of the Paper and prevent it." (No. 2, p 59–60)[25]

No copy of the German handbill bearing Franklin's "Tobacco Marks" has been found. In fact, for some time it seemed as if no copy of any sort could be found, for none has so far been located in the Papers of the Continental Congress, in the voluminous papers left by Washington, Jefferson, Gates, and Franklin, or in the broadside collections of a dozen major American libraries specializing in Revolutionary materials. The copy reproduced here is in the German State Archives for the District of Cassel at Marburg.[26] The Director reports that this copy of the handbill was presumably enclosed (though not mentioned) in a letter from Lieutenant General von Heister to the Landgrave himself, dated September 3, 1776. It was later pasted on a mounting sheet, from which it has now been removed so that back as well as front could be photographed. The back is blank.

At Amboy a Colonel James Wilson (there were nearly as many colonels as privates in the flying camp), who is not to be confused with the Pennsylvania "singer" and member of the committee of August 9, saw some of the German handbills and was convinced they would have powerful effects. Writing Hancock on the twenty-second, Wilson expressed surprise that so good a scheme was not applied more widely: "Perhaps it is not yet too late to offer additional rewards to

officers in proportion to their rank and pay." (No. 1, p 1110)[5] Congress acted immediately on the suggestion. A new committee, consisting of Jefferson, Franklin, and John Adams, was appointed on the twenty-sixth. These gentlemen were used to collaborating, and the case was urgent. On the very next day they reported a resolution in the form of an address to the foreign officers serving with the British, and it was promptly adopted. (No. 5, p 705–08)[17] Their report is not in the Continental Congress Papers, but a draft of it, in Jefferson's hand, is in the Jefferson Papers in the Library of Congress, together with a partial draft, which was rejected by the committee, in the hand of John Adams*, (No. 5, p 655)[17], (No. 2, p 299)[18] Jefferson's draft reads as follows:

Aug 27 1776

"The Congress proceeding to take into further consideration the expediency of inviting from the service of his Britannic majesty such foreigners as by the compulsive authority of their prince may have been engaged therein and sent higher for the purpose of waging war against these states, and expecting that the enlightened minds of the officers having command in those foreign corps will feel more sensibly the cogency of the principles urged in our resolution of the 14th, instant, principles which being derived from the unalterable laws of god and nature cannot be superseded by any human authority or engagement, and willing to tender to them also, as they had before done to the soldiery of their corps a participation of the blessings of peace, liberty, property and mild government, on their relinquishing the disgraceful office on which they have been sent hither. Resolved that they will give to all such of the said foreign officers as shall leave the armies of his Britannic majesty in America and chuse to become citizens of these states, unappropriated lands in the following quantities and proportions to them and their heirs in absolute dominion. To a colonel 1000 acres, to a Lt. Col. 800 as. to a Major 600 as. to a Captain 400 as. to an Ensign 200 as. to every noncommissioned officer 100 as. and to every other officer (or) person employed in the sd. foreign corps and whose office or emploiment is (not) here specifically named, lands in the like proportion to their rank or pay in the said corps: & moreover that where any officers shall bring with them a number of the sd. foreign soldiers, this Congress, besides the lands before promised to the sd. officers and soldiers, will give to such officers further rewards proportioned to the numbers they shall bring over & suited to the nature of their wants. Provided that

* It is printed in the Ford edition of the journals[17] but is there wrongly associated with the address of August 14 to the private soldiers. It reads:

"Whereas it is probable, that among the officers of the foreign Troops, now in the Service of the King of Great Britain, there may be many, of liberal Minds, possessed of just Sentiments of the Rights of human Nature and the inestimable Value of Freedom; who may be prompted by the Feelings of Humanity, and a just Indignation at the disgraceful service to which they are devoted by an infamous Contract between two arbitrary Sovereigns and at the Insult offered to them by compelling them to war against an innocent People, who never offended them, nor the Nation to which they belong, but are only contending for their just Rights; to renounce so dishonourable a service. Therefore

"Resolved that all such officers who shall abandon the service"

such foreign officers or soldiers shall come over from the sd. service before these offers be recalled, (or within after such)." (No. 2, p 298)[18]

The address to the officers was translated into German and printed overnight. (The report as submitted was doubtless used as printer's copy, just as had apparently happened in the case of a more famous collaborative effort of these three men — the Declaration of Independence. Haste thus accounts for the absence of the committee's manuscript from the official files.) On August 28, Franklin sent to Gates in New York a letter covering a packet of "both sorts" of handbills (for private soldiers and for officers), so that, "if you find it practicable, you may convey them among the Germans that shall come against you." (No. 1, p 1193)[5] Washington acknowledged this further move by Congress in a letter to Hancock of the twenty-ninth. He said — a little ruefully, for the battle of Long Island had occurred in the interval — "As to the Encouragement to the Hessian Officers, I wish it may have the desired effect, perhaps it might have been better, had the offer been made sooner."*, [27] (No. 5, p 496)[10]

What were the results of this Jeffersonian eloquence, these Franklinian devices? What effect did the handbills have upon the mercenaries for whom they were intended? They had very little effect at first, and for reasons easily understood. For one thing, not many reached their marks. The Hessians' own diaries and letters so far as they have been printed, do not mention them; and the historians who have used the pertinent manuscript sources scarcely mention the incident. One of the first Hessian prisoners, a private soldier named Christian Guiler captured on Staten Island, deposed on October 16, 1776, that "they [the hired troops] saw no papers of any kind among them from us; if they knew that they would be well treated by us, would all lay down their arms; have no desire to return to their regiment again." (No. 2, p 1073–74)[5] General Mercer, commandant of the flying camp, forwarded Guiler's testimony to Washington, to whom no doubt it proved heartening. But the British command had been shrewd enough to put the mercenary soldiers to work as soon as they arrived. The battle of Long Island took place within a few days after the last of the foreign troops had disembarked. It was the biggest battle that had yet been fought in North America, and the result was nearly disastrous for Washington's raw army. By the same token it must have been very satisfying to the Hessians since war was their business. The Americans had a much more serious desertion problem in the fall of 1776 than the Hessians did.

An "Extract of a letter from Fort Lee," dated November 14, 1776, and printed in the Philadelphia newspapers, contains the earliest mention of a Hessian deserter I have seen:[28]

> "This morning a Hessian soldier deserted to Fort Washington, the very first that has done so — He encourages us to hope that many of his countrymen will follow his example, as soon as they are assured the Americans will not hang them for meddling in the present war; a notion that has been so industriously planted, and is (so) firmly rooted, that it will be difficult to eradicate it."

* No copy of the handbill addressed to the officers has been found. Edward J. Lowell states that there is a manuscript copy in one of the Hessian regimental journals in the State archives at Cassel.

This suggests that the British had indoctrinated the mercenary troops against expected American propaganda, and not without effect.*,[29] But all such indoctrination was bound to evaporate as the war continued and as the British met reverses — especially those reverses which resulted in the capture of German troops, as at Trenton and Saratoga. The American leaders took full advantage of these circumstances. The first Hessians captured in the fighting around New York were put under the care of their compatriot Ludwick, who showed them in Philadelphia and the country round about how Germans lived in the New World. President Hancock wrote Washington on November 16, 1776, proposing an early exchange of these prisoners. "They have been treated in such a Manner during their Stay in this City," he observed, "that it is apprehended, their going back among their Countrymen, will be attended with some good Consequences." † (No. 2, p 153, No. 2, p 399)[25] After the action at Trenton, Washington ordered the separation of officers and men among the captives, so that the privates especially, "may have such principles instilled into them during their Confinement, that when they return, they may open the Eyes of their Countrymen, who have not the most cordial Affection for their English fellow Soldiers."(No. 6, p 453, 464)[10]

There can be no question about the effectiveness of this policy. Though widely scattered, there is abundant evidence to show that large numbers of the German auxiliaries deserted during periods of captivity at Bethlehem, Lancaster, Carlisle, and Charlottesville. Their names appear on the rolls of state regiments, on tax lists, and sometimes as schoolmasters or clergymen, usually accompanied by the rubric "Hessian" (which may mean anything from an Anspacher to a Waldecker). ‡

* On this point there is a very revealing passage in the diary of the Reverend Henry Melchior Muhlenberg, himself an immigrant from Germany, under date of 8 November 1776:

> "Several Hessians were brought to Philadelphia as prisoners. One of them happened to meet an inhabitant who was his aunt. The aunt asked him what had made him come here to do violence to his own flesh and blood. He replied that he had been torn out of bed, away from his wife and children, and forced into the service. Others were asked why they had fought so violently against the Americans in the battle of Long Island and treated the wounded so pitilessly. Answer: The English officers had told them that the Americans were savage cannibals, especially those who were shaggily clad, whom they must exterminate first of all if they were not to be tortured and eaten alive by them. This was therefore a minor stratagem of war; for the American chasseurs or sharpshooters, who shoot with rifles and are called *riflemen*, have a peculiar form of dress, much like that of the savage Indians, shaggy like the pictures of fauns and satyrs, and most of them are enlisted nativeborn men of English and German extraction."[29]

† It was reported that a Hessian band composed of captives taken at Trenton played at the celebration of the first anniversary of the Declaration of Independence in Philadelphia.

‡ It is an interesting fact that during the invasion of Virginia by British forces, accompanied by German mercenaries, early in 1781, Governor Thomas Jefferson thought it worth while to renew the offer of 50 acres of land tendered by the Continental Congress to the Hessian private soldiers in 1776, "further promising to all such foreigners who shall leave the armies of his Britannic majesty while in this state and repair forthwith to me at this place, that they shall receive from this Commonwealth a further donation of two cows, and an exemption during the present war from all taxes for the support thereof and from all militia and military service."[18]

(No. 4, p 505–06)[18], (No. 1, p 354–55)[30] Most of these men were inconspicuous and doubtless preferred to remain so, but a remarkable case is that of Friedrich Valentine Melsheimer, chaplain of a Brunswick regiment, who preferred to quit the service rather than to be exchanged and who became a Lutheran pastor at Manheim and Hanover, first Professor of Languages at Franklin College in Lancaster, a writer of authoritative works on American etomology, and a member of the American Philosophical Society.*[, 31, 32] There were 785 desertions among the German Convention Troops alone between the surrender at Saratoga in October, 1777, and August 1, 1779.[33] The German princelings hired out about 30,000 troops to their British colleague and relative George III during the American Revolution. Of these, between 17,000 and 18,000 returned to Germany. Among the more than 12,000 lost, somewhat more than half may be accounted for by death from combat or illness. Between 5,000 and 6,000 must therefore have deserted. (No. 1, p 356)[30] These are old figures and contain elements of conjecture, but there is no reason to doubt that they are approximately correct.†[, 34, 35] They suggest one of the reasons why the British failed in America: George III's decision to employ mercenaries was a bad one; and both the Germans who came and the Americans who received them capitalized on his error.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE MEXICAN WAR‡

By Marshall Andrews

The Mexicans' appeals for desertions from the American Army on religious grounds met with a sufficient measure of success for them to form the San Patricio Battalion.

Psychological Warfare, as we now understand it, was employed with marked effect by the Mexican Government in the Mexican War of 1846–1848.

Early in 1846, several months before the declaration of war on 13 May, the Mexican authorities had issued proclamations addressed to US soldiers of foreign birth, particularly Irish Catholics, offering 320 acres of land to privates who would desert and enter Mexico. These efforts, General Zachary Taylor reported on 6 April, "have met with considerable success." Up to the time of Taylor's report, four men had been drowned attempting to swim the Rio Grande and two had been shot by pickets. Nevertheless, at least 30 men made their way across the river to form the nucleus of what was to become the San Patricio Battalion of US deserters in the Mexican Army.

The most fruitful appeal, however, was on religious grounds and the very great majority of deserters to Mexico were Irishmen who had become convinced by Mexican propaganda that they were on the wrong side in a religious war. Another factor that encouraged desertion, and strengthened Mexican propaganda, was the

* Dr. Whitfield J. Bell, Jr., has collected data on individual deserters and has kindly allowed me to consult his notes.

† There has been no recent study of the German mercenaries in the Revolution, and there never has been one of desertion among them.[34] Such a study if it were to analyze the relations between the mercenary troops and their officers, between the German and the British troops, and between the Germans and the American troops and citizenry, would be of great value. An important new source for such a study has become available in the Von Jungkenn Papers now in the William L. Clements Library.[25]

‡Original text prepared for this volume.

treatment of soldiers in the US Army of that day. A Scottish soldier in the Regular Army wrote 5 years after the war that "various degrading modes of punishment, often inflicted by young, headstrong, and inconsiderate officers, in their zeal for the discipline of the service, [were inflicted] for the most trivial offenses. . . ."

There is no firm record of the ultimate strength of the San Patricio Battalion, but its existence and its fighting quality were well known throughout the US Army. Most of the heavy loss in storming the fort at Churubusco 20 August 1847 was attributed to the skill and desperation with which the Mexican guns were served by members of the San Patricio Battalion.

At Churubusco 69 members of that battalion were captured. A dozen of these prisoners (including their ringleader, a man named Riley) who had deserted before the declaration of war, were flogged and branded on the cheek with a "D." Sixteen were hanged at San Angel 9 September, and four at Mixcoac 10 September. Thirty more were hanged 13 September while Chapultepec was being stormed and in sight of the battle, having been "let live long enough to see the flag raised on the castle," according to the *American Star*, published in Mexico City by two American civilians.

THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

By M. J.

The Proclamation was addressed to several specific target groups and its public release was so timed as to produce the greatest possible reaction among the several audiences.

The Emancipation Proclamation of 1862–1863 was one of the most significant political warfare instruments in American military history, to be compared only with the Declaration of Independence issued at the beginning of the American Revolution. Probably no other American propaganda document had been so long contemplated before being issued. Certainly no other document had its contents more scrupulously planned, nor its timing more carefully considered.

Lincoln's remarkable qualities as judge of political and psychological situations were nowhere better demonstrated than in the course of his deliberations on the advisability of proclaiming the emancipation of the slaves during the Civil War. The record of these deliberations seems to show that in spite of the demands of the abolitionists in the North and Lincoln's own distaste for slavery as an institution, he was finally brought to issue the Emancipation Proclamation at the time he did, and in the form he gave it, by military considerations alone. The famous attack upon Lincoln made in 1862 by the abolitionist editor, Horace Greeley, accused him of indifference to Northern hatred of slavery. To this, Lincoln replied by explaining that his policy was based entirely on pragmatic considerations, that he was interested, first of all, in winning the war and suppressing the rebellion:

> "My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery. . . I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. . . .

> "I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free."(p 158)[36]

"Audiences" of the Proclamation

Lincoln considered a decree emancipating the slaves to be a plan that could have the most diverse consequences for the progress of the war, depending on what psychological effects it had on each of several different groups. Important reactions to such a decree could be anticipated from at least six major "audiences":

(1) The white population of the Confederate states was an audience that would probably react in a way prejudicial to the success of the Union cause. A proclamation emancipating the slaves would most likely strengthen the determination of this group to prosecute the war against the North. On the other hand, such a proclamation might materially lessen their power to wage war if it had certain effects on other groups. For instance, should the proclamation actually have the effect of freeing large numbers of slaves, or in leading large numbers of them to believe that freedom would be the ultimate outcome of the war, then the basis of Southern resistance, the principal root of the war, would be weakened greatly. By achieving this, Lincoln hoped that he might "deprive the disaffected leaders of all hope of winning over the more northern slave states. So to deprive them, he thought, would substantially end the rebellion."(p 164)[36] Thus, the reaction of this first group depended in part of the reaction of a second group.

(2) The slave population of the Southern states was also an important target audience for the proclamation. So great was the hope that proclaiming the emancipation would bring large numbers of ex-slaves to the ranks of the Union armies that three Union generals had already proclaimed emancipation of the enemy's slaves in their theater without prior authorization from the President. This had been done partly in the hope of gaining new recruits to the Union armies and partly in the hope of disrupting enemy forces. Not only might the Negroes, directly supporting the armies of the South, be a vulnerable target for emancipation thereby deserting to the Union side, but it was also hoped that the civilian Southern Negroes on farms and plantations might slacken their efforts or even desert their masters if Lincoln declared them to be free. On the other hand, Lincoln was inclined to believe that even if they did desert en masse there were many problems yet to solve. ". . . supposing they did throw themselves upon us in large numbers, what should we do with them? How could we 'feed and care for such a multitude?' " (p 156)[36]

Moreover if, as Lincoln suspected was the case, the white masters had full control over their slave populations, the edict certainly could not be enforced by the Union armies until they had succeeded by arms in actually conquering the Southern territory. In that case, the proclamation might seem ridiculous. The President made this argument in resisting some of the proemancipation advice given him: "What good would a proclamation of emancipation from me do. . .? I do not want to issue a document that the whole world will see must . . . be inoperative like the Pope's bull against the comet."(p 156)[36]

(3) Still a third group, from which significant reactions to emancipation might be anticipated, was the white population in the slave states still on the side of the North — more commonly known as the "border" states. This sector of public opinion (in Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri) might well feel so

threatened by a Presidential decree proclaiming emancipation of slaves in the Confederacy that it would itself go over to the side of the South as a result of it. Lincoln said of the proclamation he was urged to make: "I would do it if I were not afraid that half the officers would fling down their arms and three more States would rise." (p 153)[36]

Randall thought that this consideration was a major one in Lincoln's calculations on the advisability of emancipation: "Especially he emphasized the importance of fifty thousand Union bayonets from the border slave states; if in consequence of a proclamation they should go over to the enemy, it would be a very serious matter."(p 157)[36]

(4) A fourth group was composed of Northern abolitionists — a group that might be expected to react favorably toward an emancipation proclamation thereby furthering the Union cause. This group was, perhaps, the most politically influential and articulate one in the North. The continual criticism by members of this group, aimed at the Commander-in-Chief for his caution, destroyed the unity of Union supporters and harassed the President by making difficult his relations with his colleagues in the administration and the Congress. It was expected that the morale of the abolitionists would be greatly heightened if the war were openly declared to be a "crusade against slavery."

(5) Although an emancipation might silence the abolitionists and heighten their morale, it might also alienate many Northerners, especially Democrats, who were opposed to challenging Southern slavery. Lincoln, himself, had been elected on a Republican platform that declared its opposition to any interference with the property claims of the South. Lincoln had "sold" the war to many Northerners on the simple basis that it was necessary to defend the Union against violent rebellion and secession. Although the abolitionists ardor for the Union cause might be increased by proclaiming an emancipation of the slaves, the more passive anti-abolitionists in the North could be weakened greatly in their already none-too-fierce determination to prosecute the war. A firm and united policy against the South could be threatened should emancipation alienate much Northern support. One Lincoln scholar writes:

> "There was indeed grave danger of splitting the North in two if he appeared unnecessarily to change the issue from Union to Liberation." (p 342)[37]

> "Of the bulk of the Northern Democrats it would . . . be fair to say that their conscious intention throughout was to be true to the Union but that throughout they were beset by a respect for Southern rights which would have gone far to paralyze the arm of the Government."(p 290)[37]

(6) The British formed a sixth and most important group whose support might be gained as a result of decreeing the slaves freed. Well into 1862 a large part of the English public was identified as sympathetic with the Southern cause. Economic ties with the South and feelings of cultural kinship with Southerners led many English statesmen to favor giving the South more tangible and open support than mere economic cooperation. Many in England believed that the Yankee cause was not specifically an antislavery one. During the year 1862, English recognition of the Confederacy as an independent state was discussed in Cabinet meetings and seemed imminently threatened.[38]

Many Americans, including the Ambassador to Great Britain, Charles Francis Adams, believed that English leanings toward the Southern cause would persist

officially only so long as the English could keep up the pretext that the Union forces were not waging a crusade against slavery. Once the rebellion was officially declared to be a war between slavery and individual freedom as well as one against disunion, the British, who were not only morally opposed to slavery but who had also freed slaves under their own dominion, would very likely cease threatening the Union cause by inclining toward more active help of the South.

Timing of the Proclamation

The contents of the so-called "preliminary" proclamation of emancipation issued on 22 September 1862 were designed to take the utmost advantage from the psychological effects of appropriate timing on the expected different reactions of those diverse audiences that have been discussed above.

When Lincoln first proposed a proclamation of emancipation at a Cabinet meeting in the summer of 1862, Secretary Seward pointed out that the particular point reached in the course of the war, then marked by defeat for the Union armies and gloom for the Union cause, made the time inappropriate for such an edict. It has already been seen that Lincoln feared that the proclamation might seem to be "whistling in the dark." Hence he readily admitted the aptness of Seward's point. A contemporary reporter described the decision to postpone the proclamation as follows:

> "[Seward] doubted the expediency of a proclamation issued as a time of depression in the public mind, dreading the effect of such a step following so closely upon recent reverses. . . . It 'would be considered a last *shriek* on the retreat.' The secretary . . . said: 'I suggest, sir that you postpone its issue until you can give it to the country supported by military success . . . .' The 'wisdom' of this view struck Lincoln 'with very great force.' 'The result was,' said Lincoln . . . 'that I put the draft of the proclamation aside . . . waiting for a victory.' "(pp 155–56)[36]

Accordingly, Lincoln bided his time in the hopes of a Union victory. During all the 3 months this waiting required, he had to keep his intentions secret from the public. For this reason, he put up with and put off as many writers and persons as he was able — persons who, in calling on him, persuaded the very move he had decided to make:

> "Such complaints . . . Lincoln had to endure while all the time he was awaiting the appropriate public opportunity for launching the proclamation on which he had determined. To supply this much-to-be-desired opportunity rested with McClellan and his men. Major Union victories were not so frequent in '62; if McClellan had not checked Lee at Antietam, Lincoln's proclamation, withheld in hope of Federal triumph, would have been indefinitely delayed. From the day [July 22, 1862] when Lincoln put the famous paper aside on Seward's suggestion . . . no important triumph for the United States came, except for Antietam, until July 1863."(p 159)[36]

Thus, after the victory at Antietam, the opportunity was seized in order to issue the proclamation.

The "slow composition" of this first emancipation proclamation "extended over anxious weeks," but even when it was finally and opportunely issued, it was not to take effect immediately. After 100 days had elapsed, when a supplementary

edict should have been issued, on 1 January 1863, it was brought into effect. Thus all chances were to be maximized that the South or some Southern states, as a result of the proclamation, might repent of secession or despair of ultimate victory, by "giving notice" of the contemplated emancipation.

Accordingly the decree declared that the states in which slaves were to be considered free should not be designated until the final edict on 1 January 1863, and that those states would be the ones that did not have "Congressional representation at Washington, by men chosen at an election wherein a majority of qualified voters participated," i.e., those states still in rebellion on the appointed date.

Lincoln himself observed that when he "conditionally determined to touch" slavery, he "gave a hundred days' fair notice . . . to all the States and people, within which . . . they could have turned it wholly aside by . . . becoming good citizens of the United States."(p 163)[36]

Contents of the Proclamation: Designed to Maximize Effects on the Audiences

By the provision that the proclamation should apply only to states in rebellion, slaveholders of the border states, not involved in the secession, were to be exempt from the emancipation order. It was hoped that as a result of the proclamation this would be appeased as far as they might react toward the Confederate side. Moreover, Tennessee, a state already on the Confederate side, but one that was wavering toward the Union, was likewise omitted from the states named on 1 January 1863.

The tone of the first decree was distinctly and entirely military. It opened "with a declaration that reunion (not abolition) was the object of the war."

> "At the outset Lincoln designated himself as the 'commander-in-chief of the army and navy,' using a phrase which was not customary in presidential proclamations and which did not appear in the call for troops in April 1861. Thus Lincoln began his document with a military wording and a non-abolitionist flavor."(p 162)[36]

Ideological antagonisms to abolitionism in the North and ideological wrath from the enemy were to be minimized as far as possible by the suggestion of military expediency. Apparently it was thought that the substance of the decree would be sufficient to satisfy the Northern abolitionists. In keeping with this strategy, in the final decree of 1 January, Chase framed the beginning of the concluding sentence, "And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice." Lincoln himself significantly added, "warranted by the Constitution *upon military necessity.*"*(p 168)[36]

Lincoln had been apprehensive that the proclamation might resemble a declaration "against the comet," since it was unenforceable except where Northern armies were predominant. The edict itself did not "free the slaves." Instead it *declared* that the slaves were "and henceforward shall be, free"; and that the "Executive Government will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons." Yet, by the provisions of the first edict, Union armies were only to "recognize" and "protect" this freedom, not explicitly to achieve it.

Although fugitive slaves were not to be returned, and the fact of freedom was to be recognized by the Federal armies, specific incitement of slave rebellions against their masters was avoided in the second edict by enjoining "the people so declared

* Author's italics.

. . . free to abstain from all violence," and by recommending "that . . . they labor faithfully for reasonable wages." These recommendations were apparently inserted to avoid the imputation that Lincoln was arousing such rebellions, and so further enraging the enemy. Confederate spokesmen made this very imputation, however, Lincoln's caution notwithstanding.

Effects of the Proclamation

As had been anticipated, there was much agitation over the Emancipation Proclamation among the conservatives of the North and the population of the "border" states. With the Northern conservatives, the proclamation became part of the case against Lincoln's supporters in the Congressional elections of 1862 and the Presidential election of 1864, without, however, a triumphant outcome being attained. In the "border" states there were complaints, sometimes violent, but the ultimate effect of the proclamation, Randall asserts, "gave impetus to the movement for state laws to sweep away the institution of slavery as it remained within Union lines," and thus became favorable to the Union cause.

The pragmatic and military rather than ideological tone of the proclamation irritated some abolitionists, but most were satisfied, as is shown by the fact that this group was inclined to give the credit for its publication to their favorite heroes rather than to Lincoln. The proclamation even occasioned the beginning of William Lloyd Garrison's practical retirement from public life.

The matter-of-fact tone of the proclamation had more serious consequences in England, however, where Lord Russell, British Foreign Secretary, said it was "of a very strange nature."

> For, said he: "It professes to emancipate all slaves in places where the United States' authorities cannot . . . now make emancipation a reality, but . . . not . . . where . . . emancipation, if decreed, might have been carried into effect."(p 176)[36]

The English, as has been previously mentioned, were inclined to believe that the Northern cause was not a "principled" one. The fact that "A business community, which had seemed pretty tolerant of slavery, was now at war on some point which was said to be and said not to be slavery, was a little hard to understand."(p 279)[37]

Nevertheless, popular English acclaim of the edict made it evident that official British policy could no longer consider overtly supporting the Southern cause. Our ambassador wrote home to a friend that "The President's Proclamation has had a great effect here, if not in America. It has rallied all the sympathies of the working classes, and has produced meetings the like of which . . . have not been seen since the days of reform and the corn laws."(pp 179-80)[36]

As for the anticipated effects of the proclamation on the slaves themselves, one writer said that he doubted whether it "freed anybody anywhere." (p 189)[36] Another qualified this in the following words:

> "On the one hand it did not appear to make free any slave by its own operation during the year . . . . On the other hand it tended to awaken . . . sympathy among the slaves for the Union cause, which held out . . . the promise of certain freedom by its success. . . ."(p 190)[36]

It is observed that the Emancipation Proclamation did not have the immediate effect of "unshackling" the Southern Negro, changing his social status, and enlisting him on the side of the North. As Randall comments, "This was the more

impossible since freedom was proclaimed not by his own protectors and rulers but by an alien and an enemy."(p 195)[36] Moreover, slave rebellions in the South did not take place: ". . . the absence of such uprising is one of the attested facts of the period."(p 196)[36] As had been anticipated, it required actual conquest of the South to bring about even nominal Negro freedom:

> "As the Union armies proceeded to occupy one area after another . . . military contact with the population enabled more and more slaves to find freedom in the shadow of the army and thus to taste the results . . . of Lincoln's proclamation."(p 199)[36]

Despite the limitations of the immediate effects of the proclamation, "its inspirational and slogan value," as Randall puts it, cannot so easily be overestimated. The proclamation is properly compared with the Declaration of Independence, and the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson, because by giving the Union cause a principle based on conceptions of universal justice and natural law, it put the people of the North on the side of humane and enlightened progress, not only in the eyes of the Northern abolitionists, but also from the vantage point of the democratic conscience of a much wider section of mankind.

PROPAGANDA OF THE CONFEDERACY*

By Burton J. Hendrick

The Confederate agent Hotze, notwithstanding inadequate financial resources, achieved outstanding success in England, whereas De Leon, with a much larger budget, proved to be a bungling misfit in France.

Anyone who thinks that the publicity agent is a modern character should turn to the propaganda service of the Confederacy in Europe from 1861 to 1865. Its labor in this heroic field presents a study in all the crudities and refinements of the art. The North, it is true, did not entirely neglect the influence of public opinion as helpmeet to its Army and Navy; as its cash resources were larger, so were its expenditures on a more lavish scale; but it is doubtful whether its press agents attained quite the skill in reaching foreign sentiment as did at least one of the Davis representatives.

The [Confederate] State Department entrusted this task of spreading the "truth" in Europe to two men. One of them, Henry Hotze, a native of Switzerland, well-educated, shrewdly intelligent, full of youthful fire, had had a brilliant journalistic career on the *Mobile Register*. His companion worker, Edwin De Leon, the Confederacy's spokesman in France, fell far behind Hotze in ability and finesse. De Leon, indeed, ended his career as one of the most entertaining casualties of the time. His pre-war experience in the United States consular service and his close personal friendship with Jefferson Davis seemed to provide an exceptional equipment for his delicate task. These very advantages, however, especially his association with Davis and other leaders, inspired in him ambitions far transcending those of maker of public opinion and largely explained his undoing. Certainly he could not complain of niggardly treatment by Richmond. The starved Confed-

* Excerpts from *Statesmen of the Lost Cause*, Literary Guild of America, Inc., New York, 1939, pp 389–99. Reprinted with permission of the Burton J. Hendrick estate, copyright holder.

erate Treasury gave Hotze $750 as a working fund for publicity in Great Britain and De Leon $25,000 for the same missionary purpose in France. And Hotze's task was a more exacting one than De Leon's. In those days the work of inspiring fervor in the breasts of French journalists was no difficult or complicated labor. The formula was simple to the last degree. Editorial opinion in the joyous days of the Second Empire, especially in the newspapers that had been lukewarm to the Confederate Government, was a matter of bargain and sale. De Leon began distributing his $25,000 in lavish fashion, with fairly magical results. Papers that had violently opposed Jefferson Davis now became his most valiant champions. Only one stumbling block stood in the way of complete success. French newspaper readers, as cynical as the press itself, recognized the long-familiar mechanism of fabricating public sentiment; and De Leon's efforts added much to the gayety of a capital trained to lively humor by the operas of Offenbach and the comedies of Scribe.

De Leon sounded a less entertaining note when he published a brochure, under his own name, on the rights and wrongs of the Confederacy, the chief feature of which was a fervid defense of slavery. As the French people hated nothing quite so vehemently as this "peculiar institution," De Leon's rhetoric did far more harm than good. On the whole the man's literary adventures did not prove to be a great success. He might have survived these misfortunes, however, except for certain personal failings. For other complications rendered him an odious embarrassment to Davis and Benjamin. On leaving Richmond, the Secretary of State had given De Leon extremely confidential letters from Benjamin to Slidell. One of these was the message in which, as previously described, Benjamin had sought to bribe Napoleon III into recognizing the Confederacy and breaking the blockade. On the voyage to France, De Leon opened and read these communications; when he presented the documents, with broken seals, to Slidell, that diplomat's anger knew no restraint. The experience made him instantaneously De Leon's enemy. Slidell refused to introduce him to French officialdom, or to facilitate his missionary efforts in any way. De Leon retaliated by writing an abusive despatch about Slidell to Secretary Benjamin; at the same time, evidently stung by French ridicule of his journalistic approaches, he expressed most unfavorable opinions of the French people and their Government. Unscrupulous Yankee spies obtained possession of these official papers, and, in due course, published them, with conspicuous emblazonry, in the pages of the *New York Tribune*. Both De Leon and Benjamin were Jews, but no fraternal feelings deflected the Secretary of State from his duty in the premises. His published correspondence, Benjamin wrote De Leon, was of such a nature "as not only to destroy your own usefulness in the special service entrusted to you, but to render your continuance in your present position incompatible with the retention in the public service of our commissioner to Paris." De Leon dejectedly returned to Richmond, and fame knew him no more.

If the respective sums of money given to De Leon and Hotze measured the value placed upon their respective services, the Government of Richmond made a great error of judgment. For Hotze proved to be as great a success as De Leon had been a failure. In mental and literary equipment, Hotze was by far the superior man. Only 28 years old, he possessed a suavity, a subtlety, and silence in method that would have distinguished an experienced diplomat. As far back as 1862, he introduced into publicity procedures those "psychological methods" upon which so many modern exemplars pride themselves. No bribery for Hotze — at least, no open, flagrant bribery; he approached his problem in far more insinuating

guise. No press agent quite so noiseless as Hotze has ever plied his craft. Indeed, it was not until the publication of his official papers as recently as 1922 that many Americans had ever heard his name. In comparison with Hotze's suppleness and comprehension, James Murray Mason appears a slow-witted blunderer and even John Slidell looks like an unscrupulous marplot. Yet Richmond, at the time of Hotze's appointment, knew nothing of the man's deft qualities. Clearly no great results were expected from this youthful propagandist.

Only one point in common did Hotze and De Leon evince; this was a considerable contempt for the nations whose good will it was their duty to conciliate. The difference was that De Leon published his opinion broadcast, while Hotze displayed his only in carefully guarded communications to his Government. His earliest reports — reports that were well-written and disclosed a sure grasp of English politics and European statesmen — disclosed also complete disillusionment on British motives in the American contest. Do not look for help or sympathy, he insists — unless such an attitude will promote British interests! No other than material advantages were guiding British party leaders. The Government, the upper social casts, the merchants, individuals, and professional men — such was his diagnosis — welcomed American strife because it meant the lasting dissolution of the American Union. That would be a good thing for England because it would open a vast profitable market to her manufactures. The North, by insisting on a protective tariff, had closed this field to English goods; it was the avowed intention of the South to prohibit Yankee importations and to adopt free trade with Europe. Here was the only explanation, Hotze wrote Benjamin, for such sympathy as prevailed in England for the Confederate cause. "Intense selfishness," he wrote Benjamin, August 2, 1862, "overshadows all other national characteristics and this selfishness is narrow-minded, because there is not now any truly great individual intelligence to shape the national policy. Lord Palmerston's blood is chilled by extreme old age; Earl Russell thinks procrastination the perfection of statesmanship."(pp 505–06)[39] "Reconstruction by the triumph of either party over the other is what the government and the people of Great Britain would make every sacrifice to prevent."(p 536)[39]

Of the London press, whose favor it was his duty to conciliate, Hotze's opinion was not much more complimentary. The editors of those staid journals who were quickly swept within his orbit would have been shocked had they read the secret dispatches their friend was constantly transmitting to Richmond. "The English press is not so exaltedly pure," Mr. Benjamin was informed soon after Hotze's arrival, "nor is that of any other country, but that a man entering its ranks with purse held up would find himself practically and in no dignified manner illustrating the classic fate of Actaeon" — by which he seems to imply that such an attractive victim would be torn to pieces by mercenary journalistic staghounds. From such a fate Hotze was safeguarded by the trifling sum assigned him for purposes of lubrication. As his usefulness dawned upon Benjamin and Davis, Hotze's paltry appropriation was increased to $10,000 a year, but even then he never descended to the vulgar methods that had brought such discredit on De Leon. Nor, with lofty-minded journals like the *Times*, the *Morning Post*, the *Standard*, the *Saturday Review*, and the other organs of public opinion that were ultimately swept within the Confederate influence, would financial approaches have been conceivable. Here a high order of Jesuitry could alone achieve success.

The London of that day supported a trained group of editorial writers, attached to no particular paper. "Professional leader writers," they were called; like other

literary journeymen, they wrote their articles and submitted them on the chance of acceptance. At least eight or ten of this brotherhood were sufficiently successful to make a satisfactory living. The pay was not bad as newspaper writing goes — two to ten guineas, $10 to $50, for a contribution of ordinary editorial length. The London press, Hotze informed the department, was "the most fastidious in the world," and would "never accept an editorial without paying for it" — a punctiliousness which facilitated his operations. Hotze had one great advantage for his job. He was a man of culture, well versed in European history and contemporary politics and himself master of an energetic journalistic style. That is, his talents qualified him for the role of "professional leader writer," and such he became, in most unobtrusive fashion. He penned most informing interpretations of what was known in England as the "American question," and presented them gratis to chosen favorites among this little fraternity. No one knew the secret except the two parties in question. London leader writers, like all followers of the craft, had weary moments when they liked to avoid exertion, and well-written acceptable essays such as Hotze's proved godsends — especially as all profits accrued to their advantage.

Hotze's lucubrations, quietly promoted in this fashion, sometimes attained the loftiest sanctums in London. He was able to twist comment on the fall of Fort Donelson in a way that made it look almost like a Confederate victory. Among the papers inspired to take this view was the Thunderer itself; "in one at least of the *Times* articles," Hotze reports to Richmond, "almost my very words are reproduced." (p 361)[39] On February 22, 1862, Jefferson Davis was inaugurated permanent President of the Confederate States; this happening would have passed unnoticed in the British press had not the leading editorial in the *Morning Post* hailed it as a great historic event. The *Morning Post* was the personal organ of Lord Palmerston, Prime Minister, and the medium he constantly used to broadcast unofficially his views and policies. This conspicuously displayed editorial caused a great buzzing in London clubs. It was even hailed as pointing to British recognition of the Confederacy. Whispers went about that Palmerston had written it himself. His lordship had no claim to this distinction, for the only begetter of the famous editorial was Henry Hotze, though the financial reward was reaped by one of the "professional leader writers" whom he had made confidential friends. "I have the honor," Hotze wrote the Secretary of State, "to enclose my first contribution to the English press, the leading editorial in yesterday's issue of Lord Palmerston's organ, the *Morning Post*. In reading it you will make due allowances for the necessity under which I felt myself of studiously maintaining an English point of view and not advancing too far beyond recognized public opinion." (p 346)[39]

But this was only a beginning. Soon Hotze discovered an even more ingenious way of utilizing for the Confederate cause his little select company of free-lance journalists. On May 1, 1862, the first number of one of those weekly reviews for which London has always been famous appeared on English newsstands. It bore the title of *The Index*, and, in format, typography, dignified literary style, and general arrangement of contents, seemed to be a fit companion of such influential periodicals as the *Spectator*, *Saturday Review*, and the like. That it was greatly interested in presenting the Southern viewpoint in the American conflict was obvious — indeed this was its advertised mission; that it was in any way directly promoted by the Confederate Government did not stand so plainly on the surface. As far as one could conclude, the *Index* was an English publication, founded by

Englishmen and devoted to the Confederate cause. Yet the *Index* was the creation of Henry Hotze. He financed the venture in part from his private resources; Confederate devotees in the South made contributions, and another gentleman who has already figured in this narrative — Emile Erlanger, who made so comfortable a killing in Confederate bonds — also came to his assistance. Just how much the *Index* accomplished in directing public sentiment and official policy in England is not clear. Necessarily it had a limited circulation, confined largely to a free mailing list. In reality, however, the ostensible purpose of the *Index* concealed an adroit scheme of corruption. It provided subtle machinery for bribing the press — no less palpable because the victims themselves hardly suspected the truth. Hotze attached to the *Index*, as salaried members of the staff, six or eight of the most successful of his beloved "professional leader writers." These employees, now having steady jobs, — salaries may have been small, but they made a welcome regular increment to the journalistic income, — became accomplished students on the issues of the American conflict, and, in a reasonable period, were as competent as Hotze himself to discuss them editorially.

Week after week, for nearly four years, this group turned out leading articles for the *Index*. In his private communications, Hotze frankly declared that their work for his weekly paper itself was not the point at issue. While earning their salaries as Hotze's assistant editors, these writers kept up their work as contributors to the great London dailies. The information and opinions they had absorbed as *Index* workers inevitably formed the groundwork of their contributions to leading London organs of public opinion. Thus they received double payment. Hotze paid them as salaried workers on his staff; the London papers paid them for the same articles when warmed over for their editorial columns. This wider field was the important one; their contributions to the *Index* were a secondary matter. Hotze's real purpose was to "educate" — the word constantly figures in his reports — a group of able writers who had a pecuniary interest in spreading Confederate gospel in England and Europe. Repeatedly in his letters to Hunter and Benjamin he proudly surveys his handiwork. "Popular circulation for the *Index*? Frankly, nothing much is expected on that score. The value of an organ," he writes, "not merely as a means of reaching public opinion but as a channel through which arguments and facts can be conveyed unofficially to the government itself, appears to me difficult to overrate. The value of the paper as an agency through which connections can be established through other journals is scarcely less . . . . Every additional contributor I am able to employ becomes an ally in the columns of some other paper and I frequently employ writers with no other object." "The writers employed by me for the *Index* are among the first in their profession, and through them I inspired the columns of some of the most influential publications in this country."

He instances as an ally of whom he is especially proud

> "Percy Greg, Esq., one of the most talented leader writers of London, who, besides being a valuable contributor to the *Index*, is one of our most efficient supporters in the columns of the *Saturday Review* and other literary and political periodicals of high standing. . . . Honourable men might honourably take their customary fee for the labor of their brains performed for me, and the ideas and information thus engrafted would bear fruit many fold and on many different trees. . . . One writer usually writes for several publications and I have thus the opportunity of multiplying myself, so to speak, to an almost unlimited extent. . . . Few suspect [writes Hotze to

Benjamin, August 27, 1863] none know, the silent, unobtrusive agency through which it [the *Index*] has operated upon its contemporaries."

Occasionally Hotze completely threw off the mask. Thus, in January, 1864, he placed on the *Index* staff, as Paris correspondent, one Felix Aucaigne, at a salary of fifty francs a week. "You will not be required to write for the *Index*," he informs this new recruit. "Your duty will consist in propagating through the French papers the views and the intelligence published through the *Index*." The mention of Percy Greg indicates the quality of the men Hotze drew within his net. Greg was no gutter journalist, but one of the most distinguished contributors to the *Manchester Guardian* and the London *Standard*, besides the *Saturday Review*. He was also a novelist, a historian, a religious and political leader. In after life his hatred for America knew no bounds, and his *History of the United States* is one of the most violent polemics ever committed to paper. How much of this lifelong hostility sprang from Hotze's "education" (at the expense of the educator) is not recorded.

Any idea that propaganda in wartime is a modern invention thus rests upon a misapprehension. Just how effective was this attempt to subsidize public sentiment? It did not accomplish its great purpose — recognition by foreign governments. Hotze, just like Mason and Slidell, had his blind side. None of them successfully handled the one spectre that always rose and thwarted their efforts. The existence of slavery in the South constantly blocked their arguments at the most inauspicious moments. It enraged Hotze as it annoyed his diplomatic confreres. Everywhere he turned this ogre crossed his path. This was one lesson that his salaried writers balked at absorbing. On constitutional grounds they most eloquently pleaded the cause. An oppressed nation struggling to be free always fired their pens. But the spectacle of black men in the South — of property rights in human beings — proved a more difficult subject. If his "leader writers" could swallow this institution, the editors of the journals for which they wrote set up the bars and articles portraying the beauties of the slave system seldom attained publication. Hotze, usually imperturbable, lost patience. Like most Southerners — like Mason and Slidell, who constantly met the same undisguised dislike of slavery — Hotze never understood European aversion to what, in his opinion, was a beneficent institution. The "editorial tyrants," as he called them, who would not admit apologies for slavery in their columns, represented the greatest obstacle to success. Hotze's correspondence illustrates, even more clearly than that of Mason and Slidell, the baleful effect of slavery in defeating the Southern cause in Europe.

THE WORLD CRUISE OF THE US NAVY 1907–1909*

By Penelope Babcock

President Theodore Roosevelt in dispatching the US Fleet on a world tour in effect announced for all to hear, "the US has major interests in the Pacific area and is prepared to defend them."

On a winter morning in 1907, (p 261)[40] the people of Norfolk and Newport News, Va., watched with unbelieving eyes as the mighty US Naval Fleet steamed out of Hampton Roads, headed for the Pacific Coast by way of Cape Horn. Sixteen

*Original text prepared for the Operations Research Office in connection with this volume.

battleships loomed on the gray horizon, the strongest assembled unit the world had ever seen, (p 261)[7] and the first fleet of a world power to attempt maneuvers on such a grand scale. As the fleet turned southward, the whole world seemed to vibrate with outbursts of indignation, praise, and fear. Newspapers and yellow sheets renewed their vitriolic attacks upon the action; Westerners on the Pacific Coast hailed the cruise as a momentous step; authorities in the large Eastern cities shuddered to think what the consequences might be with their shores unguarded from a European attack; and the countries around the globe waited in silent apprehension to see what the fleet would do.

"Fighting Bob" Evans, Commander of the Fleet, was a confident man — confident that the voyage would be a successful one and confident that many valuable lessons would be gained as a result of it. During a speech he had presented at the Lotus Club's farewell banquet in New York, he had frankly asserted that the people of the US would not "be disappointed in the fleet, whether it . . . [proved] a feast, a frolic, or a fight." (p 261)[40]

The man who shared his confidence, the instigator of the whole trip, was President Theodore Roosevelt. His words came to the American people with assurance: "The fleet is in good condition, [Admiral] Evans is a good man. . . . The wisdom — indeed, I may say the absolute need — of going . . . to Japan has been amply demonstrated." (p 260)[40] But to understand the intensity of the world situation that surrounded Roosevelt's decision, one must take a retrospective glance over the years preceding the voyage. Events coupled with emotions had mounted to the breaking point, and Roosevelt was certain that the time had come for a "showdown."[41] Friction had arisen between the Japanese and American people, when only 3 years before the two countries had been on extremely friendly terms. What had caused this relatively swift change in their relationship?

The answer to this question began on 9 August 1905, when peace negotiations for the Russo-Japanese War commenced at the Portsmouth Navy Yard in New Hampshire. President Roosevelt had been requested by the Japanese nation to serve as mediator, and, although he did not wish to assume the responsibility, he accepted in the best interests of the US. As the days passed, a noticeable change in attitude toward the Japanese took place, simply because Russia maintained an effective method of propaganda. Counte Witte, the Russian delegate to the peace conference, helped to derogate the Japanese cause to American reporters. Moreover, many Americans had opened their eyes with astonishment to note the power that Japan had displayed during the war. Mr. Dooley, the famous newspaper character of journalist Finley Peter Dunne, remarked about it:

> "A few years ago I didn't think anny more about a Jap thin about anny other man that'd been kept in th' oven too long. They were all alike to me. But to-day, whiniver I see wan I turn pale an' take off me hat an' make a low bow." (p 569)[42]

With the signing of the treaty in Portsmouth, Japan gained a considerable amount of territory and received the right to free play in South Manchuria and Korea — a right that helped to establish her as a dominant power in the Far East, but caused more friction between the Japanese and American businessmen in Manchuria. One reporter claimed that the Japanese had become powerfully influential since the victory over the Russians and were looking covetously on the Philippines. "In the navy," he said, "it is generally believed that we will have to meet Japan's fleet on the Pacific before the century is old."[43] The friendly

mediation of President Roosevelt helped Japan win these advantages, but the tax-burdened Japanese masses, who had counted very much on an indemnity, were embittered against the US and their own statesmen. Roosevelt's intervention was interpreted as an attempt to deprive Japan of the full reward of victory over Russia. Still more alarming was the news from the Far East that anti-American riots had taken place in Tokyo.

Although America's popularity was fast declining in Japan, many Japanese veterans, restless and tax-burdened in their native country, looked to California as the golden land of opportunity. A steady flow of Japanese into West Coast cities began to take place, and the Californians, goaded into action by belligerent newspapers and unhindered by Congressional action, decided to take matters into their own hands. The San Francisco Board of Education in October, 1906, passed an order requiring all Japanese children to attend a public school specially set aside for them. The excuse that the Board of Education offered was that the Japanese children were crowding the American schools, but a closer glance at the number of Japanese children in the schools revealed that there were only 93 children in question. What the San Francisco officials were actually objecting to was the steady influx of cheap coolie labor from Japan. Various labor and political groups in California had labeled this movement a menace to American institutions and to the American standard of living. Newspaper sensationalism and political agitation had created a burning issue in the West.

When the Japanese learned of the Board's order, they immediately took offense. As Roosevelt put it: "The Japanese are proud, sensitive, warlike, and flushed with the glory of their recent triumph, and are in my opinion, bent upon establishing themselves as the leading power in the Pacific."[44] The suggestion of racial inferiority, especially after their recent victory, was too much for the Japanese. Their presses attacked the US for what they believed was an open and entirely unwarranted insult to the national honor. They demanded revocation of the school board's ruling and redress for the injury to Japanese pride. The cry went up from one Japanese newspaper:

> "Stand up, Japanese nation! Our countrymen have been HUMILIATED on the other side of the Pacific. Our poor boys and girls have been expelled from the public schools by the rascals of the United States, cruel and merciless like demons . . . . Why do we not insist on sending [war] ships?" (p 569)[42]

But the Californians became more and more violent in their insistence for action against all Japanese immigrants. Roosevelt was convinced that the San Francisco school board had committed a crime against a friendly nation, and that, unless some step was taken, war would come. His only alternative was to dispatch a firm but conciliatory reply to the Japanese protest and to intervene directly with the San Francisco authorities in such a way as to result in the cancellation of the segregation order. Roosevelt "realized that if he were going to unsnarl the school tangle he would have to change his methods and resort to finesse. This he did when he invited the entire San Francisco school board to junket across the continent at government expense to discuss the problem with him." (p 571)[42]

At that conference, which was held in February 1907, Roosevelt promised to halt the immigration of Japanese coolie labor if the school officials would allow the

Japanese children to attend school with the whites. The problem was temporarily settled and carried out by the Gentleman's Agreement of 1907–1908, an arrangement not entirely conclusive in any one document but an informal understanding through which Japan undertook to withhold passports from coolie labor seeking to enter the US, if the US would not put on the statute books a formal law excluding people of Japanese origin.

Roosevelt, during this period, was known to be conciliatory and pacific. He felt that the US had been wrong as far as the anti-Japanese agitation in California was concerned and he believed that in the aftermath of a successful war, public opinion in Japan might actually force the government, over its own better judgment, to take up arms in defense of national honor. In the US, however, Roosevelt's moderate policy seemed so much out of character, that he received a great deal of criticism. Mr. Dooley again made an observation: he described Roosevelt as hiding under the bed "with a small language book trying to say 'Spare us' " in the Japanese tongue. (p 289)[44] Somehow the idea had arisen that because Roosevelt was sympathetic with the Japanese, he was afraid of them. Despite the attacks made on his attitude of conciliation, Roosevelt was prepared to stand up for American rights if Japan should carry her protests too far. He was ready to maintain the political supremacy in the Pacific, which he considered America's destiny, by strengthening the US Navy. "He confided to a friend: 'I am exceedingly anxious to impress upon the Japanese that I have nothing but the friendliest possible intentions toward them, but I am none the less anxious that they should realize that I am not afraid of them and that the US will no more submit to bullying than it will bully.' " (pp 571–72)[42] Once again the peculiarly Rooseveltian character was stirred into action, and thus, the plan to send the US fleet around the world came into being — a spectacular plan, but one designed to convince Japan that the US was prepared to counter any warlike gesture. It was not so much a threat, however, as it was a demonstration and a reminder to Japan that the US Navy was the second largest in the world.

There were many persons opposed to Roosevelt's plan and some who actively tried to prevent it. The chairman of the Senate committee on naval affairs, Eugene Hale, claimed that Congress would not appropriate the money for such a disastrous voyage. To this New Englander, Roosevelt flatly replied that he had: "enough money to take the fleet around to the Pacific anyhow, that the fleet would certainly go, and that if Congress did not choose to appropriate enough money to get the fleet back, why, it would stay in the Pacific." (p 553)[45] Having silenced that faction of the opposition, Roosevelt had to contend with the violent campaign of the jingo newspapers, chiefly the Hearst chain, that either lambasted the idea or precipitated so much trouble that war with Japan seemed inevitable. Fortunately by October 1907 this campaign had lost its driving force and had not succeeded in drawing the American public into its camp.

There were a number of reasons, however, why Roosevelt found opposition to his plan, and they were not all unfounded reasons. No other power had dared to accomplish such a dangerous trip around Cape Horn, and whether or not this voyage would be successful, people feared that the unit would be gravely injured as a fighting group. The trip would either impress or provoke foreign nations, depending on whether it was interpreted as a friendly or a hostile move. And of

most importance to the American public was the idea that the Eastern shore, once stripped of its main defense, would be left open to an enemy attack.

On the other side of the fence, Roosevelt and his supporters held out that their motives were of valued importance. By sending the fleet, America would not only impress on the people of the world that her Navy was a strong and powerful one but would also prove to herself that such a maneuver was possible. The Pacific Ocean was as much a location for Naval maneuvers as the Atlantic, and Roosevelt stressed the point that the American Fleet on the West Coast was no more a threat to the Asiatics than the American Fleet in the East was a threat to the European powers. The voyage would stand as a bold announcement of American interest in the Pacific, with the intention of underlining America's ability to defend that interest if the need should arise. Perhaps Roosevelt was trying to convince the militaristic elements in Japan that their country could not afford to pick a quarrel with the US, but behind this motive, as behind all the others, stood the chief purpose of sending the fleet: to maintain peace by a show of strength. Roosevelt was proud of this last idea. In a letter to Carl Schurz his most memorable words read: "In my own judgment the most important service that I rendered to peace was the voyage of the battle fleet round the world." (p 548)[45] Years later, his opinion of the importance of the world cruise had not been altered:

> "When I left the Presidency I finished seven and a half years of administration, during which not one shot had been fired against a foreign foe. We were at absolute peace, and there was no nation in the world whom we had wronged, or from whom we had anything to fear. The cruise of the battle fleet was not the least of the causes which ensured so peaceful an outlook.
>
> "When the fleet returned after its sixteen months' voyage around the world I went down to Hampton Roads to greet it. The day was Washington's Birthday, February 22, 1909. Literally on the minute the homing battlecraft came into view. On the flagship of the Admiral I spoke to the officers and enlisted men, as follows:
>
> " 'Over a year has passed since you steamed out of this harbor, and over the world's rim, and this morning the hearts of all who saw you thrilled with pride as the hulls of the mighty warships lifted above the horizon. You have been in the Northern and the Southern Hemispheres; four times you have crossed the line; you have steamed through all the great oceans; you have touched the coast of every continent. Ever your general course has been westward: and now you come back to the port from which you set sail. This is the first battle fleet that has ever circumnavigated the globe. Those who perform the feat again can but follow in your footsteps . . . we welcome you home to the country whose good repute among nations has been raised by what you have done.' " (p 557)[45]

The cruise had succeeded in its purpose. The reception at Yokohama on 18 October 1908 had been overwhelming in its warmth and enthusiasm. Tens of thousands of school children from Japan had greeted the Fleet, and their singing of American national songs had been whole-heartedly and genuinely delivered. The Japanese hospitality had made a profound impression on Americans. Above all, and including all factors, the world cruise was a decisive psychological warfare technique, well calculated as to the results and well executed in its endeavor.

SISSON'S ACCOUNT OF WILSON'S FOURTEEN POINT SPEECH*

By Edgar Sisson

The clear enunciation of US policy objectives by the President, in a speech to the Congress was used by a skillful American propagandist in Russia in creating dissension between the Bolsheviks and the Imperial Germans.

When the threats of "Peace Break" came on December 31, 1917, I [E. Sisson, George Creel's representative in Russia] began to search in mind for ways it could be made a factor of pressure against Germany on American behalf; and at the end of three days concluded that at least the hopeful situation of dissension between the Bolsheviks and the Germans could be encouraged best by the voice of President Wilson. Keeping my own counsel, I called for that voice.

To avoid the delay of coding and decoding, I put the message on the open cable, confident that the contents would expedite it through both the Bolshevik and the British censorships. It made, in fact, record passage to Washington. The cable:

> "Creel, Compub, Washington.
>
> "January 3 — If President will re-state anti-imperialistic war aims and democratic peace requisites of America thousand words or less, short almost placard paragraphs, short sentences, I can get it fed into Germany in great quantities in German translation, and can utilize Russian version potently in army and everywhere.
>
> "Experts from previous statements will not serve. Need is for internal evidence that President is thinking of the Russian and German common folk in their situation of this moment and that he is talking to them.
>
> "Can handle German translation and printing here.
>
> "Obvious of course to you that disclosure German trickery against Russia in peace negotiations promises to immensely open up our opportunities for publicity and helpfulness."

The cable continued then with business details, requests for film equipment and additional personnel, neither of which had practical outcome, material and escort being unable to get through to Russia.

Words, however, may pass under the sea and through the air. Creel, I was to learn long afterward, went at once to the White House with the appeal, all his own force behind it. The time was opportune. A speech of Lloyd George's had given another reason that the President soon should enunciate his Peace terms, their substance already ripened in his reflective mind. My appeal very likely had an effect in shaping and simplifying the external form of the "Fourteen Points," decided the moment of their expression, and led the President to address to the Russian people the general introduction to the concrete Peace terms. He spoke as if to them, his text the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference.

*From *One Hundred Red Days: A Personal Chronicle of Bolshevik Revolution*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1931. Reproduced with permission of Mrs. Edgar G. Sisson, sole legatee of Mr. Sisson's estate.

From Creel I received on January 10 the cable that a "wonderful three thousand words are going to you today," with the personal tonic, "Congratulations on great work — Go the limit." The cable presumably had left Washington the night of January 8, following the delivery of the President's speech before Congress. The speech itself was coming in when I got Creel's word.

Besides cabling an account of progress to Creel, I included longer description on January 13, in a serial letter I was writing to my wife, the chapters to be forwarded together on the next trip of a courier outward, always an indefinite date. I wrote:

> "Three days of tumult, but happy work in the fine cause of the President's mighty message of January 8. I had the feeling in the early hours of Thursday morning that a new brew was mixing. It so happened that the outlook was so peaceful and the machine running so easily that I had mapped the day as the only purely pleasurable one since my arrival in Russia. In the morning I intended to shop for a birthday present for Mildred (Sisson's daughter), and in the afternoon had accepted an invitation to share a box at the opera of 'Boris Godunov.' That left the evening for work if it developed. The Russian day, let me enlighten you, ends at 2 o'clock in the morning. I've done a good day's work from six o'clock on many a time."

But in this case the beginning was at 10 o'clock in the morning when a friend who was translating the morning papers for me read a paragraph from Stockholm referring casually to the fact that President Wilson had made a speech before Congress. That was all, but I grabbed for my over-shoes, over-coat, and cap. I knew that the meaning was that a cable was on its way to me somewhere, and right at that second I had the suspicion that it was hung up at the Embassy — which is a mile and a half from the hotel. I drove first to our Compub office, 4 Gorokhovaya, picked up Bullard there, and went on to the Embassy.

I found that the message had got in, addressed to me, at midnight, and that the error had been made, first of not notifying me, and second of breaking the seals and starting to make Embassy copies for its different uses. If the thing had not been serious it would have been humorous as an exemplification of the redtape habit. No damage of irreparable nature had been done, fortunately, as several portions of the message had not come. Still it made a delay of several hours in starting translation.

I did not blame the Ambassador for wanting to see the message, but we agreed that he would have it just as soon for his purposes if I sent him a copy of the transcript. For the rest of the day the telegrams were sent to my office unopened. For days I had expected that messages would be coming direct to the Gorokhovaya but it took another cable to get them finally directed there.

Some vital parts of the message were strangely delayed, either in England or in Russia itself. One last bit of a hundred words did not get here until Friday morning. Translation, however, could begin at once, and two teams of translators and typists were set at it in our offices, one team doing Russian and the other German. Three of us worked at parts of the cable transcription simultaneously. I have not pounded a typewriter so fast since old newspaper days.

By six o'clock the translation of all parts of the text we had was done into Russian, and I started with several sets and an interpreter for Smolny, bent on shooting that much of it to the Russian Peace Commission sitting in Poland at Brest-Litovsk inside the German lines. I wanted it to begin to get in its work as anti-

German ammunition where I knew it would do the most good. I did not expect the Bolsheviks to welcome aid. They didn't. They smiled at me and asked what new caper of the Imperialistic American Government was this.

Alexander Gumberg, interpreting for me, may have told them that they were a lot of children and that it was time to stop playing and grow up, but I do not think he did. He did, however, by his own original methods impress upon one or another of them that their destinies depended upon their ability to be sincere toward sincerity. The satisfactory outcome was that the message started by courier within an hour's time for Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk. The trouble was that Lenin as well as Trotsky was out of the city, and little people left in charge. I make one exception — Trotsky's secretary, the big girl. She sees things quick and far, and she got the courier herself.

The translation of the full message was finished early the next afternoon, and with that, Col. Raymond Robins of the Red Cross, Gumberg and I went again to Smolny.

This time Lenin was back, and we were able to get direct to him. It did not take one minute to convince him that the full message should go to Trotsky by direct wire. He grabbed the copy and sprinted for the telegraph office himself. We were told afterward that it began to go in five minutes, all other messages side-tracked.

It was the first time either Robins or I had met Lenin, for until now, while I have worked all through Smolny, attending Soviet and garrison meetings, and have had channels running to every seat of power, I have camouflaged as a newspaper man, and have kept out of any situation that could have been interpreted as giving the government recognition that Washington did not desire to give. Even on this occasion I went only as the head of the American Press Bureau.

He (Lenin) welcomed the message as an unexpected but not undeserved staff, but he did not let us forget for a moment that he regarded it as coming not from a fellow thinker but from a just and tolerant class opponent. It will be a mistake for any one to believe that our political democracy can merge with this industrial democracy. The latter will seek revolution against capital until it conquers or is conquered.

But on the specific matter of general peace Lenin saw the potency of the speech and accepted its help. "It is a great step ahead toward the peace of the world," he said — and in English, which he speaks very well. He was as joyous as a boy over the President's humanly understanding words to Russia, and his recognition of the honesty of Bolshevik purpose.

"Yet I have been called a German spy," he said, and smiled and threw up the palms of his hands.

His only criticism was on the colonial clause, which is the only weak clause in the message. When he went unerringly for it, I knew that he had the gift for finding the cracks in any armor. But he wasn't fanatic and took the practical view that the word "equitable" could be turned in Bolshevik direction no less than in an Imperial direction.

Yet at the last he ran true to Bolshevik form, for he said, "This is all very well as far as it goes, but why not formal recognition, and when?" That is the Bolshevik idea — ask more and more until you get it all.

Robins went away after we left Lenin, and then I sought the Smolny press bureau to start the real job of getting the full text into the government papers. One of them, the lesser, the *Pravda* ("Truth"), is pronouncedly anti-American,

and while it took the copy, did not print it in full and was both unfair and unintelligent in its editorial comment. The big one the *Izvestia* ("News"), which circulates free to all Soviet headquarters throughout Russia, and as a selling newspaper has the biggest circulation in Petrograd, not only took it, but allowed us to black face the passages we desired — all clauses relating to Russia — and printed a comment that this was a sincerely meant recognition of the idealism of the Soviets, and a present aid of invaluable consequence. The appearance in the *Izvestia* alone guarantees that every Russian soldier will get the message, for the *Izvestia* is read aloud to soldiers who do not read.

Other papers printed such sections of the speech as fitted their political purposes. The anti-government papers, for instance, carefully left out all the good references to Russia, because they were good also for the Bolsheviks. Such is the newspaper method of Russia. The formula is, "Lie about your enemies."

But all Petrograd is getting the speech. Already 100,000 poster copies of the speech are printed, and although this (the 13th) was Sunday and New Year's Eve, 30,000 are on the walls of Petrograd, posted there since noon — on the third day since the message entered the town, and the second since it got here completely. It cost money, for the presses had to run on double-pay overtime Saturday night to make the delivery. But the results are worth it. Not even money will get work tomorrow, New Year's day.

On Tuesday the posting will be finished. I am re-setting in hand-bill form for a distribution of 300,000 on streets, in theaters and public places, and that distribution should be completed by Friday night. A German version of one million copies will go to press Tuesday night. The YMCA volunteered the distribution of this number of German copies along the lines, and while I have seen signs of quitting on the fullness of the job, I am going to drive them through. The volunteering was done enthusiastically and at no urging from me, for my best German plans are elsewhere. They have the men, the facilities, and I am putting up the money for extra costs. They will work, I am quite sure.

Sent a man to Moscow last night with Russian copy for printing posters there, and as the office there is ready with its plan, both the poster and the street distribution should be completed there also in five or six days. Will print about a million and a half copies there, 800,000 of them for YMCA in Russian. Will print Polish and Ukrainian pamphlets there, also the permanent pamphlet form for mailing list distribution.

The deepest German drive, aside from what Trotsky may do in the way of gunnery at Brest-Litovsk, will be in the Bolshevik propagandist organ for Germany called *The Torch*. It is printed in about three quarter of a million daily gobs and fed to German soldiers by Russian soldiers and by various contrived mediums. Its aim is German Revolution. It is the chief cause of the German yell against Russian literary efforts behind and across German lines. We have the promise of its use Wednesday morning. Perhaps I write too soon, but I have reason for confidence.

Nor was my confidence misplaced.

On the Russian version of the speech, too, I placed prominently a subhead crediting the *Izvestia* with the first printing of the original text. It had the effect of an order to the Bolshevik organizations and armies to help to circulate the posters, and as an order it was obeyed. No proclamation of Lenin's or Trotsky's ever got a wider or a faster distribution throughout Russia or along its borders than President Wilson's Fourteen Points Speech.

In its different handbill, poster, and pamphlet forms the printed issues of the speech totaled 3,463,000 copies issued from Petrograd and Moscow presses, and this sum took no account of the millions of distribution through the *Izvestia* and other newspapers, nor of handbills printed at Odessa, Tiflis, Kiev, Chita, Omsk, and Ekaterinburg, where the text of the speech was telegraphed to American Consuls and to representatives (in several places) of the International Harvester Company, and in each place circulated in quantity. The American Consul at Vladivostok received text of the address by direct cable from the US. The entire circulation in Russia and Siberia otherwise — whether by wire or in printed form — was from the Committee on Public Information (Compub), Petrograd.

Of the one million copies of the speech printed in German — entirely apart from the printing in *The Torch* — I wrote in 1920 in a report published in George Creel's book, *How We Advertised America*. Of this quantity 300,000 were put across the northern line and 200,000 similarly at the central and southern front. Half a million copies went to German prison camps in Russia, for the reason that these prisoners were soon to return to Germany.

It would have been more accurate to have said German cantonments than prison camps, although the Germans still were in nominal custody, pending formalities for their transfer. Like the Russian soldiers, the tendency of the German bodies was to remain where they were sheltered, although the lack of Russian discipline encouraged much restless moving about.

The distribution of the German edition was done by an organization of soldier package carriers formerly in the service of the YMCA and secured from that body, becoming a part of our machinery of diffusion. In February when the German army advanced into Russia, the package men worked along the line scattering German and Hungarian versions of President Wilson's later speech of February 11 in territories about to be occupied by the Germans. The head of this organization was B. Morgernstern, a sturdy personage, and able. . . .

[After the war, Sisson commented on the estimate of the effectiveness of the circulation of the speech!]

As far as Russia was concerned there was not much immediate military utility in this distribution. The military utility was against Germany, our first heavy and organized attack upon her morale. But for Russia, although shattered, still remained the question of the future, which in Russia is more a matter of years than of days, of decades more than of years, and of peasants more than of Bolsheviks.

Text extracts from President Wilson's Fourteen Point Peace Program Speech, delivered January 8, 1918:

> "Parleys have been in progress at Brest-Litovsk between Russian representatives and representatives of the Central Powers to which the attention of all the belligerents has been invited for the purpose of ascertaining whether it may be possible to extend these parleys into a general conference with regard to terms of peace and settlement.
>
> "The Russian representatives presented not only a perfectly definite statement of the principles upon which they would be willing to conclude peace but also an equally definite program of the concrete application of those principles. The representatives of the Central Powers, on their part, presented a settlement, which if much less definite, seemed susceptible of liberal interpretation until their specific program of practical terms was

added. That program proposed no concessions at all either to the sovereignty of Russia or to the preferences of the populations with whose fortunes it dealt, but meant, in a word, that the Central Empires were to keep every foot of territory their armed forces had occupied — every province, every city, every point of vantage — as a permanent addition to their territories and their power.

"It is a reasonable conjecture that the general principles of settlement which they at first suggested originated with the more liberal statesmen of Germany and Austria, the men who have begun to feel the force of their own people's thought and purpose, while the concrete terms of actual settlement came from the military leaders who have no thought but to keep what they have got. The negotiations have been broken off. [Note: An error. The Russians threatened to break the negotiations; the Germans paid no attention. The Embassy reported the situation correctly to Washington. The dispatches evidently were delayed in arrival. E. S.] The Russian representatives were sincere and in earnest. They cannot entertain such proposals of conquest and domination. . . .

"But, whatever the results of the parleys at Brest-Litovsk, whatever the confusions of counsel and of purpose in the utterances of the spokesmen of the Central Empires, they have again attempted to acquaint the world with their objects in the war and have again challenged their adversaries to say what their objects are and what sort of settlement they would deem just and satisfactory. There is no good reason why that challenge should not be responded to, and responded to with the utmost candor. We did not wait for it. Not once but again and again we have laid our whole thought and purpose before the world, not in general terms only, but each time with sufficient definition to make it clear what sort of definite terms of settlement must necessarily spring out of them. . . .

"There is no confusion of counsel among the adversaries of the Central Powers, no uncertainty of principle, no vagueness of detail. The only secrecy of counsel, the only lack of fearless frankness, the only failure to make definite statements of the objects of the war, lies with Germany and her Allies. The issues of life and death hang upon these definitions. . . .

"There is, moreover, a voice calling for these definitions of principle and of purpose, which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the many moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian people. They are prostrate and all but helpless, it would seem, before the grim power of Germany, which has hitherto known no relenting and no pity. Their power, apparently, is shattered. And yet their soul is not subservient. They will not yield either in principle or in action. Their conception of what is right, of what is humane and honorable for them to accept, has been stated with a frankness, a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a universal human sympathy which must challenge the admiration of every friend of mankind; and they have refused to compound their ideals or desert others that they themselves may be safe.

"They call to us to say what it is that we desire; in what, if anything, our purpose and our spirit differ from theirs; and I believe that the people of the United States would wish me to respond, with utter simplicity and

frankness. Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace. . . .

"We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secure once for all against their recurrence.

"What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peaceloving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us.

"The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

"1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

"2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

"3. The removal, as far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

"4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

"5. A free, open minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty and interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

"6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of all the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

"7. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this

will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they themselves have set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

"8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interests of all.

"9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

"10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safe-guarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

"11. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded access to the sea; and the relations of several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

"12. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

"13. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

"14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."

ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE COLLAPSE OF GERMAN MORALE IN 1918*

By George G. Bruntz

Propaganda proved to be an effective instrument of warfare in the struggle of 1914–1918. Its use by the Allies contributed to the earlier collapse of German resistance.

In no previous war in history did propaganda play so important a part as in the world conflict of 1914–18. Most of us know that neutral countries were bombarded with propaganda from civil authorities of the Allied and Central powers, few of us

*From "Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of German Morale in 1918," reprinted from the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 2: 61–76 (1938). Reproduced with permission of the author and the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, copyright holder.

perhaps realize the importance placed upon propaganda as an instrument of warfare by the military authorities. The destruction of enemy morale by the dissemination of defeatist, disheartening, and revolutionary leaflets, pamphlets, books, and propaganda "newssheets" was recognized as an important part of the offensive against the enemy. While the Allied artillery was pounding the German troops with shells, the propaganda sections were bombarding these same troops and the German people behind the line with arguments. The seriousness with which this attack of "word bullets" was regarded by the military machines on both sides, and the effect that Allied propaganda had upon the morale of the German troops and civilians behind the lines, is the story of the paragraphs that follow.

During the first two years of the war the governments were busy with the task of bringing public opinion at home to war pitch, and with the more strictly military side of the war. But by 1917 propaganda was recognized as a valuable instrument of offensive warfare against the enemy. The Allied Powers were the first to recognize the significance of this weapon and every Allied country set up official organizations for the dissemination of propaganda in the enemy countries. England had its Crewe House, at the head of which was the arch-propagandist, Lord Northcliffe. In France the unofficial *Alliance Française* started the work, and later the government set up the famous *Maison de la Presse*. The United States disseminated propaganda to the Germans through the Military Intelligence Section of the United States Army, the famous Committee on Public Information (CPI), the Friends of German Democracy and other organizations.

The ultimate aim of the propagandists of the Allies was to shatter the faith of the Germans in the military machine and to prepare the way for the overthrow of the Imperial Government. The various propaganda agencies were organized on a large scale and carried on an intensive warfare by word of mouth, in the press, and through leaflets, books, and pamphlets. As Karl von Vetter puts it:

> "In those days the Briton shot not only with thousands of cannon, tens of thouands of MG; he not only shot from hundreds of aeroplanes; he not only rammed with thousands of tanks against us; but he flooded us with millions of leaflets . . . . How could they help but have an effect on the used-up, half-starved troops? . . . The GHQ put a high premium for the delivery of the leaflets. It did not receive many."[46]

On July 31, 1917, the Chief of the German General Staff of the Field Army issued a circular in which he lamented the feeling of "profound depression" at home. This symptom he attributed in part to the real distress among the German people. But for the most part this situation resulted, said the circular, from the agitation of certain enemies of state within Germany.[47] On September 14, 1918, the widely read shipping journal *Hansa* of Hamburg lamented the "despondency, discontent, depression, hanging heads" (Vol 6, p 20) that could be seen everywhere in Germany. The spirit of defeatism "is visibly surrounding the German people, disturbing our spiritual balance, darkening our temper." It continued:

> "Today we can recognize the origin of this depression of German will power. It was the long-advertised publicity offensive of the Entente directed against us under England's lead and under the special direction of that unprincipled, unscrupulous rascal Northcliffe."[48]

The feeling within Germany was further described by Dr. George Herron after his fifth conversation with Dr. de Fiori:

> "The peasants and workers of Germany are already asking questions which predict the possibility of a revolution . . . . All through Germany, he declared, the peasants and workers are saying to each other that if the whole world is against Germany there must be some reason for it. It must be that they have been deceived about the war from the beginning. And why should they go on being killed and starved for masters who tell them only lies? It is better that they should kill their masters."[49]

The *Suddeutsche Monatshefte*, in April 1924, went so far as to credit the Allied propagandists with having taken over the leadership of the German people in the last few months of the war. By the fall of 1918 "the majority of the German people placed greater trust in Woodrow Wilson than in their own leaders."[50]

REPORTS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SUBSECTION

However, in estimating the effect of Allied propaganda upon the German troops and the people behind the lines we must consider, *first*, the Reports of the Psychological Subsection of the US Army; *second*, the efforts on the part of Germany at counter-propaganda; *third*, the desertions among the enemy troops; and *fourth*, German Army Orders dealing with propaganda.

The Psychological Subsection of the US Army kept a closer watch on the morale of the German troops than any of the propaganda agencies or intelligence sections of the Allied countries. This Subsection set up a detailed system for watching the deterioration of the German morale. Agents prepared daily reports which contained all news in any way relating to the morale of the Germans. After studying these daily reports carefully, the officers in charge made general interpretations of the drift of the enemy morale in a weekly report.[51] Using as a basis for its estimate, material contained in these weekly reports, supplemented by information obtained from every source open to the Military Intelligence, the Psychological Subsection worked out its famous *Chart of German Civilian Morale*, which recorded the ups and downs of the enemy morale.

Photostatic copies of this chart were supplied to the writer by the War Department, General Staff, Military Intelligence Division (G-2). The copies are not suitable for reproduction here, but the accompanying drawing (greatly compressed horizontally and showing only two of the five component lines) (Fig. 1) will suggest the nature of the original. The chart was drawn on a large sheet divided into sections each of which represented a day. A heavy black line shows the wavering morale of Germany's civilian population.* Starting in August 1914 at the top of the chart, the line runs fairly straight until the Battle of the Marne in September when there is a slight decline. It runs along quite steadily above 90 per cent until January 1916 when there is a slight drop, which is, however, regained by March. From April to September 1916 there is a rather sharp drop to 66 per cent. This resulted from the reverses at Verdun. By December it had returned again to 75 per cent and by March 1917 it was up to 81 per cent again. From March we have another decline so that by May the morale stands at 65 per cent. It remains at

* Other lines also depicted the German military situation, the degree of political unity in Germany, the situation in Austria-Hungary, the state of food supply in the Central Powers, and the U-boat sinkings.

almost this point until the latter part of October and early November when it rises sharply again because of the Bolshevik Revolution and the Peace of Brest-Litovsk. During February and March 1918 it stays near 95 per cent. But from April to May when the propaganda began to take effect, there is a gradual drop. Toward the last of May 1918 there is a sharp drop to 58 per cent and after August it goes plunging down to almost the bottom of the chart where it ends on November 11.



Fig. 1—German Civilian Morale

To get information for their daily reports agents of the Subsection interviewed Germans in the Allied prison camps. From these interviews they got valuable information concerning the feeling among the German troops and the people beyond the Rhine.

During these conversations the German officers were "often bored" while the private was gratified and "we found him sick of the war, doubtful of his leaders, and passionately curious about America's war and peace." (p 518)[52] Occasionally, however they also found officers who talked freely. An artillery lieutenant, L., who was described as an "admirer of Ludendorff" said of the propaganda in one of these interviews:

> "I can only talk as a soldier at the front, but there its effects were disastrous and especially so in the past six months. Even the little *flugblatter* after you read them, you imagined you read the truth, that our government was lying to us. I remember one, after I read it, I felt like blowing my brains out. I never let one of our men read them — but it was difficult — they were everywhere." (p 524)[52]

Checking up on the initial propaganda campaign in the spring and early summer of 1918, the Intelligence Section found that German commanders were reporting lowered morale in the ranks of their troops. The German soldiers had become uneasy and rapidly were losing faith in their officers as a result of the information scattered from the air.[53] In the *Kölnische Zeitung* for October 31, 1918, a "High Officer on the Western Front," analyzing the military reverses wrote:

> "What caused most damage was the paper war waged by our enemies, who daily flooded us with hundreds of thousands of leaflets, extraordinarily well arranged and well edited."[54]

In an American Divisional Summary of the 28th of January, 1919, is found the following from the interrogation of S., an infantryman:

> "One of the things that made a great impression on the German soldiers and which S. believes helped to shorten the war, was the propaganda dropped by American planes. Despite orders the soldiers continued to obtain the papers. Many sent them home to their families." (p 524)[52]

GERMAN COUNTER-PROPAGANDA

From the very beginning of the war, Germany, like all of the warring nations, conducted a campaign of patriotic propaganda at home to keep up the morale of the German people and the troops. This work had been put into the hands of the *Kriegspresseamt*, which had also the task of issuing war news to the German press. This double duty resulted in a failure to organize an effective propaganda system in the Fatherland, since the *Kriegspresseamt* concentrated its efforts mainly on war news. This deficiency was not noticed during the first few years of the war, but when the Allied organizations began hammering at the German front with their *flugblatter* the Germans became aware of their weakness. But even then the military leaders failed to act, since the majority of these leaders did not understand the psychology of the war. As for the Minister of War, he was "a soldier with military duties and he was more interested in the conduct of the war from a military standpoint than a moral standpoint."[55] By the spring of 1917 Germany was feeling the effects of Allied propaganda. In May of that year the minister called a meeting in which the leading military officials, the Imperial Chancellor, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of the Interior, and the Minister of Education took part. The Confidential Report of their meeting issued by the War Ministry throws some light on the propaganda activities of the Allies.

> "Z No.4240/17 G.A.I.
> War Ministry
> *Strictly Confidential*
> Report of the sitting of 25 May 1917 regarding the enemy anti-monarchistic activities and discussion of steps to be taken. . . .
> The enemy endeavors to bring about anti-monarchical feeling among the fighting forces and the people have taken on a wider field recently and are supported by highly suspicious material spread in a most vigorous manner. For the most part the enemy is concentrating on leaflets in word and picture, which are being dropped from the air, or come in from the outside and are disseminated here. It is high time that the strong undermining work of the enemy be countered with similar propaganda in even more active manner."(Vol 5, p 130)

Then follows a discussion of the steps to be taken to fight the demoralizing activities of the Allied propagandists. In the Foreign Office there was to be set up a central agency for the collection of propaganda, and close cooperation between this and the press was to be established. Important people were to be enlisted to write articles for the press, or to give speeches in towns and villages all over Germany to combat enemy propaganda and harmful rumors. The churches, schools, and military hospitals were to be used as agencies for "enlightenment." Teachers and wounded officers were to conduct lectures on patriotic subjects in an effort to raise the morale of the mass of people and the soldiers behind the Front.

The army officials also took steps to raise the morale of the men at the Front. In a memorandum drawn up and submitted by General Ludendorff to the Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army, under date of July 29, 1917, we read:

> "Everything which is likely to prejudice the morale of the troops, e.g. leaflets sent down from the air by the enemy or sent out from home, must be kept at a distance."[56]

By September 15, 1917, the *Vaterlandische Unterricht unter den Truppen* was set up with which it was proposed to raise the morale of the German soldiers. The army high command was to see to it that patriotic instruction was given to the troops. The officers were reminded that they carried the greatest responsibility for the patriotic instruction. They were to keep from the troops all unfavorable material such as enemy leaflets, and were to bend every effort to strengthen the will to victory among their men.

The patriotic instruction was to be done through lectures, films, field preaching, and army newspapers. It is significant that "discussion during the instruction is not permitted." The points to be stressed in this work were: (1) The causes of the war, reasons Germany entered, and results, especially to the German worker, if they lost; (2) The great strength of the German military machine, the victories of the U-boats, and the work of the great munitions factories; (3) The necessity and significance of the cooperation of all classes — military, governmental, industrial, and commercial; the necessity for authority on one side and obedience on the other. Faithfulness to the Kaiser was especially to be sought.

One great weakness of this attempt at patriotic instruction was that it was left in the hands of the military leaders. These were too busy with military details to bother about the *Vaterlandische Unterricht*. To be sure, a great deal of work along that line was done, but, as one German writer put it, "What good would it do to try to oppose the cry of the enemy for a struggle for freedom and justice against the militarists of Europe?"[57] Furthermore, the *Kriegspresseamt* was not capable of enlightening and arousing the people at home. To accomplish this, a *Reichspresseamt* would have been necessary, but such an organization was never set up by the Germans. The result was that the Allied propagandists were more successful in Germany than the German propagandists themselves. This fact the German leaders admitted when they said in the final issue of one of their propaganda publications:

> "In the sphere of leaflet propaganda the enemy has defeated us. We realized that in this struggle of life and death, it was necessary to use the enemy's own methods. But the spirit of the enemy leaflets will not permit itself to be killed. . . . The enemy has defeated us not as man against man in the field of battle, bayonet against bayonet. No! Bad contents in poor printing on poor paper has made our arm lame."[58]

"(Not to be taken into the Front Line). To be issued to the rank and file by companies for perusal, then collected again and filed by Regimental Staffs for occasional reissue and collection. For a man to allow himself to be taken prisoner by the enemy without having defended himself to the utmost is a dishonorable act equivalent to treachery.[64]

The document then told how the German prisoners were tortured by the Allies. It warned them emphatically not to talk or give away military secrets."

That German soldiers became recruits for the Allied propagandists in the last few months of the war is evidenced by the Army Order of August 12, 1918.

"15th Infantry Division
"On the afternoon of August 9, propaganda tracts of a seditious character, probably dropped by hostile aviators, were distributed along the road from Bac D'Arblincourt to the canal by German soldiers to passing soldiers. Everyone will be strictly warned that all tracts, whether loose leaves or packets tied up with a string, dropped by hostile aeroplanes, or found, will be immediately turned over to your officer. Every man in whose hands such a tract has been placed is in duty bound to ascertain the name and unit of the distributors and report it." (Vol 3, p 1054)[62]

General von Hutier's order of August 29, 1918, gives us an idea of the extent of Allied propaganda against Germany. Incidentally, it also tells us what the German authorities thought of the head of the British propaganda agency, Lord Northcliffe.

August 29, 1918

"XVIIIth Army

Army Order

"The enemy begins to realize that we cannot be crushed by blockade, superiority of numbers, or force of arms. He is, therefore, trying a last resort: While engaging to the utmost his military force, he is racking his imagination for ruses, trickery, and other methods of which he is the past master, to induce, in the minds of the German people a doubt in their invincibility. He has founded for this purpose a special Ministry, 'The Ministry for the Destruction of German Confidence,' at the head of which he has put the most thoroughgoing scoundrel of all the Entente, Northcliffe. . . . The letters of German prisoners are falsified in the most outrageous manner; tracts and pamphlets are concocted to which the names of German poets, writers and statesmen are forged . . . . His thought and aim is that these forgeries . . . may suggest a doubt even for a moment in the minds of those who do not think for themselves and that their confidence in their leaders, in their own strength and in the inexhaustible resources of Germany may be shattered . . . .

"Pick up the leaflets and pamphlets and give them to your commanders. . . . You will thus help the Command and you will help to hasten the hour of victory. VON HUTIER." (Vol 3, p 1126)[62]

Many other Army Orders were of the same tone. Always the appeal was for the troops to disregard the leaflets or for the officers to take steps to counteract them. During the months of September and October the German high officials appealed directly to the people and the troops to disregard the propaganda and to keep their fighting spirit. On September 2, 1918, von Hindenburg issued his famous address to the German people which was printed on large placards and posted throughout

the Empire. In this he told of the attacks the enemy was making on the spirit of the German soldiers and people behind the lines. "The enemy," he said, "wants to poison the spirit of the Germans and believes that our military force will cease when the spirit is destroyed. We must not take this plan of the enemy too lightheartedly." He closed with an appeal to the soldiers and people to resist the "poisonous leaflets" and to remember that they came from the enemy.

The appeals of the high officials, however, were of no avail. The *Leipziger Volkszeitung* gives us an idea of how they were received when it says in the issue of November 2, 1918:

> "For the Crown of Wilhelm II; to uphold the military apparatus and the power of Hindenburg the people are being goaded on to continue the fight. No more war! Immediate peace! Full political freedom! Down with militarism! . . . Long live the Socialist Republic."[65]

The people behind the lines and the soldiers had been swamped by enemy propaganda. The morale of the troops had dropped to the lowest possible level. Ludendorff wired to Berlin to request an immediate armistice of the Allies. On October 3, Hindenburg and a major of the General Staff appeared before Prince Max of Baden and told of the precarious condition of the Army. Von Kuhlman recognized the impossibility of a victory for Germany in view of the state of mind of the army and the home front. Germany had been "hypnotized by the enemy propaganda as a rabbit is by a snake."[66]

It cannot be denied that the propaganda of the Allies hit the German armies very hard. Allied authorities were generally agreed that, sooner or later, Germany would be defeated, but even the most authoritative people thought that this defeat could not be accomplished before August 1919. Thus propaganda probably helped to hasten the end of the war. Speaking of this the *London Times* stated:

> "Good propaganda probably saved a year of war, and this meant the saving of thousands of millions in money and probably at least a million lives."[67]

On November 10, 1918, the day before the Armistice, Lord Northcliffe was entertained in Paris at a *dejeuner d'honneur* by the *Continental Daily Mail.* In the course of his speech on the war situation he summarized the work of the propagandists as follows:

> "We have conducted our propaganda through many channels and in increasing volume, and our leaflets and other publications have amounted to many millions of copies every week. If we have to some extent hastened the end it was due to the fact that we are a company of experts and enthusiasts, and from the outset there has been a concentration of purpose born of complete unity. . . . Ours has been a bloodless campaign and a costless one. I wish that we had embarked upon it at an earlier stage of the war."[68]

Dr. Phillip stated before the Committee of Inquiry that, while it is difficult to measure the influence of enemy propaganda, "I do not believe that without its successful help the German downfall could have succeeded as it did."(p 167)[47] Propaganda was an important instrument of warfare during the world conflict, and without a study of the part it played, no historian can come to a real conclusion as to the causes of the collapse of the German Empire in 1918.

SECRETARY STIMSON'S LETTER TO SENATOR BORAH*

By W. E. D.

A published letter was employed to influence at least five separate target groups in behalf of at least three major political objectives.

During the night of 18 September 1931, Japanese troops of the Kwantung army drove out the Chinese garrisons and seized Mukden, Changchun, and several other south Manchurian cities. The attack was carried out with such "swiftness and precision" that the League of Nations' Lytton Commission, months later, concluded that the military moves, carried out under the implausible pretext of self-defense, were in actuality the first step of a carefully matured plan for the military occupation of all of Manchuria.

On 21 September, China appealed to the League of Nations, which had just assembled, to take cognizance of the breach of peace and to use its good offices to repair it. At the same time China called on the US, as sponsor of the Kellogg-Briand antiwar pact, to take such steps as would ensure the preservation of peace in the Far East, and the upholding of the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes.

This appeal from China did not fall on deaf ears, either in the US or in League of Nations' circles. The Secretary of State informed Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary General of the League, that the US was following developments closely, and that he, Stimson, was mindful of the obligations not only of the Kellogg Pact but also of the Nine-Power Treaty, to which the US, China, and Japan were all parties. Stimson assured the League Secretary of an attitude of "co-operation and frankness" and gave the added assurance that all information received from Manchuria would be passed along to the League. From that moment the US, under Stimson's leadership, integrated its diplomacy closely with the procedures of the League.

Despite the efforts of Washington and Geneva to clear up the trouble in Manchuria, the results achieved were disappointing. China accused Japan of unprovoked aggression. The Commander in Chief of Japanese military forces declared publicly that Japan would no longer recognize the government of Chang Hsueh-liang, the Chinese governor of Manchuria. On 8 October a squadron of Japanese planes bombed Chang's provisional capital at Chinchow. These and other activities of the Japanese army drew fresh calls for help from Peking, and led Stimson into a series of increasingly ambitious attempts to guide the activities of Great Britain, the League Council, and others so that they would adopt policies that would support the American government's position and that would in time induce Japan to abandon her conquest.

Unimpressed by what was happening in the Western capitals and in the League halls in Geneva, the Japanese army methodically extended its operations from southern into northern Manchuria, capturing Chinchow, 2 January 1932. Soon after the middle of January, fighting broke out in Shanghai, as the result of an effective anti-Japanese boycott that had been adopted by the Chinese in retaliation for the invasion of Manchuria. With the extension of hostilities to Shanghai, Stimson redoubled his efforts to secure British cooperation and in asking the League of Nations to bring judgment against Japan. While doing these things, he continued to search for means to impress Japan to drop her conquests.

*Adapted from *On Active Service in Peace and War*, by Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1947, pp 243 ff. Copyright, 1948, by Henry L. Stimson.

Shanghai provided a flaming lesson to the West on the nature of the Far Eastern crisis. During February and March there occurred a series of events in Western diplomacy that showed how deeply Shanghai had affected the situation. On 7 January the US had announced a policy of nonrecognition. Was this a sufficient expression of the American position? Was that all the US would do? The question was discussed at length in Cabinet meetings on 26 and 29 January. The three principal participants in the discussion were the President, Stimson, and Secretary of War Patrick Hurley. On 26 January, after Stimson had briefly stated that the situation was serious, Hurley opened the discussion, making the argument that notes and diplomatic representations were not going to do much good unless backed by force, since in his view the Japanese, in Shanghai as in Manchuria, were executing steps in a far-flung plan of imperial expansion that could be blocked only by war. If the US was not prepared to fight, she would do better not to waste her breath in protests that would be ignored.

President Hoover believed that the integrity of China could be forcefully defended by the Chinese themselves. He agreed with Hurley's analysis of the intentions of Japan, but he believed that by their mere size and persistence, the 450 million Chinese would eventually frustrate the Japanese grand design. In any event, according to the President, it was not a proper area or occasion for a war by the US. In referring to the President, Secretary Stimson recorded in his diary for 26 January 1932, the following:

> "He pointed out strongly the folly of getting into a war with Japan on this subject; that such a war could not be localized or kept in bounds, and that it would mean the landing of forces in the Far East which we had no reason or sense in doing. He said he would fight for Continental United States as far as anybody, but he would not fight for Asia."

The President, however, did not at all agree with Hurley about notes and remonstrances. He believed that the Kellogg Pact could become a great moral force against aggression, and he thought that the doctrine of nonrecognition of 7 January was a splendid first step in mobilizing opinion behind the principle of the pact.

> "He said that he thought that that note would take rank with the greatest papers of this country, and that that was the safe course for us to follow now rather than by getting into a war in China."

Since Mr. Hoover was the President, and since he believed that any policy of embargo or sanctions might lead to war, his position effectively blocked any governmental support for economic sanctions. This was a point that Stimson had argued with Mr. Hoover several times. The President was always willing to listen, but he was never persuaded. On 20 February he said, "he hoped that his mind was not closed on anything, but he admitted that it was as much closed as possible on the question of calling an embargo." He believed that the enforcement of the treaties to which the US and Japan were parties was a moral obligation to be met by moral pressures.

Debarred from any advocacy of sanctions, Stimson in early 1932 was hard put to it to find a policy that would be effective. He was finally driven to a double course: a bluff of force and a strong restatement of principles. The bluff was not a very good one; the statement of principles he considered one of the best things he ever did. Let us look first at the bluff.

Words alone were unlikely to be effective in blocking the Japanese. It was necessary that they have some ground for concern about the attitude of the government which spoke the words. Thus far Hurley was clearly right. Even if the US was unwilling to impose sanctions and still more unwilling to fight for the "peace of the Pacific," might it not be possible to bluff the Japanese? As Stimson put it to Mr. Hoover after the Cabinet meeting of 26 January,

> "The only difference I could see between his point and mine was the reliance which I felt we could put upon America's strength both economically and militarily. I quoted Theodore Roosevelt's saying, 'Speak softly and carry a big stick!' . . . I was against putting any threat into words. I thought we had a right to rely upon the unconscious elements of our great size and military strength; that I knew Japan was afraid of that, and I was willing to let her be afraid of that without telling her that we were not going to use it against her."

The policy of bluff on which Stimson was forced to rely was not an easy one to execute, for it was a bluff that could not be expressed. The American government could not intimate by word or deed that it favored sanctions; any such intimation was barred by Mr. Hoover's position. Stimson even felt it necessary to deny reports circulated privately in Geneva that the American government was coming round to support of sanctions. All that was possible was to keep silent on future intentions, and the silence was not very impressive. And when friendly governments attempted to sound out the American position, the bluff became still weaker.

In spite of this basic weakness in his position, Stimson remained throughout the Shanghai incident the leader of opinion against Japan. For by a restatement and elaboration of the basic position of the US, toward the end of February, he set the tone for the only affirmative action taken by the League. This was accomplished in a public letter to Senator Borah that was in many ways the most significant state paper Stimson ever wrote.

To Stimson it seemed time for a new move in the continuing campaign to mobilize world opinion. Secretary Hurley's warning that public opinion would not do the job would certainly prove correct unless the moral disapproval of the US should be reinforced by that of other major nations.

The obvious ground for a new statement was the Nine-Power Treaty. The first article of that treaty was precisely applicable to the situation in Manchuria; "no human language" could be more clear than its statement of the obligation of its signatories "(1) to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China and (2) to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government."

The obvious partner for a new *démarche* was Great Britain. It was on Mr. Hoover's suggestion that Stimson presented his plan to the British Ambassador on 9 February and discussed it in detail with Sir John Simon in five transatlantic telephone calls during the following week. He tried to persuade the British that the interests of both nations would be served by a joint reassertion of the Nine-Power Treaty. These conversations were friendly enough, and Sir John approved of Stimson's plan in principle. In practice, however, he held back. There were various reasons for his reluctance to accept Stimson's suggestion — some good and some less good. Among the good ones were Britain's membership in the League, where measures indicating adherence to the nonrecognition doctrine were

pending; it was reasonable then that the British should pace their actions to those of the League. Among the bad ones were Sir John's inability to take Chinese territorial and administrative integrity very seriously and his feeling that the question of Shanghai, as a direct threat to Western interests, should be considered separately from that of Manchuria, which he thought a dangerous subject in view of Japanese feelings. Such a separation seemed to Stimson wholly wrong — it would have been a tacit admission that aggression in Manchuria was less reprehensible than aggression in an area where there were extensive British interests.

On 16 February the League appeal was duly passed by 12 members of the Council, not party to the Far Eastern struggle. Although very politely worded, this appeal to Japan implied support of the nonrecognition doctrine and called Japan's attention to her obligation under the Nine-Power Treaty. In the days that followed, Stimson at last became convinced that the British government felt reluctant to join in his *démarche*. He was not especially annoyed at this situation. For a time he considered abandoning the idea of a new American statement, since it would be dangerous to make an official appeal to Japan and find that it went unsupported by other signatories to the same treaty.

On 21 February he decided on the Borah letter. The Japanese had launched a major attack the day before and public feeling both at home and abroad was at a new high. It would not do to let this moment pass without an American statement. At the same time, although he had failed to budge Mr. Hoover in his opposition to an embargo, Stimson had the President's strong support for a further effort to mobilize world opinion. In order to avoid or at least minimize diplomatic knifing, Stimson decided to cast his statement in the form of an open letter to Senator Borah; he recalled that Theodore Roosevelt had often used this technique in similar circumstances. On the evening of Washington's Birthday and the morning of 23 February, with the help of three of his trusted advisers, he wrote the letter. It was at once approved by the President and by Borah as suitable for publication.

The letter to Borah, as Stimson later wrote, "was intended for the perusal of at least five unnamed addressees." It is an excellent example of a document designed to influence the behavior of leaders and people well beyond our own borders. With the full knowledge that such a letter would be transmitted to the furthermost corners of the world, that is, would be translated into many languages and thus seen by individuals in positions of responsibility everywhere, it was well designed to serve as a vehicle of communications in psychological warfare, although that term had not come into use by 1932.

The letter to Senator Borah is an excellent illustration of how one instrument may serve to support a number of objectives. First it was designed to encourage China to continue to offer resistance to Japan, and thus, it was in support of a specific long-term political objective of the US, the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China. Second it was intended to exhort the League of Nations Assembly, which was about to meet, and thus, it was designed to influence the deliberations of an international agency. Third it was addressed indirectly to leaders of the British government to serve as a gentle reminder that they, through Lords Salisbury and Balfour, were joint authors with the Americans of the Open Door Policy and the Nine-Power Treaty. Thus, the letter was designed to support the short-term political objective of stirring up the British people and leaders, to cause them to adopt a course of action for the Far East in support of Anglo-American policy objectives. Fourth it was expected that the letter would be read and con-

sidered by the Japanese and thus that it might serve to deter them from further aggressive acts. It was hoped that the message would remind Japan that, if she chose to break down one of the group of treaties agreed on at the Washington Conference, other nations might feel themselves released from some of those treaties that were as important to her as the Nine-Power Treaty was to the US. Finally the contents of the letter would serve as a means of informing the American people about US policy.

The letter, which follows, was made public 24 February 1932.

"February 23, 1932

"My dear Senator Borah:

"You have asked my opinion whether, as has been sometimes recently suggested, present conditions in China have in any way indicated that the so-called Nine-Power Treaty has become inapplicable or ineffective or rightly in need of modification, and if so, what I considered should be the policy of this government.

"That policy, enunciated by John Hay in 1899, brought to an end the struggle among various powers for so-called spheres of interest in China which was threatening the dismemberment of that empire. To accomplish this Mr. Hay invoked two principles: (1) equality of commercial opportunity among all nations in dealing with China, and (2) as necessary to that equality the preservation of China's territorial and administrative integrity. These principles were not new in the foreign policy of America. They had been the principles upon which it rested in its dealings with other nations for many years. In the case of China they were invoked to save a situation which not only threatened the future development and sovereignty of that great Asiatic people, but also threatened to create dangerous and constantly increasing rivalries between the other nations of the world. War had already taken place between Japan and China. At the close of that war three other nations intervened to prevent Japan from obtaining some of the results of that war claimed by her. Other nations sought and had obtained spheres of interest. Partly as a result of these actions a serious uprising had broken out in China which endangered the legations of all of the powers at Peking. While the attack on those legations was in progress, Mr. Hay made an announcement in respect to this policy as the principle upon which the powers should act in the settlement of the rebellion.

"He said:

" 'The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.'

"He was successful in obtaining the assent of the other powers to the policy thus announced.

"In taking these steps Mr. Hay acted with the cordial support of the British Government. In responding to Mr. Hay's announcement, above set forth, Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, expressed himself 'most emphatically as concurring in the policy of the US.'

"For twenty years thereafter the 'open door' policy rested upon the informal commitments thus made by the various powers. But in the winter of 1921 to 1922, at a conference participated in by all of the principal powers which had interests in the Pacific, the policy was crystallized into the so-called Nine-Power Treaty, which gave definition and precision to the principles upon which the policy rested. In the first article of that treaty, the contracting powers, other than China, agreed:

" '1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

" '2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.

" '3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.

" '4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states.'

"This treaty thus represents a carefully developed and matured international policy intended, on the one hand, to assure to all of the contracting parties their rights and interests in and with regard to China, and on the other hand, to assure to the people of China the fullest opportunity to develop without molestation their sovereignty and independence according to the modern and enlightened standards believed to obtain among the people of this earth. At the time this treaty was signed, it was known that China was engaged in an attempt to develop the free institutions of a self-governing republic after her recent revolution from an autocratic form of government; that she would require many years of both economic and political effort to that end; and that her progress would necessarily be slow. The treaty was thus a covenant of self-denial among the signatory powers in deliberate renunciation of any policy of aggression which might tend to interfere with that development. It was believed — and the whole history of the development of the 'open door' policy reveals that faith — that only by such a process, under the protection of such an agreement, could the fullest interest not only of China but of all nations which have intercourse with her best be served.

"During the course of the discussions which resulted in the treaty, the chairman of the British Delegation, Lord Balfour, had stated that —

" 'The British Empire Delegation understood that there was no representative of any power around the table who thought that the old practice of "spheres of interest" was either advocated by any government or would be tolerable to this conference. So far as the British Government were concerned, they had, in the most formal manner, publicly announced that they regarded this practice as utterly inappropriate to the existing situation.'

"At the same time the representative of Japan, Baron Shidehara, announced the position of his Government as follows:

" 'No one denies to China her sacred right to govern herself. No one stands in the way of China to work out her own great national destiny. . . .'

"It must be remembered also that this treaty was one of several treaties and agreements entered into at the Washington Conference by the various powers concerned, all of which were interrelated and interdependent. No one of these treaties can be disregarded without disturbing the general understanding and equilibrium which were intended to be accomplished and effected by the group of agreements arrived at in their entirety. The Washington Conference was essentially a disarmament conference, aimed to promote the possibility of peace in the world not only through the cessation of competition in naval armament but also by the solution of various other disturbing problems which threatened the peace of the world, particularly in the Far East. These problems were all interrelated. The willingness of the American Government to surrender its then commanding lead in battleship construction and to leave its positions at Guam and in the Philippines without further fortifications was predicated upon, among other things, the self-denying covenants contained in the Nine-Power Treaty, which assured the nations of the world not only of equal opportunity for their Eastern trade but also against the military aggrandizement of any other power at the expense of China. One cannot discuss the possibility of modifying or abrogating those provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty without considering at the same time the other promises upon which they were really dependent.

"Six years later the policy of self-denial against aggression by a stronger against a weaker power, upon which the Nine-Power Treaty had been based, received a powerful reinforcement by the execution by substantially all the nations of the world of the Pact of Paris, the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact. These two treaties represent independent but harmonious steps taken for the purpose of aligning the conscience and public opinion of the world in favor of a system of orderly development by the law of nations including the settlement of all controversies by methods of justice and peace instead of by arbitrary force. The program for the protection of China from outside aggression is an essential part of any such development. The signatories and adherents of the Nine-Power Treaty rightly felt that the orderly and peaceful development of the 400,000,000 of people inhabiting China was necessary to the peaceful welfare of the entire world and that no program for the welfare of the world as a whole could afford to neglect the welfare and protection of China.

"The recent events which have taken place in China, especially the hostilities which having been begun in Manchuria have latterly been extended to Shanghai, far from indicating the advisability of any modification of the treaties we have been discussing, have tended to bring home the vital importance of the faithful observance of the covenants therein to all of the nations interested in the Far East. It is not necessary in that connection to inquire into the causes of the controversy or attempt to apportion the blame between the two nations which are unhappily involved: for regardless of cause or responsibility, it is clear beyond peradventure that a situation had developed which cannot, under any circumstances, be reconciled with the obligations of the covenants of these two treaties, and that if the treaties had been faithfully observed such a situation could not have arisen. The signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact

who are not parties to that conflict are not likely to see any reason for modifying the terms of those treaties. To them the real value of the faithful performance of the treaties has been brought sharply home by the perils and losses to which their nationals have been subjected in Shanghai.

"That is the view of this Government. We see no reason for abandoning the enlightened principles which are embodied in these treaties. We believe that this situation would have been avoided had these covenants been faithfully observed, and no evidence has come to us to indicate that a due compliance with them would have interfered with the adequate protection of the legitimate rights in China of the signatories of those treaties and their nationals.

"On January 7th last, upon the instruction of the President, this Government formally notified Japan and China that it would not recognize any situation, treaty or agreement entered into by those Governments in violation of the covenants of these treaties, which affected the rights of our Government or its citizens in China. If a similar decision should be reached and a similar position taken by the other governments of the world, a caveat will be placed upon such action which, we believe, will effectively bar the legality hereafter of any title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or treaty violation, and which, as has been shown by history in the past, will eventually lead to the restoration to China of rights and titles of which she may have been deprived.

"In the past our Government, as one of the leading powers on the Pacific Ocean, has rested its policy upon an abiding faith in the future of the people of China and upon the ultimate success in dealing with them of the principles of fair play, patience, and mutual good will. We appreciate the immensity of the task which lies before her statesmen in the development of her country and its Government. The delays in her progress, the instability of her attempts to secure a responsible government, were forseen by Messrs. Hay and Hughes and their contemporaries and were the very obstacles which the policy of the 'open door' was designed to meet. We concur with those statesmen, representing all the nations in the Washington Conference, who decided that China was entitled to the time necessary to accomplish her development. We are prepared to make that our policy for the future.

Very sincerely yours,
HENRY L. STIMSON

The Honorable William E. Borah
United States Senate"

As might well be anticipated, this letter was not effective in achieving all the objectives outlined. It did succeed, however, in arousing the American people to the dangers inherent in a continuation of the Far East controversy. Professor Shotwell, of Columbia University, described the letter as belonging in the same general categories of public documents as the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door Policy. The *Literary Digest*, after surveying the editorial comments in dozens of papers in all parts of the US, agreed with the *Christian Science Monitor* that the Stimson letter "ranks with the most important state papers in American history."

With respect to what, if any, effect the letter had on the League of Nations, it is well to note the following:

"Shortly afterward, Secretary Stimson received world-wide approval for his earlier non-recognition doctrine. On March 11, fifty nations of the Assembly of the League of Nations agreed to a resolution which incorporated in one part almost verbatim the American Secretary's pronouncement — non-recognition of the spoils won in wars of aggression."[69]

It would be difficult indeed to ascertain what, if any, effect the message and the League action had on Japan and China. Nearly two months after the League resolution, peace terms were signed by China and Japan. The last of the invading Japanese troops left the Shanghai sector on May 31. It would be unrealistic to ascribe Japan's action as in any direct way due to the action of Secretary Stimson. It appears that the determined resistance of the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army, in the defense of Shanghai, had involved her in a conflict of unanticipated proportions. This, plus the diplomatic pressures exerted through old-fashioned channels of diplomacy, probably had more to do with the decision to desist from further aggression at the time than any act of international propaganda, no matter how subtle in form, or direct in communication.

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CHAPTER 4

ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

Organization for Psychological Warfare

Six accounts are presented in this chapter outlining some of the features and activities of organizations and agencies to which have been entrusted the American psychological warfare and foreign information efforts of the past and present. The first account, written not long after World War I, describes the pattern of organization for propaganda agencies that emerged during that struggle in four countries: the US, England, France, and Germany. The type of organizational arrangement that emerged differed in each of these countries.

The second and third articles are "US Psychological Warfare Organizations in World War II" and "Post-World War II Developments." The most obvious conclusions to be drawn from these accounts are the following: much of the activity and the type of organization that emerged during World War II was the result of trial-and-error improvisations; for a large measure of effectiveness in propaganda operations a considerable degree of decentralization of responsibility is indicated; a central organization is required to provide logistic support and to ensure proper coordination of effort as between policy objectives, planning activities, and dissemination of output; however, where operational direction is extended to minute details of field activities, the effectiveness of the propaganda activity is likely to suffer.

"RIAS: The Story of An American Psywar Outpost" and "The Far East Regional Production Center" illustrate further post-World War II developments, namely, the administrative practice of decentralizing propaganda while concentrating printing establishments in a few centers, far removed from Washington, not too distant from the areas where the propaganda material is planned and where it will be disseminated after it is printed.

The article on RIAS was prepared by an American journalist long interested in psychological warfare operations, first as an observer of German operations in Northern France in 1940 and later as an operator in the American effort during and after World War II. "The Far East Regional Production Center" was specially prepared for inclusion in this volume by a onetime director of the center.

Not all the propaganda activities of Americans in the post-World War II period was and is government sponsored. The sixth article, "Non-Governmental Agencies Engaged in Cold War Propaganda Operations," describes the organization and activities of two agencies, supported by private funds, that are actively engaged in the cold war psychological warfare effort against the Soviet Union and its satellites. These are *Radio Free Europe*, financed by the Crusade For Freedom, at one time headed by C. D. Jackson, and *Radio Liberation*, sponsored by the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, Inc., headed by a former US Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. Having only the most tenuous and indirect connections with the government these agencies are enabled to speak with more vigor on topics relating to evils of Soviet Communism than a government agency would normally attempt.

ORGANIZATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENCIES IN WORLD WAR I*

By Harold D. Lasswell

The organizational arrangements for foreign and domestic propaganda that emerged in England, France, Germany, and the US during World War I differed in important respects. Inter-allied coordination of their separate propaganda efforts was virtually nonexistent.

Inside a democratic country there is a certain presumption against government propaganda. As Representative Gillett, commenting upon the Creel Bureau, said, admitting that it has not been conducted in a partisan spirit:

> "That is the great danger of such a bureau as this, because we must all admit that if any administration has in its power a Bureau of Public Information, as it is called, but really an advertising bureau, a propaganda bureau, a bureau of publicity, to exploit the various acts and departments of the Government, it is a very dangerous thing in a Republic; because, if used in a partisan spirit or for partisan advantage of the administration, it has tremendous power, and in ordinary peace-time I do not think any party or any administration would justify it or approve it."[1]

The truth is that all governments are engaged to some extent in propaganda as part of their ordinary peace-time functions. They make propaganda on behalf of diplomatic friends or against diplomatic antagonists, and this is unavoidable. While, therefore, the presumption exists against propaganda work by a democratic government, this statement should not be taken too literally.

During the war-period it came to be recognized that the mobilization of men and means was not sufficient; there must be a *mobilization of opinion*. Power over opinion, as over life and property, passed into official hands, because the danger

* From Chap. 2, "Propaganda Organization," pp 14–26, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1927. Reproduced with permission of Dr. Lasswell, the copyright holder.

from license was greater than the danger of abuse. Indeed, there is no question but that government management of opinion is an unescapable corollary of large-scale modern war. The only question is the degree to which the government should try to conduct its propaganda secretly, and the degree to which it should conduct it openly. As far as the home public is concerned, there is nothing to be gained by concealment, and there is a certain loss of prestige for all that is said, when secrecy is attempted. The carrying power of ideas is greatly increased when the authority of the government is added to them. With certain insignificant exceptions (the smuggling of propaganda material into adjacent enemy countries), nothing is lost, if all propaganda operations in neutral and allied countries are carried on openly. Otherwise, indeed, suspicion and distrust may exist where complete confidence and understanding are indispensable. The United States Committee on Public Information was undoubtedly correct in notifying neutral governments of what they wanted to do inside neutral borders.

It is bad tactics, however, to announce blatantly to the enemy that a "Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries" has been named. As Sir Herbert Samuel said in the House of Commons, when Lord Northcliffe was appointed to this post in 1918:

> "Possibly the Germans may regard Lord Northcliffe, the proprietor of the *Daily Mail* and the *Evening News*, in much the same light as we may regard Count Reventlow. What should we think, if we heard that an official announcement had been made by the German Government, that they had appointed Count Reventlow as the Director to carry on propaganda in the United Kingdom, and in other Allied countries?"[2]

Assuming, in principle, that propaganda should be conducted in the open by a belligerent government, the problem of organization presents itself. What agencies should carry on the work, and to what degree is unity of command practicable? The work of carrying on the war brings several government services into the active control of certain streams of information, and international attitudes are to some degree involved with the rest. There is the Foreign Office at home, and the Diplomatic and Consular staffs abroad. There is the War and Naval Department at home, and the Military and Naval Attachés abroad. There is the General Staff and the Field Headquarters. There are the various service ministries engaged upon problems of supply and internal regulation. The mere enumeration of these agencies is sufficient to remind one of the evident proposition that the influencing of attitudes is implicit in every function, and that it is incapable of complete segregation in anything like the degree to which, let us say, the purchasing of horses can be confined to a particular agency.

Disunity brings dangers. The Foreign Office and the Field Headquarters may hold out contradictory inducements to the enemy and cast the whole propaganda of demoralization into disrepute. The military people at home may announce the destruction of public buildings in the occupied zone, much to the consternation of the diplomatic representatives in neutral countries. There is always the possibility that bad news of different kinds may break simultaneously and produce an unwonted state of depression if each service gives its own news to the public. The news of a naval loss, a military loss, and an aviation loss may come when there is a shortage of flour, and when there is a prickly set of wage and price problems agitating the prints at home. If this news were handled through a central clearing house, it could be distributed over a period of time and nullified by the more favourable aspects of the general situation.

Disunity leads to a considerable duplication of effort. If the military people publish the same pamphlet that the diplomatic service publishes, and distribute it through the military attachés abroad when the diplomatic attachés have already doled it out, no good purpose can be served. It is difficult to work out a revision of general policy in the light of propaganda efforts, where there is no continuing mechanism for keeping tab on the whole range of propaganda work. The backwardness of certain departments, which may be opposed to publicity, may produce a repercussion of uneasiness and distrust. There may be delay in shifting the personnel devoted to propaganda work to the sectors where the most effect can be secured.

Some of these dangers may be offset by the dangers of unity. Any scheme of unity runs the risk of antagonizing the *amour propre* of some service and of ruining morale. If the control of foreign and domestic propaganda were integrated too tightly in the hands of one man, the one or the other might suffer from the preconceptions of the responsible head. Their requirements are so different that only a rare combination of talents can be relied upon to develop both of them to the highest efficiency.

The balance seems to point toward unity as more desirable than disunity, but it seems to justify a scheme of organization which preserves a considerable degree of autonomy to the constituent services. What are the possible forms of organization? There might be a single propaganda executive. There might be a committee of executives, each responsible for some branch of propaganda work, such as propaganda against the enemy, propaganda in neutral and allied countries, propaganda among civilians, and propaganda in the fighting forces. In any case, the propaganda work in training camps, at the front, in rest camps, on shipboard, and in transit, would vest largely in military and naval authorities. A third method is to arrange a common Press conference for all departments, but to leave all other forms of effort to the regular agencies affected, which would especially be the Foreign Office, General Headquarters, the War Department, and the Ministry of the Interior. Broadly speaking, the United States adopted the first expedient in the last war, Great Britain, the second, and Germany, the third.

A Committee on Public Information was appointed, by order of the President, soon after the entrance of the United States into the War. It was composed of the Secretaries of the Navy and War Departments, the Secretary of State, and Mr. George Creel. This was equivalent to appointing a separate cabinet member for propaganda, in fact, and Mr. Creel was responsible for every aspect of propaganda work, both at home and abroad. One result of this method of organization was to confer upon the representatives of the Committee abroad something of the prestige of three great government departments, and to satisfy the self-esteem of each one.

While the American system sprang into existence at a single stroke, and remained substantially unaltered during the War, the British system went through a long and intricate series of changes. As Major-General Sir George Aston wrote:

> "Party politicians are suspicious folk, unwilling to trust any Government with money to spend on propaganda, for fear that they will spend it in their own interest rather than the country's. So the Parliamentary War Aims Committee was established with representatives of all parties. The Committee was charged with Home Propaganda, and came in for much criticism."[3]

A small department was set up at Wellington House in the office of the Insurance Commissioners to prepare pamphlets and leaflets. Wellington House initiated the Bryce Report, which was one of the triumphs of the War, on the propaganda front, but most of its material was put out as though it were a private and not an official agency. A films and wireless committee was later set up under Mr. Mair, but its relation to the Home Office and the Foreign Office was uncertain. A Press Bureau was improvised in August, 1914, and was later adopted by the Home Office. The Foreign Office was meanwhile engaged in the following activities, according to a statement in Parliament by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Acland):

> "We are taking steps to see that there is supplied to the Press in neutral countries not only news strictly so-called, but also news which we take here to be rather commonplace, but which is of real interest to other countries, as to the condition of this country, and information with regard to trade, and with regard to employment, and with regard to recruiting, and with regard to all such matters as to which the condition of this country is really of interest to our friends."[4]

In January, 1917, the Department of Information was organized. Colonel Buchan had charge of four widely scattered services, and was responsible to the War Cabinet and the Prime Minister. An Advisory Committee was established, which consisted of Lord Northcliffe, Lord Burnham, Mr. Robert Donald, and Mr. C. P. Scott. When Lord Northcliffe proceeded on his mission to America, Lord Beaverbrook was appointed to this Committee, and later, Sir George Riddell was added. Things were still at loose ends under this system, and Sir E. Carson, a member of the War Cabinet, was asked to co-ordinate the various agencies. The War Department had organized a separate service for the purpose of conducting propaganda against the German Army, and the civilian peoples. Finally, in February, 1918, Lord Beaverbrook was made Minister of Information, occupying the post of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. At the same time Lord Northcliffe was named Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, and Directors were appointed for neutral countries for intelligence, and for cinematograph propaganda. Lord Northcliffe was technically responsible to Lord Beaverbrook in respect to finance, but, in fact, he had the right of direct access to the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet. Confusion was worse confounded by locating the Enemy Propaganda Department in the British War Mission with which Northcliffe had been working for some months past. Informal conferences were inaugurated to co-ordinate efforts, and later a Propaganda Policy Committee was presided over by Lord Northcliffe. A working unity was actually achieved, although at the expense of many weary months and years of bickering and duplication.* The Italians arrived at this same method of organization.

* The attitude of the Foreign Office clique toward the Beaverbrook ministry is reflected in the comments of the author of *The Pomp of Power*.[5] He says that a group of experts on foreign affairs refused to work under the direction of Beaverbrook and migrated to the Foreign Office. Beaverbrook relied upon Canadians "whose experience of foreign affairs and whose knowledge of foreign languages was as limited as his own." Beaverbrook has told his own story in *Politicians and the Press*.[6] Lord Bertie, British Ambassador to France, lamented that for two years (until 1917) the Foreign Office failed to establish a press bureau in Paris.[7]

The most important difference between the American and the British plan was that the latter put foreign and domestic propaganda in the hands of co-ordinate officials. When the technicalities of the matter are allowed for, the British system clearly made no distinction between Northcliffe and Beaverbrook, for instance, who both had direct access to the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet. The British, in effect, laid equal emphasis upon the necessity for departmental autonomy in dealing with home, empire, neutral, allied, and enemy propaganda. The extraordinary diversity of foreign interests to which the British were appealing probably justified this procedure, because the problems which were presented were highly distinct.* The Americans came into the War, when it was neither their business to win the neutrals, nor to play one group against another. They had a very simple propaganda message to get across (American preparations; a Wilsonian Peace), and it could be vested in one executive without much danger.

It was the Germans who had a minimum of co-ordinated propaganda effort. Each Department went ahead in its own way, and the only formal co-operation was in the Press conference, which met two or three times a week. The War Ministry, the General Staff, the Navy Department, the District Military Authorities, the Colonial Office, the Post Office, the Interior Department, the Treasury Department, the Food Ministry, and eventually the Foreign Office took part. The chairmanship was passed round in a rotating system, and the co-operating journalists chose a committee to speak for them.

The Military Authorities had to build their work from the ground up.† At the outbreak of the War there was but a single official who had contact with the Press. But they soon evolved an extensive Press service to report military operations, to edit the Field Press, to control the admission of home papers to the army, and to carry on propaganda against the enemy.

The Foreign Office was slow in clearing for action, but in October, 1914, when the check on the Marne had deferred the prospects for peace, a special *Zentralstelle für Auslandsdienst* was created. This was a very busy bureau and published an imposing array of propaganda material.

As the War developed, the conflict between military and civil authorities became more and more acute. The military men went into a paroxysm of rage when the peace resolution was moved by Erzberger in 1917, as they had when Bethmann-Hollweg held out the olive branch in 1916. The military authorities had no patience with palaver about peace; they wanted a victorious peace of dictation. Ludendorff granted an interview to the Berlin Press in which these views were put before the people. Instantly the Left and Centre took up the challenge, and assailed the military for trying to interfere in politics. The Chancellor, to avoid being caught between partisan fires, refused, as had his predecessor, to create a separate Minister of Propaganda. The military authorities had proposed this on three different occasions, for they had already begun to feel the effects of Allied propaganda. At last the G.H.Q. tried to reach the home public directly by establishing a special Press service called the *Deutsche Kriegsnachrichten*, which, in spite of the opposition of the large papers, prospered. At the direction of General Ludendorff an

* This will appear especially in connection with a later point.

† Nicolai complains that the Reichstag failed to vote them enough money to develop a satisfactory press section before the war, because "in peace times the press was conceived as a partisan instrument." (p 53)[8]

elaborate plan of patriotic stimulation was drawn up July 29, 1927. It was designed to reach the civilian and the fighting population. (p 119ff)[8]

There were other tentative gestures toward the formation of a special propaganda agency to co-ordinate German efforts at home and abroad, but all of them failed. Private citizens organized the Wagner Culture Committee, to spread pro-German propaganda very early in the War, but its work lacked both prestige and deftness. Germany suffered from the overzealous efforts of private persons to fill the gaps left by Government omissions. Professor Lamprecht spoke with contempt of the educated man who "obtained the largest possible goose quill, and wrote to all his foreign friends, telling them that they did not realize what splendid fellows the Germans were, and not infrequently adding that, in many cases, their conduct required some excuses. . . . . The consequences were gruesome." In 1916, some of the civilian authorities commenced the movement to form a *Deutscher National-Ausschuss*, but this was still a private venture. Chancellor Hertling at last took some steps toward unified control in August, 1918, but his measures were both inadequate and tardy.

The French kept their propaganda in the hands of the established diplomatic, military, and naval agencies. Occasionally they supplemented the work abroad by sending out a High Commissioner, who combined propaganda, economic, and other functions, as did the temporary war missions of all the allied powers. The *Maison de la Presse* had its agents attached to the legations abroad.*

When Allies are fighting together, the problem of co-ordinating their propagandas and their policies arises. Inter-Allied co-operation in the last War was in a rudimentary stage at the time of the Armistice. When Lord Northcliffe became head of the British Enemy Propaganda Department in February, 1918, he called a preliminary conference on inter-Allied propaganda. One of the participating experts, Mr. Wickham Steed of *The Times*, writes that M. Henri Moysset, chief private secretary to the French Minister of Marine, spoke as a French representative, and insisted upon the imperative necessity for creating a "Thinking General Staff" to unify the effort exerted by the Allies in enemy and neutral countries. The Conference did actually appoint Professor Borghese (Italy), Mr. Steed and M. Moysset, with the expectation that they would co-operate in Paris, but jealousy of Moysset is said to have prevented the full development of the work.[10] The Allies conducted a formal conference in August, 1918, and their most successful common venture was a Permanent Inter-Allied Commission at the Italian G.H.Q.

Although the problem of organizing international propaganda campaigns was not satisfactorily solved in the late War, the experience of the Allies in certain other projects was complete enough to reveal sound principles of administration. Sir Arthur Salter, who digested his experience with the Inter-Allied Shipping Control with such skill, has generalized the conditions of continuing co-operation upon executive matters between independent governments.

> "Contact, and indeed regular contact, must be established between the appropriate permanent officials of the several national administrations. It is important that these officials should (where possible) continue to exer-

* A committee to conduct artistic propaganda abroad was formed in the spring of 1918 under the direction of the Minister for Education and Fine Arts. Besides the *Maison de la presse* there were unofficial members from organizations like the Chambre syndicale de la haute couture.[9]

cise executive authority in their own departments and, where geographical reasons prevent this, that they should, at least, be specialists, and continue to exercise a decisive influence on them. The officials must enjoy the confidence of the respective ministers, must keep in constant touch with their policy, must, within a considerable range, be able to influence their action, and they must have an accurate knowledge of the limits of their own influence."[11]

He declares that they must work together in sufficient intimacy to develop trust or knowledge of the limits within which they may trust one another, and that they must endeavour to develop such relations as will enable them, without disloyalty to their own governments, to discuss policy frankly in the earlier stages before it has been formulated in their own countries. The formal authority may best be supplied by the occasional meeting of the responsible ministers. Formal meetings of international representatives ought to be solely for the purpose of ratifying agreements already arrived at informally. Even minor negotiation should never be in the nature of a bargain.

Salter argues that the arrangement which he suggests, is an appropriate solution of the role of committees in administration.

"Nothing is so ineffective as a committee which consists of persons, each of whom has no specialized function and no personal executive authority, and yet tries to direct executive action. But if a number of persons, each of whom has a direct executive authority, which he continues to exercise in his own special sphere, meet from time to time, in order to dovetail their common measures and adjust them to a common plan, and then return to their departments to put into effect what they have agreed the committee is an effective instrument of co-operative action."[11]

US PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ORGANIZATIONS IN WORLD WAR II

By W. E. D.

US propaganda agencies created during World War II were more the result of trial and error planning and ad hoc *improvisations than of careful blueprinting.*

Introduction

When war came to the American people on 7 December 1941, the task of disseminating propaganda to foreign audiences was in the hands of two emergency agencies: the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), which confined its activities to Latin America, and the Coordinator of Information (COI), which operated in the rest of the world.

The Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, under the direction of Nelson Rockefeller, was created on 16 August 1940, with the mission of developing good inter-American relations. The information aspects of the CIAA's program — the press, radio, and motion-picture activities — was regarded as an integral part of its general cultural and commercial relations program carried out in close cooperation with the Department of State. When war was declared CIAA helped convince the Latin American people that hemisphere solidarity was necessary for the proper protection of western hemisphere interests. The agency

very ably supplemented the commercial news services with the dissemination of special feature articles, through local information activities, through film distribution, and by means of short-wave radio programs beamed from the US.

Coordinator of Information

The Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) was established by a military order of President Roosevelt on 11 July 1941. It was assigned two major functions: the coordination of intelligence collection and analysis from all sources, including the armed forces; and the transmission of information abroad to areas outside Latin America. The second of these two missions was not clearly stated in the order establishing COI. At the time the US was trying, to be sure without great success, to observe the outward signs of neutrality between those forces fighting Nazi Germany and those associated with it. Although it was not specifically stated in the order establishing COI, it was clearly understood by the Coordinator, Col (later General) William J. Donovan, and the President that a Foreign Information Service (FIS) was to be established as an integral part of COI. This service was directed by the President not to engage in domestic information activities.

Colonel Donovan appointed Robert Sherwood, an intimate confidant of the President and the White House staff, as the director of FIS. Its major headquarters was established in New York City. In accordance with its mission, this service, which from the very beginning was virtually an autonomous agency, undertook to spread the gospel of democracy, the cause of the United Nations and to explain the objectives of the US throughout the world, except in Latin America. In accordance with its directives, FIS cleared those aspects of its plans and projects that dealt with US foreign and military policies with the State, War, and Navy Departments and attempted to implement its operational objectives in close cooperation with the British government.

The FIS operated on the basic assumption that a democratic country cannot successfully undertake a Goebbels-deception type of foreign propaganda and that truth was the only effective base on which to build an American information program. Accordingly it attempted to establish a propaganda program with the day's news as the chief ingredient.

When the war came to the US in December 1941, both the CIAA and FIS were developing programs for the use of short-wave broadcast facilities. However, in only a few languages had programs already been beamed overseas. It was not until several hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, that the first Japanese-language short-wave program was directed to the Japanese Empire by FIS from transmitters located on the US west coast.

Notwithstanding the employment of psychological warfare on both the strategic and tactical levels in World War I, Americans began similar types of operations in World War II with little if any reference to the lessons learned in the earlier struggle. In addition, top-echelon leaders from the President down were, first, deeply engrossed in problems of general military and political strategy, and, second, they were either ignorant of or indifferent to the potentialities and limitations of the use of psychological warfare in the world-wide struggle against the Nazis and the Japanese. As a consequence, thinking on the kind of organization required for effective operations in psychological warfare was neither clear nor consistent, with the result that confusion in this area was widespread in the 6 months that followed the attack on Pearl Harbor.

This confusion on how to handle the nation's program of war information, domestic and foreign, was such as to lead to numerous suggestions on how best to reorganize the effort. All reorganization plans had these three features in common: all recognized that the existing situation was not good, all suggested that the lines of administrative responsibility should be clearly fixed, and all provided for a better integration of planning and a system for the coordination of output.

Office of War Information

By Executive Order 9182, dated 13 June 1942, the Office of War Information (OWI) was established. This order was based on suggestions contained in a memorandum on the reorganization of war-information services submitted to the President by the Director of the Budget on 7 March 1942. Nelson Rockefeller, the head of CIAA, successfully resisted the Budget Bureau's suggestion that his agency be integrated into a single organization engaged in foreign information work. As a consequence, the order establishing OWI left CIAA out of the new organization.

The OWI was created by the transfer of various information services, domestic and foreign, to it. Included among the war-information agencies or services merged into OWI were the following: Office of Facts and Figures (OFF), Office of Government Reports (OGR), the general information activities of the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), and FIS of COI.

It is the organization and activities of the FIS of COI that is of particular interest to the student of psychological warfare. Upon merger into the OWI, FIS became its Overseas Branch. The Domestic Branch of OWI, originally comprised mainly of the personnel transferred from OFF, OGR, and OEM, is of less concern to those primarily interested in international propaganda and foreign information.

The remaining functions of the disbanded COI — those involving the collection and analysis of intelligence data on foreign areas — were transferred to a new agency, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under the leadership of Col Donovan. OSS was made an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

The order creating OWI did not clearly establish a division of responsibility between it and OSS for the conduct of psychological warfare.

During the first year of OWI's existence the domestic-information activities of OWI were dominant. The Overseas Branch continued until late spring or summer of 1943 much as FIS had in COI — as virtually an autonomous unit. During the period of time from the establishment of OWI, in June 1942 until 9 March 1943, three important factors were to influence the character of the organization that emerged from the war experience. First, the overseas activities of both OWI and OSS were vaguely defined. Second, the psychological warfare organization — OWI, OSS, and CIAA — were all rent with interagency and intragency disputes. Third, although the major efforts of the top-echelon leaders in OWI were largely concerned with the OWI domestic program, OSS under the dynamic leadership of General Donovan developed far-reaching plans for the conduct of psychological warfare in connection with the then forthcoming military campaigns. These plans were not accepted by Robert Sherwood, Chief of the Overseas Branch, or Elmer Davis, Director of OWI.

JCS in December 1942, during the first extensive US military operation of World War II, tried to resolve the conflict between OSS and OWI by the issuance of an order stating that OSS was to have complete authority "to plan, develop, coordinate and execute the military program of psychological warfare." It turned

out that the issuance of this order was an unfortunate occurrence. The order did not get to the basic problem of organization — the lack of adequate integration and coordination.

The rivalry of the empire-building agencies continued unabated. The compartmentalization of the various information-dispensing agencies prevented any one of them from knowing what the others were planning or doing. The JCS directive proved not to be the answer to the problem, for it gave all too little emphasis to the prevailing American philosophy or political concept, i.e., that propaganda, if not all psychological warfare, is first and foremost a civilian and not primarily a military responsibility. As a consequence both Mr. Davis, head of OWI, and Mr. Rockefeller, head of CIAA, appealed directly to the President, protesting the military usurpation of a presidential delegation of authority.

Following the appeal to the President an executive order, No. 9312, was issued on 9 March 1943, which set forth more clearly the responsibility of OWI in the overseas commands. The new executive order stated that OWI was to be the agency to conduct foreign information and overt propaganda operations abroad but "in areas of actual or projected military operations" all plans and projects "should be coordinated with the military plans" and would "be subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the approval of the theater commander. . . ."

This order did not clearly define what, if any, psychological warfare functions were retained by OSS. For example, the order did not state whether OWI or OSS had jurisdiction over subversive activities, covert propaganda campaigns, etc. The order did little to resolve the difficult problems of coordination as between the separate agencies. However, the progress of the war tended to resolve the intensity if not the subject of the interagency disputes.

Psychological Warfare Agencies within the Military Establishments

At various times during the course of the war the military establishments in Washington displayed a slight, though inconsistent, interest in psychological warfare operations. The Navy Department established a highly secretive Special Warfare Branch (OP-16W) within the Office of Naval Intelligence to plan and to assist with the conduct of special operations in the area of psychological warfare and fields related to it. Captain (later Admiral) Zacharias was one of the moving spirits in this organization. In addition to Zacharias's appeals to Japan in 1945, the most noteworthy operations of the small psychological warfare staff of the Navy were those associated with the "Commander Norden" appeals to Nazi submariners.*

In the War Department headquarters in Washington, support for psychological warfare was neither as intensive nor as consistent as in the Navy Department. A Special Studies Group (SSG) was set up prior to the actual outbreak of war, but it was more a high-level strategic planning group than strictly a psychological warfare planning or operational agency. During its relatively short life its major activities involved the establishment of liaison with COI and CIAA, providing these agencies unclassified military information that might present the US in a better light to the world at large. One of its major accomplishments was the recommendation for the establishment of a Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) within JCS, which was implemented.

* See "Commander Norden and the German Admirals," in Chap. 7 of Vol II of this study.

JPWC was a military organization, its membership being composed exclusively of military personnel. Its functions were defined as follows:

> ". . . to initiate, formulate and develop psychological warfare plans. . . [and] under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff committee to coordinate psychological warfare of other US governmental agencies and to collaborate with interested nations to the end that all psychological warfare is in accord with approved strategy."

This was an ambitious task for a military group to undertake in view of the aggressively ambitious programs sponsored by civilian agencies that ostensibly had White House backing. Quite naturally nothing very pretentious ever came from the JPWC. After the establishment of OWI the latter organization refused to cooperate with JPWC. JCS reorganized its JPWC, which in the course of time became inundated in handling the numerous administrative problems of OSS. By late 1942 JPWC ceased to be active and was finally abolished by the JCS. Following this move no JCS committee possessed or attempted to exercise any consistent responsibility for psychological warfare operations.

Psychological Warfare Organizations in the Overseas Military Commands

Executive Order 9312, dated 9 March 1943, redefining the respective functions of OWI and OSS, was in large measure responsible for the character of the psychological warfare organizations that developed during the war in the overseas commands. That portion of the order that provided that "all plans and projects . . . should be subject to the approval . . . of the theater commander" was rigidly adhered to and greatly influenced the type and extent of operations conducted.

The organization for psychological warfare operations everywhere was improvised and largely established on an *ad hoc* basis. There was relatively little interchange of information from one major military command to another. The result is that one cannot describe with one stroke of a pen the characteristics of the organization that existed in the Army for the conduct of psychological warfare operations in the field. There were important differences in structure from one command to the next.

The area in which the US began its first major military psychological warfare effort of World War II was North Africa. The character of the operation (joint Anglo-American) and the personality of the Commander (General Eisenhower) were such as to set the tone of the organization that was to carry through to the campaigns on the continent in 1943–1945. General Eisenhower's concept of military organization required that a military staff established to plan and to supervise psychological warfare operations be, in fact, a joint undertaking of the Americans and the British.

Under General Eisenhower's command the basic concept on organization that prevailed was first, a complete integration of available British and American talent; and second, the utilization of personnel in positions of major responsibility, in accordance with their individual abilities, irrespective of whether or not the individual was a member of a military service or of a civilian agency. As a result, in General Eisenhower's commands (North Africa, 1943, and Northwest Europe, 1944–1945) the top position in psychological warfare was assigned to an American general.

Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force

The task of planning for the use of psychological warfare and of carrying out actual operations in the area of continental Europe was entrusted to the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF). The division was actually a special staff section of SHAEF. Unlike the other divisions of the Command, PWD was assigned both staff planning and operational functions.

The missions of PWD were:

(a) To wage psychological warfare against the enemy.

(b) To use the various media available to psychological warfare to sustain the morale of friendly nations occupied by the enemy and to cause the people of these countries to acquiesce in the wishes of the Supreme Commander.

(c) To conduct so-called "consolidation" propaganda operations in liberated friendly countries.

(d) To control information services in Allied-occupied Germany.

Through most of the history of PWD until the beginning of the posthostilities phase of the German Information Control operation, the Chief of PWD was assisted by four deputies, one assigned from each of the four civilian agencies that contributed personnel to PWD, namely, the two American agencies — OWI and OSS — and the two British agencies — the Political Intelligence Department (PID of the Foreign Office) and the Ministry of Information (MOI). For a short period there was still a fifth deputy — a representative of the American military service. This officer served as the Chief's deputy on purely military matters. A few months prior to the German surrender the civilian deputy representing OSS was withdrawn for other duties and was not replaced, and later still the post of military deputy was abolished.

While the four civilian deputies functioned they divided the various operating and staff sections among them as their primary responsibility. These sections were:

Plans and Directives	Press
Intelligence	Films
Radio	Publications and Displays
Leaflets	Special Operations

In the separate sections, branches, and subsections of PWD, some were headed by British, others by Americans. Whenever a Britisher headed a section, his deputy invariably was an American and vice versa. This practice tended to force the personnel involved to think, to plan, and to act in concert, as an inter-allied team, rather than as representatives of civilian or military agencies of this or that country.

Another characteristic of the organization and the manner of utilization of personnel in Europe has to do with the source and other features of the manner of assignment of personnel. Propaganda personnel were assigned to the theater by the British Army, PID, MOI, the British Broadcasting Corporation, and by the following American services: the Army, OWI, and OSS. Some were members of the regular army, others reserve personnel, some were career public servants,

and still others, civilians volunteering to work in civilian agencies for the duration of the war.

Assignments to specific tasks both at headquarters and to field units were made on the basis of what was believed to be the qualifications of the individual irrespective of his or her civilian-military status and, within reasonable limits, without great regard to military-rank status of personnel. For example, loudspeaker teams, composed of an OWI civilian linguist and an American or British military technician, often were assigned to support front-line military operations. Personnel involved in such actions frequently did not realize the different organizational affiliations and in some instances even the ranks of their colleagues.

In the separate American army groups and field armies special staff sections were organized to coordinate the staff planning and operational problems of waging psychological warfare. To these army groups and field armies were assigned field units known as "mobile radio broadcasting companies." The organization of these companies was the result of hasty improvisation in the US in 1943 and 1944. In all, five such companies were activated during the war and sent to Europe, the first being sent to the Italian front and the last four to the Northwest Europe front.

The separate army groups and field armies seldom found it advantageous to keep the companies intact. Experience demonstrated that the most effective manner of utilizing the personnel was to dispatch personnel and teams on detached duty to specific locations or to certain units for certain designated operations. When the operation for which they were assigned was completed the personnel involved were returned to the parent company for assignment elsewhere.

Psychological Warfare in the War against Japan

In the Pacific area in the war against Japan, there were several separate US military commands or subcommands and in each the type of psychological warfare organization that emerged during the war differed from that in other areas in several important respects. In one command, the South Pacific (COMSOPAC), which was merged with the Southwest Pacific Area Command in June 1944, personnel of American civilian agencies (OSS and OWI) were refused clearance for operations. No formal provisions were ever made in the area of COMSOPAC for a psychological warfare planning staff or for operational personnel to engage in propaganda operations. Admiral Halsey, the area commander, simply did not want to have anything to do with psychological warfare. The only propaganda operations ever conducted in the area under his command were the improvised, largely uncoordinated, efforts of enthusiastic Japanese language and intelligence personnel desirous of capturing a larger number of Japanese prisoners for interrogation purposes.

In the Southwest Pacific Area, under General MacArthur, a Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) was established in June 1944, just as the headquarters of this command began drafting its final plans for the reconquest of the Philippines. At the headquarters a quasi-special staff section (actually called a branch) was established under the direct supervision of the Military Secretary to the Commanding General. In this unique setup the Chief of the Psychological Warfare Branch enjoyed direct access to the commanding general of the theater.

Within the headquarters planning staff the psychological warfare personnel were divided about equally between military officers and OWI civilians, with the military personnel, as time went on, assuming an increasingly dominant role, and

with the OWI agency serving largely as a major source of needed equipment and special supplies required in propaganda output. There was little, if any, attempt made to establish a highly integrated staff of the type that emerged in Europe.

In the lower echelons of this command—in the Sixth US and the Eighth US Armies — special teams composed largely of military personnel were dispatched on limited liaison-type assignments from the theater psychological warfare staff agency. Where coordination or supervision of the psychological warfare teams were attempted by the lower echelons, it was usually through the intelligence section (G2) rather than through the operations section (G3) of the command involved.

In the Central Pacific Command (CINCPOA), under Admiral Nimitz, psychological warfare activities as a recognized coordinated instrument of military operations was even later in coming into being. Notwithstanding indifference and lack of understanding of the nature of psychological warfare operations by top-echelon staff personnel, small-scale, uncoordinated, unsupervised propaganda attacks were tried as improvisations by intelligence personnel in nearly every military campaign in the Central Pacific area where American units of regimental size or larger were involved.

An OWI outpost in Honolulu provided some logistic support to division and corps military operations. Standard appeal leaflets were prepared in limited numbers in advance of actual landings and were carried to the scenes where they were later dropped on enemy forces. Loudspeaker equipment was often assembled and improvised on-the-spot broadcasts were made to Japanese troops by division language personnel and even on rare occasions by Japanese prisoners of war. The success attained on such occasions was such as to win a slow but grudging respect from military commanders for this type of military operation.

Late in 1944 or early 1945 the joint intelligence center JICPOA at Nimitz's headquarters set up a small planning staff to plan propaganda operations against Japanese troops. Personnel assigned to the JICPOA Psychological Warfare Section, with few exceptions, were composed exclusively of young navy or army officers who had studied the Japanese language in military-sponsored schools as a part of their previous service experience.

During the Okinawa campaign (1 April – July 1945) the Tenth US Army was supported by a small psychological warfare team dispatched from this Central Pacific Headquarters in Hawaii. This team was small in number and inadequately supported by its own intelligence staff, and as a consequence was able to engage in only the most general type of planned propaganda activity. There was no one on the Tenth Army Staff immediately responsible for psychological warfare operations. The Army G2 served as the spokesman when psychological warfare interests were involved, often with little coordination or liaison with the psychological warfare team on temporary duty with the Army. In addition to the activities of the formal psychological warfare organization within the Army, on several occasions corps and division intelligence personnel improvised psychological warfare attacks for use against the Japanese enemy.

It was just 5 days before the surrender of Japan that the Central Pacific Command reached the decision that psychological warfare was a sufficiently potent support weapon to deserve the status of a special headquarters branch. Accordingly, a Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) was established at Nimitz's headquarters. Had the war continued much longer surely a much larger organization would have come into being, and thus psychological warfare might have attained

even greater recognition in a command headquarters where naval personnel predominated.

In the Southeast Asia Command the Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral Mountbatten, desired to create a psychological warfare organization and program modeled after that of General Eisenhower's in SHAEF. This would have meant, among other things, a British chief for psychological warfare, with an American deputy and alternately a British and an American as head of the various subsections. However, because of differing concepts on political matters, such as the problem of colonialism, the US did not deem it wise to become directly associated with British propaganda output in South and Southeast Asia.

Owing to these differences in political orientation personnel in OWI, the US State Department, and American military personnel in the Southeast Asia Area Command refused to become members of a joint British-American psychological warfare effort. Furthermore, although Southeast Asia continued throughout the war to be an area of great strategic importance to the US, as compared to other regions it was not one where large numbers of American military personnel were involved.

The American military activity in the area was largely centered in North Burma. Here an OWI psychological warfare team was organized to support the military reconquest of that land. In addition to the OWI information personnel who were given the mission of inducing the various Burmese racial groups to cooperate with the allies, a psychological warfare team was organized for the purpose of inducing Japanese soldiers to lay down their weapons. The members of that team were composed almost exclusively of OWI civilians, ably assisted by a group of Japanese prisoners of war.*

In China, even though American political and military interests were great, military operations did not involve a large number of American personnel. The type of psychological warfare organization that arose was similar to, but not identical with, that which emerged in Burma. OWI provided the bulk of the personnel and most of the equipment used in the propaganda effort. The major difference between the program in China and that in Burma would appear to be this. In China a larger number of military personnel were directly involved, and during the later stages of the war a coordinating committee was established to oversee operations. An Army field-grade officer was assigned as chairman of the coordinating committee.

Number of Personnel Involved

It is not possible to give more than an informed guess as to the number of Americans, civilian and military personnel, involved in the psychological warfare efforts in the separate military theaters or subareas during World War II. In the original group of Psychological Warfare personnel that landed in North Africa, not more than 40 Americans were involved. Including natives, who were employed later to assist in the effort, nearly 1000 men were employed in various psychological warfare and information capacities in North Africa. In the SHAEF psychological warfare organization probably not more than 600 men were employed. The number engaged in similar work in the Southwest Pacific area probably did not exceed 200, exclusive of natives assigned to purely housekeeping functions. In Burma and China it is estimated that about 80 Americans in the two areas combined

* See "Use of Japanese Prisoners of War" and "Personnel Problems of the OWI Assam Psywar Team" in a later section of this chapter.

were involved in the purely military phase of the psychological warfare effort. The work of these men was supplemented by that of an undetermined number of indigenous personnel. In the Central Pacific area, not counting intelligence personnel devoting only part time to psychological warfare work, probably not over 25 individuals were engaged in planning and operational activities in psychological warfare at any one time prior to 1 August 1945. The number of individuals employed in the Overseas Branch of OWI is not known to the writer. But it is evident from an examination of the facts that the number involved in the World War II worldwide psychological warfare program is insignificant when compared to the many millions engaged in the more conventional type of military action.

Summary

The major lesson relative to psychological warfare organization to be learned from a discussion of American World War II experience would appear to be this. There was little preplanning. Most of the organizations that emerged during the war were based on hasty improvisations. In no single instance did the personnel involved come to have a real sense that the organization of which he was a part was all that it might have been. The American experience, indeed the free world's experience, in the use of psychological warfare is limited. Thus it is necessary to recognize the dynamic character of psychological warfare organizations and the fact that there is an ever-present necessity for further observations in order to learn how to organize an effort more effectively to accomplish the various missions undertaken or assigned.

POST-WORLD WAR II DEVELOPMENTS

By W. E. D.

A number of significant developments that have occurred since the close of World War II are believed to be well designed to increase the effectiveness of the American foreign information effort.

Little more than 10 years have elapsed since the end of World War II. In this period many changes have taken place in the organization and personnel of the US agencies engaged in foreign information and psychological warfare activities. In a few short pages it is impossible to do more than to describe rather crisply some of the more important of these changes, with little discussion of the conflicting political pressures — domestic and foreign — that have led to the alterations in organizational structure and the increased or decreased emphasis on continued propaganda output that has occurred from time to time.

OWI Liquidated — 1945

President Truman on 31 August 1945, 2 days prior to the formal surrender of Japan, by Executive Order 9608, established an Interim International Information Service (IIIS) in the Department of State and transferred to it the overseas information functions of OWI and the information activities of CIAA. The executive order authorized the Secretary of State to continue within the Department of State such foreign information functions as he considered necessary, to abolish any he thought desirable, or to transfer any to other executive agencies.

The order also provided for the liquidation of OWI and IIIS by 31 December 1945. In the meantime the Secretary of State was to study the problem of continuing a foreign information program and to recommend a solution to the President.

William Benton (later Senator from Connecticut) was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and as such was made the responsible head of the new IIIS. Benton drew most of the key personnel for the new agency from OWI and CIAA. Among the major tasks facing him in his new office were these: to win congressional understanding and approval for a new peacetime propaganda service including the necessary funds with which to operate; to gain from top-echelon and rank-and-file members of the Department of State a sympathetic understanding of the requirements of the new service; and to establish effective liaison, adapted to peacetime conditions, with responsible intelligence-collecting and policy-making officers both inside and outside the Department of State.

As a result of the study requested by President Truman, the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC) was established in the Department of State in early 1946. The activities of this office remained largely unchanged until 1948; however, its name was later changed to the Office of International Information and Educational Exchange.

When funds were being considered for the 1948 fiscal year (FY48) Representative Taber, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee in the 80th Congress, called attention to the fact that Congress was being asked to appropriate money for an agency for which there was no enabling legislation. As a result of congressional action, funds for the overseas information program were drastically curtailed. However, thanks to the efforts of Senator Smith of New Jersey and Congressman (now Senator) Mundt of South Dakota, the US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 was passed. Funds appropriated for a foreign information service for FY49 were then more than doubled.

US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948

The Smith-Mundt Act directed the Secretary of State "to provide for the preparation and dissemination abroad of information about the United States, its people, and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media, and through information centers and instructors abroad." The administration of the act was placed under the International Information Administration (IIA) of the Department of State.

With the passage of the 1948 act the major objective of the information service became that of promoting abroad understanding and trust of the US. This line was undertaken largely as a response to the Soviet campaign of vilification of the US and distortion of US international intentions. This objective was interpreted as a gigantic advertising campaign, carried on for the most part by the broadside telling of America's story. However, by 1950 it came to be recognized that the advertising method adopted to tell the "American Story" sometimes overwhelmed and confused people abroad, not infrequently leading to increased resentment rather than better understanding.

In 1950 after the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the emphasis of the program shifted sharply from a "full and fair picture" of this country to one with more definite objectives. Programs were designed specifically to deter further aggression, to help maintain the stability and cohesion of the countries of the non-Communist world, and to inspire in them confidence in their mutual capacity to meet any eventualities. With this change came the development of a system of priorities among countries in programing and a highly specialized approach to each country or area and to the various social or economic groups within them. In

short, an attempt was made to adjust the content and the techniques of the program to needs growing out of the widened schism in the world.

The shifts in emphasis through the years have been reflected in changes in the organizational pattern of the agency principally responsible for administering the information program. Major changes occurred in a reorganization in January 1952. From a position subordinate to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, IIA was reconstituted as a relatively autonomous unit of the department. The role of Assistant Secretary in the program became essentially that of a channel through which foreign policy and information policy could be coalesced. Authority over operations formerly divided among the general manager of the information program, the Assistant Secretary, and the regional bureaus of the department was concentrated in the Administrator.

Foreign Information Activities of Other Executive Agencies

With the capitulation of Germany and Japan in 1945 and the occupation of their territories, the US military authorities assumed two major functions with respect to the political reorientation of former enemy people: the control of information activities in these former enemy areas, and the dissemination in these areas of information and propaganda from the US. The control of information services was historically, if not logically, a natural outgrowth of combat psychological warfare operations in Europe, but somewhat less so in Japan.

The control of "information services" in former Nazi areas was placed under the jurisdiction of an Information Control Division (ICD) with the dissolution of PWD/SHAEF. Much of the original work undertaken by ICD/USFET (later OMGUS) stemmed directly from planning undertaken earlier by PWD. Information control for Germany and Austria combined three related goals: destruction of the Nazi propaganda machine; guided reconstruction of German information services; and fostering of desired ideas and attitudes among the German people. The attainment of these objectives was sought through censorship of German media of communications, by a reorganization and restaffing of German information activities, and by means of a positive Allied information and propaganda program. In the course of time many of these activities were phased out, and the remaining functions undertaken by the High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG). One of the most effective of the information activities sponsored by the US in occupied Germany is discussed in the next case.

US information control differed sharply in Japan from that in Germany. There were fewer American propaganda specialists with wartime psychological warfare experience in the Far East struggle available for postwar service in Japan. Further a Japanese government was still in being after the war and many actions that were deemed desirable could be carried out through orders transmitted by Americans to the appropriate Japanese officials. The Civil Information and Education (CI&E) section of Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP) headquarters put its main emphasis on breaking the connections established during and prior to the war between the Japanese government and the various media of communications. In addition CI&E launched a number of propaganda campaigns to support specific objectives of the occupation.

In the military establishment in Washington, staff planning activities involving psychological warfare ceased with the end of World War II hostilities. Several months after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, in June 1950, the Department of the Army created the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare as a special

staff section. The duties of this office are largely planning and advisory in character. The Department of the Air Force later established a Psychological Warfare Division in the Air Force headquarters' Directorate of Plans. This division was a relatively small one and after several months in being was renamed the Subsidiary Plans Division. Planning for the future use of psychological warfare in the US Navy headquarters involved even fewer individuals, the task being entrusted to a branch of the Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

In addition to the three military services and the Department of State's IIA, at various times in the post–World War II era the following US agencies operating in the international field also possessed their own overt international information service: the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) (of the Department of State); the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA); and Mutual Security Administration (MSA).

Coordinating the Efforts of Various Agencies

The seemingly ever-growing tendency for the various agencies interested in international operations to engage directly in propaganda and information activities, as well as the increasing awareness that acts of governments themselves carry great psychological warfare implications, led to the demand for some coordinating machinery on the US government executive level. Accordingly on 17 August 1950 President Truman announced the establishment of a national psychological strategy board that in time came to be known as PSB. At the time of its establishment it was stated that the mission of PSB would be to coordinate "foreign information and psychological strategy in situations where joint action by more than one agency of the Government is required in this field."

The original PSB was in fact only an interdepartmental committee. It was composed of the following: a representative of the Secretary of Defense; a representative of JCS; a representative of the Director of CIA; and the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs serving as chairman. Representatives of a few other agencies sat with the board as observers and advisers. In late 1951 a new PSB was established, this one presided over by a specially appointed chairman and with the following members: the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Director of MSA. PSB was given a small operating staff. The members of the original board on the establishment of the new one became the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee. The precise line of demarcation of authority between the new PSB and the coordinating committee was never clearly defined. In general, however, the principal functions of PSB seemed to lie in the planning for long-term objectives, whereas the mission of the interdepartmental committee lay in the direction and determination of current psychological operations and policies.

Former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Edward W. Barrett, who headed both the original PSB and the Interdepartmental Committee, has written concerning their achievements:

> "Both did some good in coordinating strategy and operations. Both have thus far fallen far short of being cure-alls. In retrospect, it appears that both have attempted too much Washington masterminding of complex tactical problems that could best be solved by first-rate men in the field."[12]

After General Eisenhower became President he appointed a special committee to prepare recommendations for reorganizing the foreign information and psychological warfare effort of the US government. This committee was headed by

William H. Jackson, Chairman, with C. D. Jackson, White House adviser, as one of several members. Following the report of this committee two major changes were accomplished. PSB was abolished and replaced by an Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), with membership comparable to PSB, but with a revised and smaller supporting staff.

US Information Agency Established — 1953

A second and equally important step in the reorganization of the US foreign information program was the creation of the US Information Agency (USIA) on 1 August 1953. This agency was given independent status, with the director reporting to the President through the National Security Council. The agency was made responsible for all US information activities overseas, except for those that might fall under the jurisdiction of a military commander in time of armed conflict (Fig. 2). Thus information activities formerly carried out by IIA and TCA of the Department of State and by MSA were transferred to USIA. The administration of the Exchange of Persons Program was retained by the Department of State.

The activities of the USIA, although not identical with, nevertheless closely follow, those of the predecessor agency, IIA of the Department of State. The major media of communications employed in reaching overseas targets are shortwave radio (VOA); press material radioed to Public Affairs officers overseas, and placed by them in local newspapers; films; and information center service, including circulation of books and the supplying of reference material. To ensure that the agency speaks with authority on foreign policy matters it receives from the Secretary of State complete, day-by-day guidance on matters involving US foreign policy.

Recent Developments

In the more than 3 years that have elapsed since the establishment of USIA as an independent agency a number of developments have occurred that are of great significance in the field of international communications, propaganda, and psychological warfare. Many of these developments occurred as the result of efforts to correct deficiencies in the manner in which the US foreign information effort was being planned and administered. Many of these changes suggest that some of the criticisms of past efforts, implicit in some of the accounts appearing in this casebook, are no longer valid.

Recent Developments with Respect to Administration and Coordination of USIA Effort. A number of significant steps have been taken to increase the status of the Director of the agency within the Executive branch of the government and to improve the effectiveness of liaison and coordination between USIA and other agencies, either directly or indirectly concerned with the administration of the foreign information program. During the first half of 1955 the Director of USIA was designated a member of OCB and the agency was given representation on OCB's staff. Thus the agency became a full-fledged participant in the deliberations of OCB. Along with this important development, the Director was invited to become an observer at the meetings of the highly important National Security Council.

In addition to the formal recognition of importance accorded to USIA, a number of administrative and procedural arrangements have been undertaken that add greatly to the efficiency and effectiveness of operations. The Director and key members of his staff have met regularly once a month with the President. Close and continuing liaison has been established at various echelons between officers in



Fig. 2—Organization of US Information Agency
Source: "*First Review of Operations, United States Information Agency,*" August–December 1953, p 22.

the agency and appropriate personnel in the Departments of State and Defense and in such *ad hoc* agencies operating in the field of foreign relations as the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA).

Further evidence of the far-reaching changes that signify the new importance attached to effective planning and implementation of a foreign information program is the designation of one top-level presidential assistant to devote his major effort to this field of endeavor. A number of prominent men, well known for past accomplishments in the field, have been assigned this duty by President Eisenhower. These have included: C. D. Jackson, a World War II civilian deputy director of PWD/SHAEF, and a member of the special committee, appointed by the President in 1953 to prepare recommendations with respect to future psychological warfare efforts; Nelson Rockefeller, World War II director of CIAA; and, William H. Jackson, a former deputy director of CIA, and chairman of the 1953 Presidential Commission on Foreign Information.

As a result of top-level planning and the recognition accorded the effectiveness of foreign information activities, four individuals from the Office of the Assistant Director for Policy and Programs were assigned as working members of the US delegation to the conferences held in Geneva in 1955. The idea incorporating the President's "Summit" proposal that the US and the Soviet Union agree to mutual aerial reconnaissance and open exchange of military blueprints actually originated during preconference deliberations conducted by Presidential assistant Nelson Rockefeller.

Personnel from key overseas areas, as well as from Washington, were in attendance at Geneva during both the Summit conference and subsequent Foreign Ministers Conferences. In addition to their advisory functions, such personnel performed two other important duties: They directed the flow of information from the American delegates to the world's press and provided on-the-spot news coverage to US posts around the world. This development truly marked a wide departure from the practices followed at prior international conferences.

Another relatively recent development that has led to the improvement of liaison and coordination between separate officers within USIA as well as with outside agencies and departments in Washington was the move of the VOA's studios from New York to Washington, completed in November 1954. This move, directed by the Congress, greatly improved integration of the broadcasting services within the agency and made possible closer liaison with other governmental departments.

Improved Facilities For Intelligence, Research, and Evaluation. During the latter half of 1954 the Office of Research and Intelligence was created in order to provide facts and analyses about foreign conditions and issues to both planners and output personnel. This new office inaugurated a greatly expanded program of internal research on world wide Communist activities, including analyses of their current propaganda "line." A widened program of public opinion polls was undertaken to provide policy planners more informed estimates of peoples' reactions, anxieties, etc., in foreign areas.

"Country plans" for every key area in the world have been revised on the basis of the agency's restatement of mission and new estimates of the situation abroad. Objectives in each area and country have been stated with greater clarity and simplicity. These are changed as circumstances dictate.

Developments with Respect to Evaluation and Improved Operational Efficiency. In order to assist and advise the Director of USIA on the proper management of the agency's resources, at home and abroad, a small independent inspection staff was

established in 1954. A Broadcast Advisory Committee and a Committee on Books Abroad continue to advise relevant sections of the agency on specialized activities that come under their separate jurisdiction. The US Advisory Commission on Information is the principal channel for reports of effectiveness to Congress. This commission, consisting of five citizens, is charged by the Congress with the task of making an independent assessment of the foreign information services of the US government.

Expanded Operations. The expansion of output operations of USIA have kept pace with developments in the field of expanded internal services, the development of better planning facilities, and the establishment of improved liaison with all other government departments. VOA, the radio voice of the agency, has expanded operations to include transmissions in 41 separate languages and to 56 or more foreign countries or autonomous areas. In recent months President Eisenhower's pronouncements on "Atoms for Peace," "Mutual Inspection for Peace," and similar themes, have been highlighted in output in all media operations.

The number of program hours broadcast to the Soviet Union has reached 79 daily. Programs in Cambodian, Hindi, Tamil, and English, addressed to crucial areas in south and southeast Asia and Africa, have been added. Programs suitable for rebroadcast over local facilities are prepared and sent abroad to be aired.

Among the more significant recent developments, however, are these: Films that are especially suitable for release over local television outlets have been prepared and sent to overseas areas where that medium of communication is increasing in importance. Private groups, particularly universities and private industry, have been encouraged to undertake or expand foreign operations in line with information objectives of the agency. Also there has been a greatly expanded utilization of exhibits and participation in trade fairs by the US government and private interests.*

The increase in the use of films for overseas television outlets was occasioned in part by requests from abroad for coverage of special events in the US. Material of this type has been in widespread demand so that, by the end of 1955, films were being sent to more than 100 stations overseas. In order to increase the opportunities for information dissemination by this new medium, the USIA has provided, on request, technical assistance and advice to local television stations abroad.

The Office of Private Cooperation had been in existence for quite some time prior to the creation of an independent USIA, but it has only been in recent months that its efforts have begun to bear real fruit. All manner of American groups, extending from corporate cities through veteran and civic organizations to private industry, have undertaken projects in furtherance of our international information objectives. Foreign cities have been saluted with appropriate musical programs, etc., by American cities. The Veterans of Foreign Wars and Rotary International have purchased and placed in foreign schools a 99-volume specially selected *American Bookshelf*. Local chapters of various industrial and advertising councils have been induced to undertake projects to inform peoples abroad of US national aims and policies, and many magazine publishing firms have made unsold copies of their journals available for use by people abroad. In addition some American firms have been induced to see that these magazines reach a foreign reader.

The story of American participation in trade fairs abroad has been given separate treatment in this casebook, and therefore little need be added here. However, the

* See "The USA Goes to the Fair" in Chap. 8.



*This is not a true picture of the organization of the Department of Navy. The Navy is organized horizontally whereas the Army and Air Force are organized vertically on the General Staff System.

Fig. 3—US Organization fo

— — — Units having



This is not a true picture of the organization
e Department of Navy. The Navy is organized
zontally whereas the Army and Air Force are
nized vertically on the General Staff System.

Fig. 3—US Organization for Psychological Warfare as of 1954

— — — Units having a psychological warfare function

employment of specially prepared exhibits is another matter. There have been exhibits established at these fairs, but the ones that have received the greatest acclaim have been those mounted on wheels and carried directly to the people. "Atoms for Peace" exhibits were widely shown in Yugoslavia, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Japan, India, Pakistan, Italy, Germany, Greece, Turkey, and Denmark in 1955 and 1956.

A photographic exhibit, "Family of Man," selected and arranged by the Museum of Modern Art, was shown widely during the latter half of 1955 and 1956 in Germany, Mexico, Guatemala, France, Belgium, Holland, England, and Italy. The exhibit in Berlin is reputed to have drawn many visitors from the Communist-controlled East Sector. Along with television and trade fairs, exhibits are rapidly becoming an important channel for impressing foreign audiences with the peaceful intentions and non-warlike objectives of the American people and their allies.

RIAS: THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN PSYWAR OUTPOST*

By Edmond Taylor

The American radio outlet in Berlin, "Radio in the American Sector," has proved to be a valuable adjunct to the American effort in the propaganda struggle against communist forces of East Germany.

RIAS, the US-sponsored "Radio In the American Sector" of Berlin, . . . has long been recognized not only as the most successful of all official US operations in the foreign information field but also as the epitome of dynamic "psychological warfare." Its aggressively anti-Communist programs are particularly admired by the more advanced American devotees of *Realpolitik*, and their effectiveness has been certified by such diverse authorities as Stewart Alsop; the *New Leader;* Representative John Taber, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee (who stunned State Department witnesses at a budget hearing last spring with the remark, "We don't need to spend much time on RIAS; we all know what a wonderful job it's doing"); Fulton Lewis, Jr.; and Gerhard Eisler, who, as East German propaganda chief, considered it necessary to spend more than RIAS's total annual budget of some $3 million just to denounce the station in the Soviet Zone.

Its Audience

There is fairly substantial evidence for believing that about ten million of the Soviet Zone's eighteen million inhabitants listen to RIAS regularly and that it is the favorite station of between eighty and ninety-five per cent of these listeners. In addition, it has a substantial "eavesdropping" audience in West Germany, and — though it broadcasts only in German — in several of the satellite countries as well. An American diplomat in Warsaw has reported the appearance in a circus there of a clown whose anti-social behavior was explained to the spectators by "RIAS" printed on his shirt.

RIAS broadcasts have forced authorities in East Germany to take action on a variety of issues ranging from restoring holidays and granting Christmas bonuses to workers, to installing ventilators in a smoky factory and cleaning up a filthy washroom. The public prosecutor in an East German town was once so moved

* From "RIAS: The Voice East Germany Believes," an account in *The Reporter*, 10 Nov 53, pp 28–32. Reproduced with permission of *The Reporter*, copyright holder.

by a RIAS political soap opera about a Communist public prosecutor that he emulated its hero in releasing two prisoners he was interrogating and escaping with them to West Berlin. The station also deserves a large share of credit for the phenomenal success of the US government's food-package campaign in Berlin last summer.

RIAS and the Uprisings of June 1953

Although RIAS did not instigate the mass uprising of workers in east Berlin last June (1953), its special labor programs had been working up a mood of rebellion in East German factories since 1950, and when the storm finally broke in the Soviet sector of the city, the station was ready to exploit it. Sober American and Allied observers are agreed that RIAS broadcasts were the main factor in converting a local riot overnight into what was virtually a national revolution throughout the Soviet Zone — a revolution from which the discredited Communist regime has still not fully recovered. No "psychological warriors" in history have ever furnished a more dramatic illustration of their art.

If RIAS were merely a relay station for the standardized broadcasts of the Voice of America, or even if it were closely responsive to the guidance of the master strategists in Washington, no particular lesson could be drawn from its success — as compared with the inconclusive record of most other government information programs — except that East Germany is an unusually fertile field for political propaganda. Actually, only four per cent of RIAS's programs are relayed from the Voice, and ninety-three per cent are produced locally by the station's staff of 480 Germans and 6 Americans. As to guidance from Washington, the staff makes a reasonably conscientious effort to hew to the official line, but since directives from headquarters reach Berlin from two days to two months after the events that inspired them, RIAS has to develop most of its own strategy as it goes along.

Its Operational Methods

Thus, even after making substantial allowance for the unique position of Berlin as a western bridgehead behind the Iron Curtain and for the special psychological climate in East Germany, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the superior results achieved by RIAS over other information activities conducted by the US government — and perhaps over those of all other governments — can only be explained by examining the differences between its operational methods and attitudes and those of other such enterprises.

As a former member of the psychological warfare fraternity myself, I had long suspected that this was the case, but it was only recently when I returned to Berlin as a visiting journalist that I was able to measure the gap that separates the staff of RIAS from other practitioners of the same art — American or foreign — and to understand how much of the station's success can be traced directly to its respect for certain homely aspects of human reality that tend to be disregarded, both in our social science laboratories and in the Orwellian world of contemporary bureaucracy.

The relationship first became clear to me in a conversation with Gordon Ewing, a forty-year-old native of upstate New York, who was the political director of RIAS for several years and now runs the whole organization.

We were alone in his office in the semi-deserted building late on a Saturday afternoon, and an early fog was already blurring the gaunt skeletons of the surrounding ruins. Ewing, a tall, slow-spoken man with a small mustache, used to

be an English instructor in a Midwestern university and he still looks the part. He was reminiscing about his role in the events of last June. RIAS, he explained, had not called on the East German population to revolt, because that is not its style. But on the night of June 16, when he broadcast an appeal for a general strike that had been put out by the West German trade unions and accompanied the appeal with commentaries prepared by his German staff stressing the ineptitude of the East German police and the successful mob tactics of the Berlin rioters, Ewing was well aware that he would be pouring gasoline on the flames.

Policy Direction

Ewing had no instructions from Washington and no possibility of getting them in time to do any good. He knew that if RIAS went too far it might conceivably start a world war. On the other hand, if its broadcasts were not militant enough he would certainly be blamed for missing the best opportunity to shake Communist rule in East Germany that had arisen since 1945. Neither of these two considerations, however, was uppermost in his mind when he faced and finally made his courageous and lonely decision.

"The thing that made me hesitate the most," Ewing confessed, "was the thought of the massacre that would take place if those Russian tanks really started firing into the crowds."

This is the kind of purely sentimental consideration with which our neo-Machiavellians have small patience, but the experience of RIAS demonstrates that it is sound strategy not merely to seem, but actually to be, a little sentimental at times. Over the years RIAS has systematically tempered its subversion of Communist authority with a humane regard for the safety of its listeners. At times it has deliberately passed up opportunities to make trouble for the East German government when its staff did not think the political gain would be worth the cost in human suffering.

Instead of reading its audience sermons on the need for resisting Communist tyranny at all costs, it gives them technical instructions on how to resist it without endangering their lives. Instead of calling for a superhuman effort to overthrow the regime, it shows the inhabitants of the Soviet Zone how, with a little courage and a lot of ingenuity, they can band together to win limited victories that can make life under a totalitarian regime a little less harsh for them. The result is that RIAS listeners have developed great confidence in the station, and this is precisely what made Ewing's decision on the night of June 16 so dramatic.

"An occasion like that gives you a terrible sense of responsibility," Ewing remarked in his quiet, slightly hesitant voice. "It's all right for the advanced psychological warriors to tell you to give them both barrels, but when you know that your listeners will actually go out and do what you tell them, it makes you think."

The Calculated Risk in Psywar

For all his scruples and hesitations, there was nothing Hamlet-like about Ewing's eventual decision to broadcast the story of the east Berlin riots in a way certain to generalize the revolt throughout the Soviet Zone. This time, the calculated risk had to be taken, and Ewing took it deliberately. He was sure that the Soviet forces would not invade west Berlin, and he believed that they would not fire into the east Berlin crowds if they could possibly help it. He realized that eventually the revolt would be crushed, and that inevitably there would be many victims, but

he felt confident that the spirit of resistance in East Germany would be immeasurably strengthened by even a temporary victory over the Communist regime.

Only history can tell whether the losses of the uprising — those who were killed at the time and those arrested in the subsequent repression — were justified by the gains. When you raise this question in talking with the RIAS staff, however, you get a great deal of light on the kind of men who are successful at persuading other men to risk their freedom and even their lives. In evaluating the results of the June uprisings, RIAS staff members may refer in passing to the important political objectives that they think were achieved — they seem to have no doubts on this score. But they are more inclined to talk about such intangible gains as the reawakened sense of human solidarity and the increased sense of personal dignity the East Germans won in their heroic struggle. As G. M. Gert, Ewing's enthusiastic American deputy, puts it, "The East Germans proved to themselves that men can be men, even under a totalitarian dictatorship."

One might be a bit dubious about this tendency to invoke the ethical implications of anti-Communist resistance, particularly in connection with other men's sacrifices, if it were not so obviously sincere, or if it were primarily the RIAS vocabulary of public rather than of interoffice communication. In fact, one of the remarkable differences between RIAS men and most other political propagandists I have met is that whereas the latter talk among themselves in terms of interchangeable priorities and objectives and reserve their moral abstractions for public occasions, at RIAS the process is reversed: There is a great deal of talk inside the office about human dignity, talk that is finally implemented in broadcasts which stress better factory conditions or how to deal with Soviet tanks.

The RIAS Staff

RIAS is staffed by passionate political idealists, naively dedicated democratic activists. This is particularly true of the youthful German staff which sets the emotional tone of the whole organization. But their idealism is disciplined by several factors that save them from becoming merely political fanatics like their opponents. One of these factors is the almost religious respect that RIAS men have not merely for truth in the abstract but for plain facts.

All RIAS men like to think of themselves primarily as journalists, and in many ways they are more like old-fashioned American crusading newspapermen than official propagandists. They are forever working some political point into a musical program, a sports event, or a variety show, but the news, in their eyes, is sacred. The station's exceptionally full program of world news is as balanced in selection as that of the British Broadcasting Corporation.

Like all good journalists, the RIAS staffers realize that telling the truth involves more than avoiding deliberate lies.

"In this business," Wolfgang Kohl, RIAS's Soviet Zone editor, explained to me, "it's the little things that count. It's not enough just to tell people that Communism is terrible. You have to tell *how* it is terrible, and you must be right, down to the number of potatoes in the prisoners' soup. But sensing the exact mood of the people is just as important as accuracy about material details, and when the mood changes you have to alter your approach. A false emotional note shakes the listener's confidence as much as a wrong fact."

Kohl, a pudgy, rather Latin-looking veteran of Hitler's Wehrmacht, is particularly attuned to the mood of the Soviet Zone because he used to live there

himself. In fact, he once wrote his scripts at home, with his wife smuggling them into west Berlin in her blouse. Like other RIAS editors, Kohl is greatly helped in his work by the two to three thousand letters the station receives every month from listeners in the Soviet Zone, and even more by a large number of visitors from the East who risk arrest by slipping into RIAS for a quiet talk whenever they have the chance. Some of these visitors occupy strategic positions in the East German government, and it is not uncommon for RIAS to broadcast the full details of a closed party meeting or a hush-hush official conference within a few hours after it has taken place.

This intimate contact with its listeners enables the station's staff to keep constantly in touch with political reality behind the Iron Curtain. But more than that, it helps them maintain the feel for human reality which both bureaucrats and political idealists are prone to lose. As a result, the people at RIAS often understand better than some sober American statesmen the restraints anti-Communist leadership must impose upon itself to be effective and the adjustments it must always be ready to make to changes in the political climate. They know that there are times, such as last June, when you have to take risks to exploit success, and times when you will lose the confidence of your followers if you keep urging them forward into danger.

They realize that freedom can seem a cold word unless it is warmed by real human sympathy and an understanding of human weakness. They know that even the most implacable enemies of Communism sometimes grow weary of purely negative opposition, that they need something to love as well as something to hate, and that the average man is reluctant to destroy what his own hands have helped to build, even if he has been forced to build it. Above all, they have learned that American nationalism is not a cause for which Europeans will gladly die, that to influence other men you must be willing to be influenced by them, and that you must adjust your objectives to their needs rather than call upon them to adjust their interests to your cause.

The Strategy of Constructive Subversion

Out of all these lessons, RIAS has developed over the years a curious, flexible, almost Gandhian strategy of constructive subversion, a technique of open conspiracy against which the Communists seem to have no effective psychological defense. By constant probing, it has discovered in the conscienceless East German regime areas of political sensitivity that amount almost to a sense of shame. When Eisler, shortly after his return to Germany, denied in a press conference that any German technicians had been shipped off to the Soviet Union, a member of the RIAS staff telephoned the post office in east Berlin to ask how he could mail a package to a mythical uncle who he explained had been deported to Moscow. A postal employee obligingly gave him full instructions. RIAS recorded and broadcast the whole conversation, and two days later Eisler publicly retracted his statement.

When directors of the official East German youth organization announced that there would be free and democratic elections for local chairmen of the organization throughout the Soviet Zone, RIAS did not call on its young listeners to boycott or sabotage the elections. Instead it instructed them to insist on electing chairmen who would respect the avowed aims of the group by giving them sports and wholesale entertainment instead of political indoctrination. Naturally, there

was a landslide for the RIAS-backed candidates. Then, when the Communist authorities attempted to invalidate the elections on various pretexts, RIAS attacked them so scathingly that they had to back down.

Time after time, RIAS has waged similar constructive yet insidiously dissolvent campaigns for limited social or economic objectives in East Germany; and time after time it has scored rapid, almost unbelievable victories, shamed the Communist authorities into keeping old promises, and frightened them out of undertaking new oppression — while winning the gratitude and confidence of its listeners.

It is hard to say whether this strategy of attacking Communism in terms of its own professed ideals and forcing the Communists to behave in an un-Communist way by seeming to take them at their word could be applied more generally in the broader framework of American foreign policy. Similarly, it is not easy to see how the organizational attitudes which are the secret of RIAS's phenomenal success in Germany can be adapted to the requirements of our foreign information program as a whole. At the very least, both these problems seem worth some serious study. . . .

THE FAR EAST REGIONAL PRODUCTION CENTER*

By Earl J. Wilson

To ensure more prompt and efficient production of American printed material a regional production center was established in Manila, in 1951, to serve the needs of the many Far East outposts of USIA.

When North Korean Communist forces knifed across the 38th parallel, American information personnel overseas in the Far East were still grappling with the gigantic task of seizing the psychological offensive in the face of a rapidly disintegrating political and military situation that was being fully and skillfully exploited by Communist propagandists.

Only a short time before had Congressional appropriations finally made available funds for the long overdue "Campaign of Truth." The outbreak of war found the entire program of the US Information Service in the difficult process of switching from "a full and fair picture of America" to a hard-hitting psychological offensive against communism.

Clearly the urgent need was to lose no time in reaching millions upon millions of Asians with the message. But how was this to be done? Part of the answer was found in the establishment of an organization called the Far East Regional Production Center at Manila, which has since become one of the most important single US psychological offensive weapons in Asia.

It was recognized that publications in great volume at the "rice roots" level of comprehension were required to reach the xenophobiac, illiterate, and antiforeign target of the newly awakened masses, and that to be fully effective such publications would mostly have to deal not only in local languages and dialects but also in familiar symbols and that many of them would have to appear purely indigenous if they were to gain acceptance.

Based on such reasoning, the theory of "regionalizing" and decentralization from the department [of State] gained favor and the RPC — as it came to be

* Original text prepared for Operation Research Office by the Chief Editor of the Far East Regional Production Center in 1955.

called — was set up in a quonset hut on the shores of Manila Bay. It consisted of a small editorial-technical staff of Americans, reinforced by Filipino artists, editors, and technicians, and of modern offset printing equipment.

During 1951 — the first full year of operation — more than 35 million finished publications were shipped out to the field posts!

It was quickly established that, owing to the increasing complexity of US propaganda, the department would have to give field operators the widest latitude in determining what type of publications would be most suitable and effective for their particular country. In other words it was decided, that although Washington would be responsible for over-all policy guidance, the field operator, under his mission chief, would have the last word in local execution.

RPC therefore was set up as a sort of "middleman" to service USIS operations in the Philippines, Korea, Formosa, Indonesia, Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaya in three basic ways (in addition to the actual printing): (a) to adapt for the Far East "pilot models" of publications originally prepared in the department, (b) to assist posts with the preparation of publications, and, (c) to prepare RPC "pilot models" as well as periodicals that are all offered to the posts for adaptation, blanket acceptance, or rejection. Each post retains complete control over what publications will be distributed in that particular country.

Each post is entirely responsible for its own translations. RPC has no translation staff whatever. Using the photo-offset printing method makes this possible. Text from an English-language dummy is translated and typeset in each individual country, then pasted down over the original copy and airmailed to the RPC where the page is then photographed, printed, and shipped back to the post in bulk for distribution.

RPC is believed to be the first to operate in such a crisscross of languages and dialects on so wide and fast a scale. Material has been turned out in Burmese, Bicolano, Cambodian, Chinese, Cebuano, English, French, Hiligaynon, Indonesian, Ilongo, Ilocano, Korean, Laotian, Malayan, Tagalog, Thai, Tamil, Visayan, Vietnamese, and Pampangonese. Generally speaking, there is not one country in the area where just one language or dialect will suffice.

One of RPC's most popular and useful publications is a monthly magazine called the *Free World*. This is published in 11 languages with close to 400,000 copies produced. *Free World's* editing is unique in that it aims at putting out 11 *different* magazines to suit the linguistic and cultural patterns of the various racial groups, as well as being tailored to local political, economic, social, and military problems.

To achieve this RPC puts together in dummy form once a month what is termed the "base model" of the magazine with picture stories furnished by the department, by the posts, and by RPC's own roving photographer. In addition to the "base model" RPC sends out along with its monthly dummy a number of "optional" layouts, most of which are made from photographs furnished by the posts themselves.

By building up a large "bank" of "optional" stories in each country it is possible for the local operator to tear the base model apart in order to construct a more suitable finished product. The optional layouts are simply pasted down over the unwanted stories, the English text translated, typeset locally, and returned to RPC for printing.

At the same time surveys are under way that will undoubtedly result in some decentralizing of the printing of *Free World*, thus saving time and shipping costs, as well as entering the commercial field for maximum distribution and production

at minimum cost to the American government. *Free World* is reaching out. For example the Cambodian version of the *Free World* is the first magazine ever to be printed in Cambodian; the distribution of this periodical in the strategic Communist-threatened area has resulted in precipitating near riots among eager would-be readers.

Another RPC innovation is the weekly production of more than 250,000 copies of a wall sheet called the *World Photo Review*, which is also made up from photographs furnished by the department and the posts. Intended mainly for villages, and secondarily as a newspaper insert, this publication reaches untold millions and is published in some 13 languages. Again to mention Cambodia, the Buddhists there, for example, post the weekly sheet on some 9000 temple walls, opening up a huge mass audience heretofore virtually untouched except by the Communist-led Vietminh propagandists.

Each week, after photographs for the *World Photo Review* have been selected (on a basis of fundamental themes, policy guidance, current events, and human interest) a telegram containing the English captions and the space allotted for each is sent out to the nine posts.

This makes possible the immediate processing of the photographs themselves and the printing of the background color, while at the same time posts are translating, typesetting, and airmailing the captions back to the RPC for final printing.

World Photo Review week after week hammers away at certain basic themes thereby building stereotypes through the use of actual photographs. In addition to using the wall sheet in numerous schools for the teaching of current events, many posts utilize local newspapers, which in turn use the blank reverse side of *World Photo Review* for the printing of their own local picture page. The result of this is an indigenous-appearing local product.

RPC early discovered the rather obvious fact that it is much more difficult to deal in simplicities than in complexities. How it can be explained, for example, to an illiterate Thai farmer that his son is fighting in distant Korea for international peace through collective security, while the Communists din into his ears that his son has been sent to Korea to die for the American imperialists?

Consequently one of RPC's most successful illustrated pamphlets was written on the premise that the reader would know little of America, nothing of Russia, little of democracy, and nothing of communism. The pamphlet was aimed at the Filipino *tao*, with the intention of exploding the Communist myth parroted by the Huks, and to awakening him to the democratic concepts around him that he could easily identify with his own existence. Moreover, it was based on the best research available on present Filipino psychology.

This type of magazine is used, for example, by psychological warfare (civil affairs) officers of the Philippine army to explain page-by-page to barrio folk the dangers of communism. This technique has been especially effective when a village has been attacked by a Huk band. While the armed forces pursue the culprits, the civil affairs officers use the pamphlet to put in context the local action with the over-all danger from within and the threat of aggression from abroad.

One of the chief advantages of RPC is that it has the use of an independent plant that enables it to maintain control of capacity without having to get in line with customers in commercial plants who have long contracts for the printing of such things as cigar bands, soap wrappers, labels, etc. In a crisis, RPC's entire facilities can be turned full force on producing given material, often shipping out the completed publications in a matter of only a few weeks.

RPC publications are often the result of cooperation in a number of countries and in the department. One recent example was a cartoon book, *The Story of Doctor Liang*, which tells the story of a Chinese doctor who completed his medical education just after the Communists took over the country, and goes on to tell how he was drafted into the army, sent to Korea and finally captured by the UN forces. It is a true story, and Dr. Liang speaks of his gradual awakening to the Communist threat in his own words.

The basic material for this cartoon book was founded on information volunteered by prisoners of war in Korea. It was then put together as a text in the department and sent to the RPC, where it was illustrated as a cartoon book. Since its main target was the overseas Chinese, and since Hong Kong is the central translation center for Chinese, the finished dummy was channeled there. On completion of the Chinese text the book was offered to all posts.

To reach the mass audience of densely populated Asia takes, of course, millions on millions of publications. One of RPC's first efforts was a cartoon book, *When the Communists Came*. More than a million copies were printed in numerous languages and dialects of the Far East. These cartoon books, 1/8 inch thick, if placed in a single stack, would tower nearly 20 times as high as the Washington Monument.

And yet this represents but a mere scratch on the vast wall of ignorance, misunderstanding, and distortion that separates America from the peoples of Asia. The task of contacting and influencing these teeming millions is so vast as to stagger the imagination and to cost immense sums of money. However, new techniques are being explored that will probably lead to a certain amount of "reverse" decentralization making possible the stepping up of publication production far above present RPC limitations. This would involve the making of negatives and plates at the RPC for shipment to other countries for local printing of tailored publications that would enter commercial sale and become thereby self-perpetuating.

At the same time much progress is being made in restudying the "mass" and finding exactly what is meant by it, and what elements of the mass audience should be reached, and with what tools. Countries have been resurveyed in light of prime targets, and specialized publications are being developed to meet these needs. In all of this, RPC will unquestionably play an important part.

NON-GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES ENGAGED IN COLD WAR PROPAGANDA OPERATIONS*

By John Scott

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation compete with government propaganda agencies for audiences in Soviet dominated lands.

Radio Free Europe

While the Voice of America, an official agency of the US Government, is bound by certain diplomatic niceties, *Radio Free Europe* (RFE), privately financed and operated, is not. The principal objective of RFE is to reveal the Communist regimes in the worst possible light. Though the total volume of RFE operations is far

*From *Political Warfare: A Guide To Competitive Coexistence*, John Day Company, New York, 1955, pp 32–37. Reproduced with permission of the author and copyright holder.

smaller than that of the Voice of America, this station represents, along with Radio Liberation, something unique to the US — a non-governmental, free-enterprise organ of political warfare.

RFE was organized in December 1949, to conduct psychological warfare against the Soviet-imposed Communist regimes of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania.

It is financed by the Crusade for Freedom, a fund-raising project of the American Heritage Foundation. Both the Free Europe Committee and Radio Free Europe obtain support from the Crusade — which has received millions of dollars of public contributions since its establishment in 1950. RFE thus has no juridical connection or responsibility to the US Government. When it champions governmental policy, it does so, not as an instrument of that policy, but because the United States is a powerful country in the free world — and because the future of the captive countries is inextricably linked with the Western philosophy of freedom, and consequently with American policy.

RFE's broadcasting policy is designed to encourage the enslaved peoples of captive countries in their hope of regaining national freedom as well as individual liberty; to demoralize the regimes by nourishing the natural anxieties of Communist functionaries, sowing seeds of dissension and threatening retribution; to convince friends behind the Iron Curtain that they are inherently strong, and that regimes that must rely on terror to maintain power are fundamentally weak; and to remind all listeners of the eternal spiritual values of the Western world and the political and economic benefits which European federation holds for captive countries once they are again free.

RFE has twenty-one short-wave transmitters and two powerful medium-wave transmitters, located in Germany and Portugal. Seven of these transmitters broadcast simultaneously twenty program-hours daily into Czechoslovakia; six others beam sixteen and a half hours into Poland. Three transmitters beam alternately three hours of broadcasts into Bulgaria and three into Rumania. However, the allocation of these transmitters is flexible. When occasion warrants it — as it did on the occasion of Stalin's death — all transmitters are simultaneously employed to saturate alternately Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, overpowering all jamming for a considerable period of time.

RFE's news-gathering service includes sixteen branch offices from Scandinavia to Turkey. All reports go to Munich for evaluation. This operation is impressive. In the card index of the Hungarian section alone there are 42,000 cards. The central newsroom has a staff of 7 Americans and 10 Germans, distributing an average of 350 stories daily to the 5 national desks (Czech, Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Rumanian). Most of the spot news is written in Munich, but a good deal of other program material originates in New York.

A typical day's broadcasting by RFE would include international commentary, a satirical press review, article-of-the-week (the most interesting article of the week on world politics), radio magazine (a digest of news briefs from free-world magazines), "black book" (naming Communist informers and dangerous agents unsuspected by the listening audience), and messages — from refugees to their families.

Most of the newscasting is done live. The shows are written in the original languages, approved by each language desk chief — then translated into English for logging and control.

RFE is an American organization, and is directed by Americans. Policy directives come from the New York office, and the Czechs, Poles, Bulgarians, etc., who comprise the majority of the organization's employees in Europe represent RFE rather than any national committee or party of their native countries, although many of these employees are members of various committees and political parties. . .

Radio Liberation

. . . Radio Liberation was established and is supported by the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism Inc., now headed by Howland Sargeant, formerly Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. It has its studios in the large, imposing building which used to be the Munich Municipal Airport. The actual broadcasting facilities are located a number of miles away in Central Germany, and until quite recently programs were taken to the broadcasting station by courier. Direct communications have been established, however, and the broadcasts are made live from Munich.

The program director of Radio Liberation is Professor Wladimir Weidle, St. Petersburg — born *émigré* author; the program advisor for Russian-language broadcasts is Victor Frank, son of the Russian philosopher Simeon Frank, and former director of the Russian desk for the BBC; the American advisor is Manning H. Williams, formerly with the staff of the US Embassy in Moscow.

Broadcasts are programmed by a staff of *émigrés* of various USSR nationalities who operate nine area-language desks, and broadcasting is done in the following languages:

Three Slavonic languages	Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian
Nine Turkic languages	Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tatar-Bashkir, Azerbaijan, Karachay-Balkar, Kumyk, and Chechen-Ingush
Six Caucasian languages	Georgian, Armenian, Avar, Ossetin, Adyge, and Kabardin

The programs are broadcast on three or more transmitters simultaneously. Radio Liberation broadcasts no music and very few sound effects. Hour long programs in Russian are on the air twenty-four hours a day, and, quite apart from its straight Russian programs, Radio Liberation beams a total of 357 hours per week to the non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union alone.

About half the features broadcast by Radio Liberation emanate from the New York program section headed by Boris Shub (former political advisor to RIAS in Berlin), who solicits the co-operation of former Soviet writers, scientists, and military personnel, as well as older Russian *émigré* scholars. Radio Liberation Munich staff handles the rest of the feature material, together with news programs and commentaries. The whole Radio Liberation staff totals about 160 employees.

Radio Liberation aims to be the voice of the democratic anticommunist emigration, and its main purpose is to promote disaffection within the Soviet Union. Testimony from escapees and defectors from Soviet armed forces in occupation areas indicates that Radio Liberation is heard by large numbers of Soviet officials and officers.

Frequently Radio Liberation takes issue with the position of Western governments vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. It opposed, for example, General Mark Clark's 1952 offer of $100,000 for a North Korean, Russian-made MiG and said so. *Émigré* contributors to the station's programs, with a more intimate understanding of the psychology of their fellow-countrymen, realized that a purely materialistic appeal could be taken as an insult to long-suffering listeners who might measure things according to a different set of values. Radio Liberation's objection was based on the principle that fighters for freedom cannot and should not be bought.

Here is a translated sample from a Radio Liberation script (recorded in Berlin during a broadcast to Soviet occupation forces endeavoring to quell the revolt of East Germans, June 17–18, 1953):

> "Workers of East Berlin are fighting for the cause of all mankind, and for delivery of the whole world, including our Motherland, from Communism. Help them! When ordered to fire on the demonstrators, remember they are not enemies of our country, but defenders of our freedom. Soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army: the German workers' struggle against Kremlin oppression is unfolding before your eyes. The demonstrators are protesting against a government which on the Kremlin's orders attempts to set up a concentration camp system like that in our country. You Soviet fighters were not sent to Germany as cops! Look at the demonstrators' faces! They are working people like yourselves, not capitalists. In 1917 your fathers, then serving in the Czarist army, were ordered to shoot at workers' demonstrations. They refused and turned their weapons against those who issued the orders. . . ."

Personnel Selection

Publicists who have written on the subject of psychological warfare are in general agreement that adequate personnel is an important key to success or failure of any propaganda effort. Past experience appears to suggest that money and elaborate schemes of organization are not adequate substitutes for competent personnel.

American academic institutions and business establishments do not normally train individuals to perform this highly important function, only comparatively recently accepted as a proper peacetime activity of the government. In view of this there is no one logical source to which administrators may turn to recruit needed staff. As the US has accumulated experience in psychological warfare activities, a few writers have ventured to suggest those attributes of training, experience, and aptitude most likely to lead to success in propaganda work. Excerpts from the writings of some of these publicists have been combined with the major conclusions of a formal research investigation in the lengthy discourse "Personnel Qualifications for Psychological Warfare." The conclusion emerges from this study that few, if any, men may be found who combine all the skills, knowledge, and aptitudes useful in waging psychological warfare against any given target. Thus, in order to ensure that all interests and areas of knowledge are represented in a propaganda effort the team approach must be utilized. It is desirable to recruit a number of people, so that the skills, knowledge, etc. that any one person brings to the task complements those brought to the same effort by others.

The two accounts "Personnel Problems of the OWI Assam Psywar Team" and "Selection of Information Service Personnel in Occupied Germany" are the products of experience gained during World War II. The first study consists of excerpts taken from an official wartime report by field representatives of the OWI, whereas the second article is a personal account describing the screening procedures used in the selection of indigenous personnel employed to work with the American occupation officials in postwar Germany.

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

By W. E. D.

Effective psychological warfare operations require many skills and individuals with varying training and aptitude.

In discussing personnel requirements for psychological warfare operations it is well to recognize that psychological warfare is not a simple, homogeneous activity. Thus it is not possible to describe in a few words the qualifications to be sought in personnel to be employed in psychological warfare or in activities related to it.

Although psychological warfare has been used by Americans throughout our history as a free nation, it was not until World War II that it achieved a recognition or status of a reasonably well-organized effort. Prior to that time, relatively little thought was given to the determination of what type of person was most effective as a propagandist. It was fashionable for the majority of those who wrote on the subject to declare that "a propagandist is born not made."

Although one may agree that propaganda work requires certain innate intelligence, this is not to say that much of the information required for success cannot be acquired. Furthermore, even if one were to accept the dubious thesis that there is little that can be done to teach the skills and knowledge required for propaganda work, this is not to say that there is any less need for a set of criteria by which to separate the potentially successful propagandists from those candidates less likely to succeed. In other words, what are the indicators that tend to suggest that one man or woman is more likely to be successful than another in psychological warfare?

Paul M. A. Linebarger, by implication, does not agree that a man cannot be trained as a propagandist, for he has written

> "America does not normally produce psychological warfare personnel in peacetime, and if such personnel are to be needed again, they will have to be trained especially and in advance." (p 99)[13]

Sir Robert H. Bruce Lockhart, one of England's most able foreign propagandists during the past quarter century, has written at length relative to personnel qualifications for psychological warfare as he observed these from his background of expe-

rience in the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office (PID) and as the Director-General of the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), during World War II.

> "I cannot say that PWE was an easy team. Every good propagandist must possess the qualities of a prima donna or, as Ernst Toller once said, must be born with one eye. The department was composed almost entirely of temporary officials who had plenty of *esprit de corps* but considerably less knowledge of official procedure. There was no lack of brains, especially in the organization at Woburn where Rex Leeper had assembled and trained a varied array of talent which gave the form and shape to the propaganda policy which was finally adopted. . . .
>
> "The composition of PWE was extraordinarily varied. It contained a handful of professional soldiers and civil servants. The rest were drawn from almost every walk of life and included journalists, business men, advertising experts, school-masters, authors, literary agents, farmers, barristers, stockbrokers, psychologists, university dons, and a landscape gardener. I do not think that any one profession provided any initial advantage of training. A propagandist is born and not made. The journalists were undoubtedly the best exponents of propaganda. They wrote the best leaflets. They had the best understanding of the value of the spoken and written word, and in a department which had always to work at top speed they alone had the requisite sense of urgency. Being used to ephemeral work, they were not so good on policy and sometimes felt frustrated by the hampering necessity of consistency. Our schoolmasters were excellent. The dons included some brilliant men, but were inclined to resent criticism. With one exception the advertising experts were a disappointment. I have an open mind about psychologists. We employed three, and one, at least, did useful work for our German section. Psychological analysis has undoubtedly a place in political warfare, but it was not sufficiently tested in the war to justify any firm conclusions. My personal view is that in propaganda an ounce of first-hand experience of a country is worth a ton of theoretical knowledge, and this theory applies not only to our psychologists but to all the propagandists we employed." (p 155)[14]

Linebarger has stressed the team character of work in the field of psychological warfare planning and operations. He states

> "Effective psychological warfare requires the combination of four skills in a single individual:
> "(1) An effective working knowledge of US government administration and policy, so that the purposes and plans of the government may be correctly interpreted.
> "(2) An effective knowledge of correct military and naval procedure and of staff operations, together with enough understanding of the arts of warfare, whether naval or military, to adjust propaganda utterance to military situations and to practical propaganda operations in forms which will dovetail.

> "(3) Professional knowledge of the media of information, or of at least one of them (book-publishing, magazines, newspapers, radio, advertising in its various branches), or of some closely related field (practical political canvassing, visual or adult education, etc.).
> "(4) Intimate, professional-level understanding of a given area (Italy, Japan, New Guinea, Kwangtung, Algeria), based on first-hand acquaintance, knowledge of the language, traditions, history, practical politics, and customs.
>
> On top of these, there may be a possible fifth skill to make the individual perfect:
>
> "(5) Professional scientific understanding of psychology, anthropology, sociology, history, political science, or a comparable field.
>
> "The man who steps up and says that he meets all five of these qualifications is a liar, a genius, or both.
>
> "There is no perfect psychological warrior.
>
> "However — and the qualification is important — each psychological warfare team represents a composite of these skills. Some members have two or three to start with, the others virtually none. But all the personnel, except for men with peculiarly specialized jobs (ordnance experts; cryptographers; translaters; calligraphers), end up with a professionalism that blends these together.
>
> "They may not meet professional standards as officials — officers — journalists — Japanologists — psychoanalysts when they return from psychological warfare operations against the Japanese, but they have met men who are one or more of these and have picked up the rudiments of each skill — enough, at least, to suspect what they do not know.
>
> "The advertising man or newspaperman (skill 3) who goes into psychological warfare must learn something of the enemy, neutral or friendly groups whom he addresses (skill 4), something of United States civilian government procedures (skill 1), something of military or naval organization and operations (skill 2) and ideally something of psychology or sociology or economics, depending on the topic of his work (skill 5)." (pp 99–103)[13]

Dan Lerner[15] rejects the view that propagandists are born not created. He holds the view that "good propagandists can be 'made.'" He says,

> ". . . we may start from the view that an indispensable ingredient in the propagandist mixture is intelligence. Since this qualification would seem to be required in all 'intellectual' occupations, it tells us nothing about the distinctive characteristics required of the propagandist.
>
> ". . . Mr. Crossman [stresses two factors] empathy and timing. By these terms, he intends to isolate as factors in the personality structure of the propagandist the ability to project oneself into the way of thinking of one's audience and the ability to recognize, in the moods of that audience, the correct moment for saying something (or saying nothing) with optimum effects. . . .

"Stated in general terms . . . some essential qualifications for the propagandist are:

"(1) Intimate knowledge of the background of the audience — its language, history, myths, institutions, practices, social composition, and politics.

"(2) Detailed knowledge of the current developments among the audience — its unifying beliefs and practices; its divisive beliefs and practices; its current grievances; its current fads in dress, speech, and manners; and its 'propaganda case-history' (the recent flow of propaganda from all sides to which its attention has been exposed).

"(3) A systematic 'policy conception' of the propaganda process, which requires constant awareness that the purpose of sykewar is to use the target's hopes, fears and wishes (in addition to one's own) in manipulating symbols to achieve policy purposes.

"(4) A systematic conception of the psychocultural process of opinion-formation, which constantly involves awareness that sykewar operates within a vast environment. Any element of the environment is capable of affecting the attitude-structures of any target. The skill required of the propagandist is the ability to discover the decisive affective elements in a given target and how to manipulate them.

"(5) A 'nose for politics.' This characteristic is harder to define than to recognize. It is not important that a propagandist's nostrils should dilate when a political theme is raised. It is important that he should sense the political (as well as psychological) consequences of any theme, whether it deal with high doctrinal symbols or the most elementary symbols of life in a primary social group.

"(6) A 'flair for expression.' For a sykewarrior, the verbalizing tendency, which is characteristic of diverse personality types, should be present but brought under control. The effective sykewarrior probably will not be an *emmerdeur* [a crude term roughly meaning 'baloney artist']. Ease and grace and fluency of expression are uncommon skills — as is the 'gift of tongues.'

"These are not intended as an exhaustive catalog of characteristics required to make a propagandist. They are intended merely to indicate the kinds of talents and interests, acquired by experience and education, which 'the propagandist' can convert into usable skills.

"Additional specific skills are required for specific functions: the policy-maker must know how to convert into propaganda policies the political purposes he serves; the leaflet writer must know how propaganda policy can be most effectively converted into texts designed for the eyes of the audience; the broadcaster must know how to do the same with texts designed for the enemy's ears; the intelligence reporter must know how to select, observe, and systematically record the data on which all the other members of the propaganda team depend.

"Here we enter the field of 'know-how' — which Americans will readily recognize as the outcome of experience and training. Given the requisite factors of knowledge outlined above, and an intelligence adequate to convert such knowledge into usable skills, training can short-cut the trial-and-

error methods of unaided common sense by providing systematic summaries of past experience. Such training would involve, for optimum results, many years of travel and education. Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, regarded by some as the Navy's outstanding sykewarrior in World War II, shows uncommon insight into his own career as a propagandist when he begins his autobiography by reprinting the Navy order which, twenty years earlier, sent him to 'shore duty beyond the seas' explicitly 'for the purpose of acquiring a knowledge of the Japanese language and the Japanese people.' With all his intelligence, Zacharias could not have become an outstanding propagandist without this long prior training. Even with both his intelligence and his training he would not, for example, have been an outstanding contributor to Sykewar against Germany. Knowledge of the specific target, through long experience and education, is the basis of training for successful propagandists.

"It is quite clear that training of the kind which has been emphasized here will not automatically produce great individual propagandists or guarantee that all propagandists so trained will be equally efficient. Differences among individual propagandists involve psychiatric problems of personality which this writer recognizes but is not competent to discuss. Certain it is, however, that training will produce a higher level of propagandists, among whom the most brilliant individuals will readily be detected by their performance. Perhaps more important than brilliant individuals, in the long run, training will produce those 'skill-clusters' which are essential to sustained team work." (pp 88–91)[15]

In 1950 a survey of individuals who served in a psychological warfare capacity in World War II was made. Both military and civilian personnel were interviewed in the course of the project. Among the questions raised in the interviews was one dealing with what special skills, aptitudes, knowledge, and training, in the opinion of the respondents, are required for effective work in psychological warfare. The analysts who evaluated the answers given came up with the general conclusion that it was unwise to generalize with respect to all personnel involved in psychological warfare activities. The major emphasis in the survey was directed to a determination of the kinds of personnel and organization required by military forces operating under field conditions, however, many of the conclusions reached, are believed to be equally valid for situations other than those experienced under combat conditions. Excerpts taken from the report prepared after the completion of the interviews follow:

". . . for purposes of this analysis, qualifications required of psychological warfare personnel must be discussed in terms of a job classification scheme. . . . A systematic approach to the problem of personnel selection must proceed by defining the kinds of functions psywar personnel actually perform.

Idea Men

"The general directives issued by the key psychological warfare executives must be interpreted in terms of the particular target group before they can be translated into propaganda. This function, a vital one in any effective psychological warfare operation, is performed by what a top-

level administrative aide at PWD/SHAEF called the 'idea men.' They are 'the men who will provide the spark' for really good propaganda.

"At first glance, the problem of deciding what qualifies an individual for such a role seems almost insolvable. Time and again, in talking about the outstanding 'idea men' of World War II, respondents referred to a certain intangible quality of mind in trying to account for the extraordinary ability these men displayed. . . . such phrases as 'born propagandist' and 'a kind of talent or genius' do not solve the problem of criteria for selecting 'idea men' in the future. It is equally obvious, however, that 'the imagination to see the enemy from the inside, to know what would get under his skin' does not appear out of nowhere. It must, in fact, be based on a knowledge of the enemy. In other words, while the creative propagandist may possess certain elusive qualities (imagination, sensitivity, perception) to a higher degree than other people, these abilities must be supplemented by a backlog of experience, knowledge, and attitudes in order for them to be useful to psywar. These latter qualifications, at least, can be defined and identified.

"In short, it is possible to approach the problem of qualification for the idea men 'through the back door.' The successful 'idea man' in psywar must have, at the very least, the following qualifications:

"(1) *He must have an intimate, first-hand knowledge of the target people.* In order to 'embarrass the enemy,' as a Crossman admirer points out, one has to know a great deal about the enemy:

" 'He [Crossman] had a thorough knowledge of Germany and of the Germans. . . . A man who knows all the languages in the world, who can't project *himself* in the enemy country and see the things the enemy would, doesn't make a good propagandist. Cynical accurate knowledge is important to being a good propagandist.'

"Familiarity with the target group was a distinguishing characteristic of the 'idea men' in general. The man in charge of field radio operations for the First US Army stated the prime requisite for the 'idea man' in psywar as follows:

" 'I think he must have a pretty broad knowledge of people . . . number one. The area in which he is to operate is the first important thing. If he has traveled that area before, if he has had any opportunities at education which made him aware of the psychological traits of these people, their traditions, their general artistic and educational levels, the general economic situation of the country. Much of this he can learn. . . . The men who were best were those who knew the area, who had some personal interest in it, maybe relatives, maybe travel, maybe school there, and who had come to know that nation pretty well.'

"Such 'a thorough understanding of the prejudices, the emotional enthusiasms, the likes and dislikes of the particular audience for which you're shooting,' to quote a member of Col Hazeltine's group [in PWB/AFHQ, North Africa] is the *sine qua non* of the effective propagandist. The person most likely to have the kind of understanding called for is someone who had been a resident of the country in question.

"(2) *He must be a well-educated man.* Without setting up any standard for 'well-educated,' most respondents seem to assume that the men who are most capable of absorbing the necessary information about a foreign country are those with better than average education and intellectual approaches to their experience. . . . The experience of having lived on foreign soil is, of itself, no guarantee that the individual will assimilate the things that can be useful to a psywar worker. A man who had acted as liaison officer for a psywar operation contends that 'in the main, the academicians would have the cultural and historical background in a way to really understand these people fully, in the way that somebody else, who may have been there with a commercial firm, wouldn't have the cultural background.' However, as the field radio administrator made quite clear, it is not necessary for such previous education to have been acquired through formal channels. . . . The respondent who recommended academic people thought that men with the right kind of background might be found among the journalists:

" 'Their residence may have been with the intention of teaching in the universities, or for some other reason. . . . Somebody who has been in journalism would probably have the same qualifications (as the academician). Had he been in newspaper and magazine work, he would have to acquire enough of the culture, the history, and the background to understand why they feel the way they do, today.'

"A high-level administrator who worked in the Near East observed that Crossman 'was and is an able journalist.' He knew how 'to put his ideas into words, he knew how to write.' Later on, speaking of Wallace Carroll, 'another good propagandist,' he recalled that 'he again was an old-line journalist and newspaperman.'

"(3) *He must be politically aware.* A superior education may stand a man in good stead, but the studies and the interest are most valuable when they have a certain direction. As a psywar operator with a Ph.D. in political science pointed out, 'In essence, psywar is politics; it isn't psychology; it's politics. It's political behavior; it's attitudes of individuals and countries and groups, and how to get into them.' On the basis of this contention, he goes on to say that the creative thinker in psywar should have a flare for politics:

" 'He . . . has to have political awareness. He has to be politically minded. . . . . Men who work in this field must have a kind of political sensitivity with which only certain people are born. One cannot do it by just reading a book on politics. One has to be passionately interested in politics — politics and world affairs.'

"Whether one goes along with this extreme view of how political awareness is acquired, the major point still stands: the man of ideas in psywar should be one who is interested in political affairs. It is for this reason that someone who wrote directives at Radio Luxemburg qualified his remarks about the need for well-educated men:

" 'Basically, they must be people with pretty damned good education. Education, not because they had to, but driven by interest: in history, in political science, in economic conditions.'

"(4) *He should know the language of the target.* Someone who has lived in a foreign country for a considerable length of time, and is also a man of intellect, normally knows the language of the people among whom he has lived. Crossman, for instance, knew the German language thoroughly, and, according to at least one respondent, he applied this knowledge consistently:

" 'I can remember some silly mistakes made in leaflets because they didn't know that a certain customary phrase was used as a derogatory expression, in this area. Crossman was always seeking these.'

"This respondent states, however, that language 'is not a must' but that 'if you're actually printing leaflets or running a radio station, you must have language experts with you.'

"In connection with the 'idea men,' therefore, fluency in the language is more often considered a symptom of genuine feeling for the target group than a necessary qualification for the job. A member of the staff at Radio Luxemburg went so far as to say that linguistic skill could be over-emphasized:

" 'I think the idea that the language is of utmost importance can easily be overdone. What goes with it is a knowledge of national character and behavior and background.'

"(5) *He must have a certain liking for the target people.* In order to conceive of ways in which to attack the moral fiber of the enemy, the psywar operator must "understand the enemy's thinking processes, his patterns of behavior, his attitudes, his logic, and try to meet it — fight it."

"Hate, as several respondents observed, is a barrier to such understanding. A former member of the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, who had his own program to the Dutch, in Germany, stressed this fact:

" 'The best propaganda man, from our viewpoint, is a man without hate. If you hate, you're biased. And you cannot be biased. . . . If you're unbiased, then you're understanding. First you must think of what you want to achieve. You must determine what reaction you want to get. And you cannot think clearly of the reaction of these people if you're blinded by hatred. You should plan your action on a completely clear, unhampered point of view. Then you can say — if A is going to have reaction B, that's not the reaction I want, and so on down the line until you find the reaction that you really want. A man that hates cannot do that.'

"The political scientist previously quoted made the same point: 'You cannot do effective work if you hate. Hate is a private reserve which should be kept at home.'

"The 'idea man' may be a strong individualist, and he is not necessarily a man everyone will like. A pleasant personality and the ability to get along easily with all kinds of people are important in other phases of psywar work, but 'idea men' do not need to have these characteristics. Respondents did not make this point directly, but implied it by their comments on the men they considered outstanding propagandists.

"Men capable of thinking up the 'dirty tricks' for psywar are likely to be strong-willed, opinionated, and possibly even eccentric. They will provoke admiration, but they will also provoke antagonism and disapproval. Such was the case, for example, with Hans Habe. Two of the men who had contact with Habe during their service in psywar indicated the ambivalence with which he was regarded:

" 'I think Habe is an excellent study case for the psywarrior because . . . I think he combines all of the best and some of the worst in these people. He was a colorful character, and some people hate him violently, but with more violence than I think is justified because I don't think he was anybody's real enemy, except the Germans. I think he caused real havoc among some of his German listeners with some of the ideas that he had. Some of his personnel like him very much, some dislike him very much, and I don't think there are too many in between. Lt Habe was ridiculed frequently by the other officers. . . . Habe had many of the faults of a human being. He was vain, for instance, and he overdressed, was a thorough extrovert. . . . But he was an excellent officer as well as an excellent propaganda person. One of the best.'

"Richard Crossman was the object of similar criticism. A top-level administrative aide, who considered him an 'ace propagandist,' described him also as 'a rather appealing personality, but quite a dangerous type — most of us think that and would tell him so to his face.'

"Crossman was considered 'a dangerous type' by his fellow workers primarily because they found him both personally and politically unpredictable. At the same time, however, they recognized that this was part and parcel of what made him so keen a propagandist.

"Thus, the potential 'idea man' in the psywar organization may be highly individualistic, provided: (a) he has certain additional qualifications such as having lived in a foreign country, having absorbed the spirit of the people, and having been curious enough to learn its cultural, political, economic, and social history; (b) he has sufficient background to interpret this knowledge; and (c) he does not hate the people of that country so strongly that his hatred interferes with his political or propagandistic judgment. Such individuals, according to the weight of opinion in these interviews, would most likely be found in academic or journalistic circles.

"Locating men with all these qualifications is not an easy task. People like Crossman and Habe, who possess an extra indefinable spark, are probably even more rare. Fortunately, however, not many such men are needed in psywar. A top-level administrator made this quite clear:

" 'Actually in psywar very few real propagandists are required. If you have a half dozen people who are professional propagandists in the organization, that will be sufficient.'

"This respondent went on to say that too many 'brains' would make the psywar organization top-heavy:

" 'You need 90 percent of people who are good workers in regular skills. And then you need only a few people who are specialists in area, who are specialists in ideas.'

"This, if true, considerably lightens the personnel recruitment task for psychological warfare. In all probability, moreover, this respondent's estimate that 'two or three guys will do the trick . . . one of those fellows, or several of them to every area of high policy level' is fairly accurate:

"Another administrator suggested, if it is impossible to find someone who has all the qualifications, it may be possible to get two or three people whose combined capabilities would be an adequate substitute:

" 'In this whole business of being a propagandist, sometime you won't find the combination — a person who knows a lot about the people he's talking to and about, and also knows how to say it in a way that it gets across. So there you have to make a compromise. You have to get an area specialist and a good newspaperman or a writer of some kind. . . . I suspect, more often than not, that was what happened. You had a combination. At least until the time came along where, after a few months, your good writer had picked up enough savvy about the kinds of things that made sense to the Germans to do it himself.'

Administrators

"No large-scale business or industrial concern would underestimate the need for men to handle the mechanics of organizing, managing, and implementing plans. However, during the last war, according to reports of top-level personnel and those involved directly in field operations, trained administrators for psywar were a neglected category. A civilian administrator who served with PWB/AFHQ said, such officers were hard to find.

" 'In setting up future operations, you'll make a big mistake if you don't get more and better administrative personnel than we had. . . . Our major weakness in PWB in this last war was on the administrative side.'

"This shortage may have been in part the result of inadequate planning, for there were other respondents who complained that in their particular operations there were 'more . . . administrators than you can shake a stick at.' . . . A commanding officer from one of the Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company units pointed out, organizational know-how does not inevitably turn up in combination with a talent for developing propaganda lines:

" 'There were many large brains in psywar who could plan the over-all strategy of an operation, but could not personally follow through. That was where I felt I was of most use. Given a certain job, I could organize the men I needed. I could pick such teams, and I was able to lead such teams. In other words, a man who is able to put a plan into action is very necessary.'

"There is, then, a recognized need for persons with special qualifications along purely administrative lines. But it is not enough to say, as one respondent did, that 'as far as administration is concerned, men with the administrative ability [are needed].' The question arises, what precisely constitutes a good psywar administrator? For example, is just any person who has had administrative experience qualified to manage a psywar operation? Are the skill requirements for the administrator who serves

in the field the same as, or are they different from, those desired of the administrator at the policy level?

"Some answers to these questions can be found by looking into the backgrounds of men who were considered by their associates as good psywar administrators in World War II, and by looking into the statements of respondents who were concerned with the problem of administration. On the basis of these two types of data, the following statements can be made about the 'ideal' psywar administrator:

"(1) *He is an experienced executive.* Although drawn from a wide variety of fields, the men who did well in high administrative posts in psywar operations during the last war were all experienced in forming and running large organizations. They were men of demonstrated responsibility and initiative; they were used to routine and to keeping an eye on details: and, even more important perhaps, they were skillful in handling subordinates. All these qualities are necessary components of the psywar administrator.

"An OWI Administrator emphasized the importance of being able to delegate authority:

" '. . . When I started the German magazine, for which McClure would have been responsible, I went to see him. I told him that I was supposed to run this from London, because I have other magazines there. And you are responsible for what I am doing. How are you going to control me? You've got to control me somehow. He said: "There's only one way to control you. You are in charge of that magazine. If it's bad, it goes into the wastepaper basket." He knew how to delegate authority. He knew that there were some things that he himself had no experience in. He also knew that there were things he knew better than we.'

"An executive officer who served in PWD/SHAEF stresses another facet of the administrative personality. He has the ability to subordinate personal gratifications to the success of the job:

" 'An Executive Officer is one who's willing to say "no" at the risk of his own personal popularity. He knows that one of two things may be accomplished: either the achievement of what seems to be the over-all objective in the face of what might seem to be immediate pressures (which later turn out to be important), or leaving the matter open for the commanding officer so that he doesn't have to be the one to say "no." So the basic characteristic of a commanding officer is to be willing to place what you feel is the achievement of the job above the personal consideration of popularity. You can't be both popular and effective. . . .'

"These qualities are basic to any good executive; they do not set the psywar administrator apart from other businessmen. But there are situations that the psywar administrator must meet that narrow the field from which to choose such personnel.

"(2) *He has done work that has sharpened his sensitivity to public reactions.* Since he is to deal with fast-changing situations involving foreign nationals, the psywar administrator must be a flexible person sensitive to the reactions of the people he deals with. He cannot afford to be provincial in

his outlook, for he must be aware of the implications of his decisions for people of backgrounds different from his own.

"One respondent, a civilian who had been head of publications for OWI in the Middle East touched on the administrator's need for a broad outlook:

" 'In terms of personality, the most important thing is the ability to get along with people of all backgrounds, and educational and social and national backgrounds. A democratic feel. You must have respect for them.'

"Another civilian, a top-level administrator from PWB/AFHQ, suggested that the psywar administrator should be a man who 'has learned to adapt himself to foreign conditions and foreign peoples.'

"Indeed, almost without exception, the psywar administrators in World War II, who were rated highly, were men whose studies, business, or pleasure trips had taken them to foreign countries. They came, as their records show, from a variety of professions: journalism, radio, publishing, politics. These are the same fields the respondents mention as developing the breadth of understanding and adaptability that the psywar administrator needs.

"The respondent quoted above feels, for example,that business managers of newspapers are cut out for administrative work in psywar because 'in handling the writing, publication, and distribution of printed material or radio programs, I don't think there's any substitute for the kind of experience they've had.'

"Another respondent, formerly chief of publications for the psywar team attached to the Seventh US Army for the invasion of Southern France, has a further candidate, namely, 'a successful business executive with an editorial sense, who also has a very high interest in world affairs':

" 'A publisher. He would be an ideal executive for psywar. It could be the head of an ad agency. The head of a news service. I'm not very much for an editor, a man who is only on the editorial side of any publishing enterprise. To head up a psywar operation, you must have top executive ability. And writing is just one phase of it. . . . That is, of course, for the printed forms of psywar. Radio, and other forms, you would go to the other industries for them.'

"(3) *He knows something about military procedures.* Since psywar must in wartime work hand-in-hand with the military, it is important that the administrator be conversant with military procedures, and understand the relationship between psywar and the over-all military operation.

"Unfamiliarity with Army procedure was a stumbling block for many World War II psywar operators. According to an operator who had taken part in both planning and administration:

" 'The great weakness of many of the psychological warriors was that they found it difficult to adapt themselves to the Army forms and the Army paper work, and very often success with what you want to achieve in the Army depends upon your knowledge of Army framework and Army procedure.'

"(4) *He is not a specialist.* It was generally agreed by the respondents that the man placed in charge of administrative affairs does not have to be a specialist in any particular phase of the operations. . . . The job of the administrator demands that he have a clear grasp of his goal and that he be capable of gaining the full cooperation of his men in accomplishing it. Technical jobs can be handed over to specialists.

"(5) *He has an understanding of the various psywar operations.* For effective control of the men under him, however, the administrator must have an understanding of the various operations for which he is responsible. This knowledge would include some acquaintance with both the technical and creative sides of the work. The managing editor of a psywar publication in the Philippines referred to the administrator's need for sympathetic understanding of the problems faced by writers:

" 'A well-knit unit should have an officer (if it's going to be military psywar) who is acquainted with the general problems of producing, writing, and creating. You've got to be flexible enough to operate in an ad-lib operation.'

". . . In short, a good administrator, to use the phrase of one respondent, is a 'jack of all trades,' with a wealth of background and experience in executive, public-related jobs to draw upon, and a personality that makes it possible for him to get along easily with both civilians and military men.

"The picture of the ideal administrator varies, to be sure, with the position he is to occupy within the psywar structure.

"A respondent who bemoaned the fact that Elmer Davis and Robert Sherwood, [Director and Deputy Director of OWI] were not administrators, spoke at considerable length about the need for an 'administrative type' at the very top of a psywar organization:

" '. . . you should have as the head of it, a man of very considerably recognized stature. I would say that maybe he should be a general, but maybe better still one whose stature in this general area is recognized by the average guy in the street. . . . I think that whoever heads it up, whether it's a full-time job or a number two assignment to somebody — there should be somebody really on the top level — who is interested in it to the point that he insists that it gets coordinated.'

". . . Lower in the administrative scale, face-to-face personal contacts are more important than public contacts. Here, as the same respondent pointed out, the administrator does not need prestige. He must, however, be a 'leader':

" '. . . In the field, what you really need in heading up the operation in any given area is a leader. Leadership is more important than any other single thing in that job. You can get guys who know the area, who are good technicians, proficient writers in terms of whether you want radio writing or leaflet writing or whatever — you can hire all those. But I stress that leadership and management are all-important in getting something done.'

"Insofar as specific operations such as leaflets, publications, or radio are concerned, men with more than a dilettante knowledge of the particular operation are evidently needed.

". . . Even at the technician level, personnel will be called upon to control the behavior of, for instance, foreign nationals hired in the field. A technician placed in this position, as a printer pointed out, must establish his authority by setting a good example to his subordinates, by treating them fairly, and by knowing his job.

". . . The administrator cannot be chosen without regard to the position he is to occupy within the organizational hierarchy. It may be all right for top-level administrators to have only a nodding acquaintance with the ways of printing machinery, but as one moves down the scale to the man actually in charge of the print shop, anything less than a thorough understanding of the process may have unfortunate consequences. In each case, decisions as to what individuals are to occupy control positions should be based, in part, on the character of personnel and the type of operation they are to administer.

Liaison Men

"In order to carry out its objectives, particularly in its tactical phases, psywar must rely on cooperation from many other agencies. If, for example, it is to get the information on which to base leaflets, radio broadcasts, or loudspeaker appeals, psywar must have access to prisoners-of-war and to intelligence reports. This necessitates working closely with G-2 (Intelligence Section). The dissemination of leaflets, to cite another instance, requires the services of the Artillery and the Air Force. In cross-the-lines operations, combat troops must cooperate to the extent that they not hinder the operators' attempts to persuade the enemy to surrender. Occasions may arise, finally, where psywar must avail itself of assistance from allied or enemy nationals. In a thousand and one different ways, therefore, psywar needs some personnel who are capable of smoothing the way with, and getting cooperation from, non-psywar organizations and individuals.

"During World War II, certain individuals held the title of 'liaison officer' and were called upon, in theory, to establish needed rapport with non-psywar officers. In actual practice, however, these men carried additional responsibilities that got in the way of their nominal tasks.

"It may perhaps be assumed that, in the future, better indoctrination will reduce the need for salesmanship on the part of so many psywar operators. In such circumstances, the functions of the liaison officer would presumably fall into a sharper pattern than that described above. He would be responsible for establishing contacts with Intelligence sections, for arranging for leaflet dissemination via Artillery or the Air Force, and for acting as a buffer and factotum vis-à-vis the extra psywar needs of his colleagues. Thus the liaison job would be more specialized than in the past, and could be assigned to individuals chosen specifically for it. The following statements can be made about the qualifications such an individual should bring to this work:

"(1) *He should be able to get along easily with all kinds of people.* One after another, respondents reported that successful relations with non-psywar outfits had invariably resulted from good personal relationships which it was hard work to establish.

". . . The very nature of the different kinds of groups that the liaison man must contact helps to determine the qualities he must have.

"First of all, the men charged with the responsibility of establishing connections between psywar agencies and Army Intelligence or any other branch must be 'regular guys.'

". . . Thus, in order to be able to get along with both the average soldier and professional psywar personnel, a liaison man must be a person who understands human beings. This quality is perhaps even more important than being a 'regular guy' or being 'well enough educated.'

"(2) *He should be a man of initiative.* A respondent who had not had the title of liaison officer, but had been engaged in setting up radio stations as the Army moved up through enemy territory in the ETO, told how relations improved as soon as the psywar personnel manifested an interest in helping other outfits:

" '. . . when we tried to find out what they needed, they liked us pretty well, . . . when it came to the Rhine crossing and the pontoon bridges, and we broadcast eight times a day the flood levels of the Rhine River, so that the engineers could adjust their pontoon bridges to the level of the Rhine, nothing was too good for us. Here we were actually participating in military action that was helping them to do something they couldn't do themselves. They loved it. In Sicily . . . the Italians were trying to quit but didn't know where to quit. We told them where to go, and it was wonderful.'

"This same respondent concluded: 'It wasn't a matter of saying, "This is what I can do." It was a matter of going out and doing it. You had to go out and do it and prove it. And you had to fight sometimes to be able to do it.'

"(3) *He should be courageous.* Not infrequently, the sort of thing the liaison officer had to do in order to get cooperation from members of other branches required considerable physical courage. This was particularly true of the men who worked with the Air Force. An intelligence officer who had served with PWB/GHQ, SWPA, emphasized the fact that the Air Force liaison men have 'to get along with the pilots and their crews, not (be) afraid to go out on a mission with some leaflets and throw them out.'

"(4) *He should have a thorough knowledge of psywar.* The respondents familiar as they were with the difficulties faced by the liaison officers, placed much emphasis on salesmanship and the ability to win friends and influence people. However, most of them recognized that charm alone is not enough. As the respondent who had served in Burma put it, a liaison man who is to deal with the military 'should know what he is talking about. He should not ask them what to do, he should tell them about psywar and be able to back up everything he says.'

". . . The liaison man is also at an advantage if, in addition to understanding 'the over-all strategic and tactical propaganda objectives,' he has a thorough knowledge of the mechanical techniques of psywar. The man who knows the technical side of things commands respect. For example, the civilian air liaison man who went out with the pilots on their dissemination missions was able to explain the technical problems involved, and he was even able to suggest to the pilots the use of new techniques:

". . . Finally, a liaison officer who is familiar with previous and current psywar operations is more likely to do a good job than one who is not. A member of the 4th MRBC, who headed a loudspeaker unit, claimed that 'being able to show instances of effectiveness was helpful in securing cooperation, being able to show that it was more effective than anything else.'

"To secure cooperation from other groups, then, the liaison man must have a well-rounded knowledge of his work. He must comprehend its goals, know enough about actual operations to be able to evaluate situations from the point of view of how psywar can contribute to them, and be sufficiently acquainted with past operations to cite cases and offer concrete evidence of psywar effectiveness in similar situations.

"(5) *He should understand the organization and capacities of the military.* Since he must work with representatives of the armed services, it is essential for the liaison man to know how the military is organized and how it functions in order to keep from antagonizing the very people whose cooperation he is after.

"Know-how vis-à-vis the military is important. A former member of the 4th MRBC made this point as follows:

" '. . . Besides helping the liaison man avoid blunders, familiarity with the military would be of use to him in all discussions as to where and how psywar could be used.' A former artillery liaison officer stated that 'as far as artillery liaison goes, the special skill that might be needed is special training as an artillery man.' Understanding the problems facing the military was also suggested as a requirement by the man who became general theatre liaison between psywar and the Air Forces in North Africa. As he put it, the job 'involved not only telling the Air Forces what we wanted to have them do, but also working with Air Force Headquarters and finding out what their capabilities were.'

"It is a short step from recognition of the importance of knowing the military side of the picture to the recommendation that the psywar liaison man be a military person himself. This was the conclusion of a civilian who was a former air liaison man in Burma, who recounted his success in establishing good relations with the Air Force personnel who distributed his leaflets. He believed that the psywar liaison officer 'should be military. He should understand the military. Not merely to kow-tow to them, but he should be an equal.'

"The requirements for the liaison man, as set forth here, evidently grew, in large part, out of the peculiarities of the psywar situation in World War II. The liaison man's functions at that time were twofold: he had

to break down the resistance to psywar on the part of the military personnel; and he had to act as an intermediary between civilians and the military, who were, more often than not, hostile to one another.

"As psywar comes to occupy a less ambiguous position vis-à-vis the military establishment, the basic qualifications for the psywar liaison man in the field will perhaps be somewhat simplified.

"It will, to be sure, remain necessary that the liaison man have a winning personality, that he be intelligent, and be 'a regular guy. . . .' He will still have to be a specialist of sorts in the area where psywar and strictly military functions meet. However, in the future the liaison officer may not be obliged to ride along with the bombs that carry the leaflets, and he may not have to solve the technical problems that arise on each side of the gap he bridges, or to devise ways and means of 'bribing' reluctant military men who have not been convinced of the value of psywar.

"Psychological warfare at higher levels often involves contact with both civilian and military personnel from countries other than the US. For the purposes of these contacts, the liaison man perhaps does not need to be a military expert, but he should have a pleasant personality, and certain further qualifications that would not be required of other men in the US Armed Forces.

"As an artillery liaison man who had worked with Allied Military units indicated, liaison with the French and British was no different from liaison with US units insofar as personal relations were involved. He put it in much the same terms as the interviewee who had worked exclusively with US troops: 'Relations were pretty good. More on the basis of personalities, I would say, than by any other basis. . . .' This respondent did not, however, explain in detail the foundation upon which his good relations with foreign groups had been established.

"(6) *He should know the foreign group with which he is working.* The man who had functioned as liaison for psychological warfare with the French Radio Group had spent some time as a student in France. He knew the French people and he knew the Americans. Consequently, he was able to work well with the French, and was especially qualified to step into the picture as a soothing agent when friction developed.

"(7) *He should know the language of the foreign group.* Fluency in the language of the foreign group with which liaison is conducted may usually be taken for granted in the man with knowledge of the people and the culture, and vice versa. Nevertheless, as the man in charge of field operations in France for PWD/SHAEF pointed out, 'if an American officer is able to establish language liaison with an opposite number, his battle is won.' It would seem that the ability to speak the language, even if it is not accompanied by thorough understanding of the people and the culture, serves liaison personnel in good stead.

"(8) *He should not be provincial in his attitudes toward foreigners.* It is extremely important that the man who is chosen to deal with allied or other foreign nationals be someone who does not 'look down' upon for-

eigners. A respondent who had lived in China for 20 years, and who had returned there as a representative of the OWI, put considerable emphasis on this point:

" '. . . the important thing for any information man or propagandist, is to be a very good American — in all contacts with the hundreds and thousands of people that you should see in your work [in order] to get over the idea of acting democratically, of being fair . . . a good American. . . . Americans are just naturally provincial. It's hard for them to adapt themselves to countries where there are no flush toilets, no running water. They begin to separate the world into first-class people and second-class people. The first-class people are those that have all the refinements we have in America. I think, almost automatically, that if you do that you're going to be condescending in your attitudes toward people. . . . Too many of the people that I've seen in information work were just not their best; they didn't treat the people as equals. They didn't treat the people with whom they were accredited in the same way they treat fellow Americans. There was a definite barrier between them. I think that Orientals, in particular, can feel any condescension. I think that's very important.'

"Thus, in addition to being a likeable person in his own right, the psywar operator who is to deal with foreigners should be someone who is capable of genuine sympathy with foreign peoples. Ideally, he should be a person whose experience includes the kind of familiarity with foreign populations that comes with having lived abroad.

Creative Men

"The creative men determine the form and substance of psywar messages and are thus the vital core of psywar operations. They are the men who translate the policies and bright ideas into the day's activities, and each day they create ideas of their own for leaflets, radio programs, and loudspeaker broadcasts. They are mostly writers or artists, the former, however, outnumbering the latter. They should have at least some of the qualifications of 'idea men.' But World War II showed that they can function adequately without that extra spark that distinguished Richard Crossman and some of the other 'propaganda geniuses' of World War II.

"Specifically, the following statement can be made about the qualifications of the writer who will contribute most to psywar, whether behind a desk at headquarters or in an office on wheels:

"(1) *He should know his target thoroughly.* Since part of the writer's job, in the words of a former top-level OWI administrator, is that of 'interpreting that area, and . . . taking the fundamental policy and . . . making sense to that particular area' a basic requirement for the writer is that he know his target thoroughly. The administrator just quoted, one of whose functions had been to integrate field office operations and Stateside directives, explained why this interpretive function must be left to the writer:

" 'There is no way that Washington can sit down and say this is exactly what you ought to say to the Italians, or the French, etc. About all they can say is: these are our beliefs; what we generally feel about that part of

the world and what our general line should be. Only on the local level, it seems to me, can you do a good job in interpreting that in the light of day-to-day conditions as they go along.'

"The writer, like the 'idea man,' must be capable of looking at the world through the eyes of the target, with understanding and without hatred, in order to anticipate the way in which the target will interpret the content of his leaflet or broadcast. An Army officer who performed psywar functions in the Central Pacific area touched on this subject:

" 'I think first of all the man has got to have a basic knowledge or understanding of the people he's working against. He has to have some comprehension of the way they think and the way they act because . . . a man might do a tremendous job doing leaflets against the Germans and then turn around and be nothing but a miserable flop trying to do leaflets against the Japanese. The Germanic philosophy and actions and reactions and attitudes toward certain things would be completely different from the Asiatic reaction, for certain things. So I think that basically, any man that is going to try to design propaganda or counter propaganda has got to have a knowledge of the people that he is directing his propaganda against.'

"It seems generally agreed that residence in the area is the best way for the writer to acquire the kind of knowledge he needs. A former leaflet writer who served with the OWI in Assam explained one of the advantages of having lived in the country:

" 'If you've lived in a country, you can always throw in that little touch in a leaflet of the commonplace to the person addressed that makes it seem that you're in communion. In other words, experience in the country itself is valuable.'

"(2) *He should be fluent in the language.* Since the creative people are dealing directly with the written or spoken communication, it is more important for them than for the idea men to have a thorough knowledge of the language. This does not necessarily mean text-book knowledge. The leaflet or the broadcast, in order to be effective, requires treatment of the language in its living, colloquial form.

"Men who worked through translators were sensitive to the shortcomings of this means of overcoming the language barrier between writer and target. In the words of a respondent who had done loudspeaker work for the V Corps of the First US Army:

" 'To do creative propaganda work toward the enemy, you've got to know the language 100 percent, or don't do it. For example . . . if you write a leaflet and make one spelling error there, I feel that the whole leaflet might as well be burned.'

" '(Interviewer: Couldn't you use a translator?) A translator would lose the touch. If I would sit down and write something in English and then translate it, somewhere, something gets lost. Your greatest weapon is to show that you know everything about them — facility in their language is vital.'

"(3) *He should have the ability to express himself clearly and accurately.* It was pointed out by a number of respondents that psywar does not require 'great' writers or 'great' artists. It is, however, the writer's or the artist's task to convey the import of the directives in a form that will be meaningful to his audience, and this calls for a certain minimum of proficiency as a writer or draftsman. However, as a member of the 4th MRBC who had his own program at Radio Luxemburg discovered, a professional novelist is not ideally suited for this type of activity:

" '. . . there's one chap who's a brilliant writer. But he is too much of a writer, inside. He only wanted to write what he felt. He knew that his talent was wasted on it, as it was. Great writers are selfish; they want to write the things they see and feel. And they want to choose the subject.

"What is needed are people who have the ability to express themselves simply and easily through writing or the spoken word. One of the people who had taught propaganda techniques to men going to the Far East, himself a well-known novelist in civilian life, stressed this point:

" '. . . literary skill has absolutely nothing to do with leaflet writing. When we first started recruiting people for leaflet writing, we naturally turned toward writers, either of fiction or newspapermen, radio writers, and so on. While many of these people turned out to be excellent leaflet writers it was not because of their special skill with words. What it really required was a basic intelligence — I would say that that is the basic requirement in almost any field — so that a man or a woman can grasp quickly what the elements of a leaflet are, for example. The capacity to write would have nothing to do with it; the capacity to understand the necessity for saying something briefly even if ungrammatically, was important.'

"The respondents imply that people whose interest in writing is primarily literary are not necessarily the best people for psywar, but none of them questions that some facility with words is essential. A former chief of the leaflet section for PWB/GHQ, SWPA, pointed this out:

" 'If one can't express himself in writing, he can hardly expect a person who reads what he writes to know what he's talking about. . . . He should also be able to express himself clearly in speaking. He may have occasion to speak to the enemy via radio or some other means.'

"When the creative worker does not happen to have a facile command of the language of the target groups, it is even more important for him to have the ability to express himself accurately, intelligently, and clearly.

"(4) *He should be politically aware.* Again like the 'idea men,' the writers, since they are dealing with living and changing situations, should be men who are sensitive to the political implications of what they are doing. A former officer in charge of a loudspeaker unit said that 'a comprehensive outlook on what is happening' is essential for the creative man in psywar: 'He has to have a very firm foundation in the political aspect.'

"(5) *He should be emotionally well-balanced and adaptable.* Various factors in his working environment make it important for the creative worker in psywar to be both stable and flexible.

"In the first place, as a former instructor in psywar techniques observed, 'There are so many things happening behind the scenes and at long distances that ultimately affect what you are doing, that you have to get into a philosophical frame of mind about the inconsistencies of the people who are directing you, or the people with whom you are working and getting information that they give to you that seems insane and misguided and unintelligent.' He added that people who 'are thrown into a tizzy' by changing directives or similar inconsistencies are not good risks for work in psywar. In the words of a field administrator, the creative man must be disciplined enough 'to take a directive and carry it out whether he approves of it personally or not.'

"Secondly, the creative man must be able to get along easily with his fellow workers, who may have extremely varied backgrounds.

". . . Thirdly, the writer or the artist must be able to adjust his style and his techniques to the taste of his audience. A former leaflet writer who served with OWI in New York, London, and Paris made this point:

" 'Above all else, he has to have an easy ability to have his mind changed because, so often what appeared to an American, fresh over there, to be an ideal way to convey something to the Frenchman was not the ideal way. He had to be able to change his mind and then go off on a tangent, perhaps, and take what might have appeared to him to be the second best way of doing it. . . . Very often, particularly in the case of artists who came over, they changed their minds drastically and sometimes painfully.'

"Thus, for example, the writer or the artist employed in psywar must be capable of controlling his personal feelings, subduing his individualism, and allowing the situation to dictate his behavior to a greater extent than might be necessary in other work.

"Needless to say, some creative men in any psywar operation will be working in or around a combat zone. Those who go abroad must, evidently, be willing to face the fact that the living conditions they encounter will not always resemble those to which they have been accustomed. As for the creative man who operates in a combat situation (for example, a writer attached to a roving loudspeaker unit), he must be able and willing to withstand the dangers of this life, without grumbling.

"(6) *He should be in good physical condition and be physically courageous.* To survive the rigors of life at the front lines, men must be 'in top shape' physically. An individual whose health is less than perfect, will not only hinder operations, but will risk further deterioration of his health. When operating at the battlefront, the creative man is no less exposed to danger from bullets and shrapnel than the infantryman. He must, therefore, if he is 'to do the job that an advance echelon requires' have 'a certain amount of real personal courage,' according to a man who worked on the preparation of radio broadcast materials in the Philippines.

"(7) *He should have some background in military matters.* There are two reasons why a man who is to do creative work at the front should have had some combat experience and military training. In the first place, he must be able to protect himself when he is in an exposed position, as the respond-

ents learned from actual experience. In the words of a former non-commissioned officer with a PA unit:

" 'For a man who did loudspeaker work on the front lines, like myself, you had to have military training. You had to dig foxholes, you've got to know what to do when you're being shelled or when you get into small arms fire, and you've got to know how to use your weapons. . . .'

"Secondly, in order to be able to make the most effective and efficient use of their particular weapon, psywar operations must know how it relates to the actual military situation. Respondents who had engaged in this tactical aspect of psywar appear to have felt that they could not emphasize the point too strongly.

"(8) *He should be able to think 'on his feet.'* In a combat area, the situation may change quickly and psywar materials for example may become obsolete before they have been disseminated. At such times the man who is attached to a loudspeaker unit must be capable of rewriting his address on the spot. As the man just quoted went on to say:

" 'I think that psywar personnel must be resourceful, in that they must improvise, think of new ideas on the spot, because there is not much time, like a selling job: you never know what your partner, or in this case the enemy, will think up; and you have to improvise on the spot and still get the maximum use out of every situation, because things don't always proceed according to plan, as we well know.'

"To summarize, the men who do the creative work for psywar should have a detailed knowledge of the target group, fluency in the language, and the ability to write and speak clearly and concisely; they should be politically aware, and disciplined but flexible. The closer they are to the front, the more important it becomes for them to be in excellent physical condition, to have some background in military matters, and to be able to think 'on their feet.'

Researchers

"An integral part of any psywar operation is the collection and evaluation of intelligence, upon which much of the propaganda output must be based.

"The intelligence function calls for personnel capable of monitoring enemy radio broadcasts, reading the enemy's written propaganda and captured documents, interrogating prisoners of war, and evaluation of all information gathered from these sources in terms of its usefulness for psychological warfare purposes.

"The persons assigned to this aspect of psywar should be highly qualified in several respects. In part, the standards of selection for researchers resemble those for the creative personnel. For the most part, however, a researcher should be a man of a distinctive type from the standpoint of both background and personality.

"(1) *He should be an expert in the language of the target audience.* Language tends to be mentioned first among the qualifications of the researcher. Unlike the 'idea man' or the writer, he cannot fulfill his mission without it.

An interrogator, for example, would be utterly lost unless he were able to speak freely with the prisoner he was interviewing. This means that the interrogator must be, to quote a man who had worked in psywar intelligence with the Fifth US Army, 'not just . . . a guy who speaks the language academically; he is a man who must speak it as if he were native born.' This same kind of skill with language is, of course, necessary for the man who monitors and evaluates enemy broadcasts or who follows the trends in the enemy press.

"(2) *He should know the target people.* For evaluating the material culled from the mass media, and in face-to-face relations with enemy soldiers, research personnel need intuitive understanding of what various events, ideas, or symbols may mean to the enemy. Such understanding comes only from knowledge of the target audiences' *culture*, in the broadest sense of that term. An OWI civilian who served as an analyst of German propaganda described the background needed for the task he had performed:

" '. . . it's important . . . let's say in analyzing German propaganda to know something about Germany, to know the language, and to know German reality in order to appreciate the contents of the propaganda. . . . By German reality I mean precisely German folkways, German mores, German institutional ways and the German literature and the psychology of the people, the geography of the country. It's important to know where Berlin is and what Berliners are like and what meaning, let's say, the *Kaiser Wilhelme Gedachtes Kirche* has to the average Berliner, and what a hit, let's say, by a British or American bomb on one of these buildings means, to the average Berliner or to particular groups of Berliners. . . . What is the *Brandenburger Tor* where all the victorious armies of Germany marched through, much like the *Arc de Triomphe* in Paris. If you don't know what that is, of course, then any talk by a Berlin commentator about the *Brandenburger Tor* might not mean very much to you.'

"This same type of detailed background information is extremely useful to the men who interrogate prisoners of war. The chief of the propaganda section of the 4th MRBC, who occasionally interrogated German POWs, stressed the advantage of knowing as much about the target group as possible.

" 'If you can tell a man that you know his home town, or that you've been to his home town, or if you're familiar with expressions that he uses, it's invaluable. If you can sympathize with him and discuss things with him, it puts you at a great advantage if you don't have to ask him where this and that is. It surprises the man that you're interrogating and makes him feel that you know a lot and that he won't give anything away by telling you more.'

"(3) *The interrogator should be skillful with people, and should be emotionally mature.* In order to make headway with a war prisoner, and get the kind of information from him that is needed, the interrogator must be adept at establishing rapport. 'You have to talk to them on their own level,' a former Information Control Officer for one of the MRBCS said. You have to make it easy for him to 'pour his heart out to you like a big brother.'

" 'You cannot sit above them, because then you won't get what you want. That might be fine for tactical interrogation, when you want to find out where a gun is located, but if you want to get morale information, if you want to know how he feels — to get at the truth of it — you have to talk to him on the same level.'

"While it is necessary to put the POW at his ease, the interrogator must also carry the weight of authority. Some of the interrogators themselves regard this delicate balance as having been more easily achieved by older men than by the very young.

"This was, in part, a matter of the age level of the prisoners of war. An interrogator with the 2nd MRBC stressed the 'maturity' factor:

" 'What I think is most important is that he's mature. Not too young. If you talk to an older man (and most of the POWS were older men) and you are very young, you cannot make an impression on such a man.'

"(4) *The analyst should possess a background in the social sciences.* As a former member of the 3rd MRBC commented, those who collect and analyze written or broadcast material, as distinct from the men who deal with people, 'don't need much personality, they just have to be fairly well educated.'

"Respondents seemed to agree that considerable academic training is necessary for the type of evaluations required of the propaganda analyst. A researcher who is analyzing the enemy's propaganda output should be a person who has studied the sciences dealing with human relations, history, political science, economics, psychology, sociology, public opinion, and propaganda. The former OWI analyst already quoted expanded on this point.

" 'I think he needs a good background in propaganda and public opinion devices and techniques, familiarity with the techniques of propaganda. . . . I think you need a man who is familiar with or trained in psychology, and in this particular branch of psychology, that is, applied psychology, and who has sufficient political and historical background to appreciate the significance of particular items that occur in the texts. It ought to be a man who is sufficiently articulate, also, to convey his observations accurately. It ought to be, in other words, a man with some sort of scientific training. I believe that's extremely useful. Men also who know how to make quantitative analyses, and don't rely on first impressions only and don't make rash generalizations, but wait for evidence before he passes judgment on whether a trend actually exists or a trend is changing and in what direction that trend is changing.'

"It is a man with this type of background who will best be able to fulfill the analyst's function. The latter, according to a former OSS man, who had worked in Intelligence, is essentially 'to understand quickly when he reads something . . . what does it mean,' to distinguish between 'rumor and fact, between nonessential and essential information.'

"Thus, although the research personnel need the same kind of knowledge about the same area as the 'idea men' and the writers do, they should

possess, however, an analytical rather than a creative turn of mind. Instead of *building* something out of their knowledge, it is the job of the research men to *break down and evaluate* the material passing through their hands. The creative men may well have acquired their skill through experience in a variety of places. The propaganda analysts, by contrast, will probably have acquired theirs in an academic environment.

"In addition, the research people should know the language of the target like natives. This applies equally to the men who work with earphones, at desks, and to those who are out interrogating prisoners of war. Although interrogators must have sufficiently out-going personalities to enable them to acquire the confidence of prisoners of war, personality is a relatively less important attribute for the propaganda analysts, monitors, and translators.

Technicians

"The backbone of psychological warfare consists of the men who set the type, run the presses, operate the radio transmitters, and, in general, provide the mechanical means for disseminating the propaganda conceived by the creative staff. They are not only essential to psychological warfare; they constitute the bulk of its personnel. A former administrative assistant at PWD/SHAEF said: 'You need 90 percent of people who are good workers in regular mechanical skills.'

"Even if this estimate is somewhat extravagant, the technicians certainly form a large group within the organization, and for this reason and for no other, deserve more attention than most respondents tended to give them. Almost invariably the subject of technical personnel was dismissed with a 'you can get guys . . . who are good technicians,' or a casual 'if he were a technician, he'd have to be a good one,' with no further attempt to define or describe what constitutes a good technician for psywar.

"There were, however, a few people whose interests and experiences prompted them to discuss the technician in somewhat greater detail. It is, therefore, possible to construct from the respondent's comments a composite portrait of the skills or attributes the technician should have to work effectively in psychological warfare. The technician should possess the following characteristics:

"(1) *He should know his job.* It goes without saying that the man assigned to a linotype machine or to a Davidson press must know how to operate it. More than mere automatic performance is often required of the technician. He may be confronted with supply shortages, failures of irreplaceable parts, or the need for immediate restoration of broken machinery. The technician qualified to surmount operating obstacles of this nature must know his tools so well that he can treat a crisis as a challenge rather than as a reason for giving up.

"(2) *He should be emotionally well-balanced.* Since he must work frequently under the most unfavorable conditions and be exposed to exasperating shortages of normally essential items, the technician must have an uncommonly even disposition.

". . . It is not impossible, however, for the technician who has acquired the skill required to have also the kind of temperament that will survive the frustrations of work in a combat zone. In the opinion of the man who had supervised a printing plant, the 'people who go into that type of production work — have a good deal of patience . . . you've got to have a lot of patience with that type of condition that you might run into.'

"In addition to being a mechanical expert, the psywar technician must have a stable personality — that is, he must be the kind of man who is not 'thrown' by unprecedented situations.

"(3) *He should be interested in ideas as well as machines.* Several respondents noted that technical personnel do not have to be language or area experts. However, in order for them to function most efficiently within the organization, it is helpful for them to have some notion at least of what psywar is trying to do.

". . . Such training would, however, be wasted upon persons not susceptible to ideas. On the other hand, intellectual facility, although an asset to the technician, is no substitute for his mechanical aptitude and knowledge of the job.

"To summarize, the ideal technician for psywar activities is a man who is expert in all phases of the operation he is chosen to perform; he is emotionally well-balanced; and he possesses an outlook broad enough to enable him to take an interest in psywar's long-range goals.

"Although respondents did not say so explicitly, the technician, who may be called upon to serve in a combat zone, must be in good physical condition.

Service Personnel

"The men who selected support personnel for psywar units during World War II evidently assumed that anyone who could drive a truck, cook a meal, or rig an antenna is qualified to perform these activities in a psywar organization. Experience, however, proved that this is not the case.

"A number of respondents complained of friction and even hostility between 'those people who do . . . intellectual work and the others, who furnish and produce the food, drive the trucks, and so on.'

"One respondent, formerly propaganda chief of the 4th MRBC, claimed that the service workers sometimes even interfered with the execution of the psywar tasks: 'Cooks wouldn't want to make an early breakfast for people who had to get on the radio at three or four in the morning and had to go to bed early.' In his opinion, however, the tension between the two groups could have been avoided by more careful selection of men who were to provide service support for the units.

" 'One suggestion would be that the service personnel be picked specially, not at random. We had some pretty low-class people there. They weren't good enough to become soldiers so they put them in there to become our service people. They antagonized and sometimes spoiled our work. . . . I think that the officer who selected our service men . . . put in a bunch of

eight-balls. . . . That can and did disturb a unit a great deal. It's a thing that could be eliminated and could be a lot better.'

"A psywar group is clearly, from the standpoint of its own efficiency, not the place for the traditional army 'eight ball.' Reports of the difficulties encountered by higher level personnel in World War II suggest two basic qualifications for the serviceman.

"(1) *He should be of average intelligence.* Although the service worker may not be called upon to perform any functions unique to psywar, he must be able to understand the latter's significance and his role in it.

"As the former propaganda chief of a mobile radio company explained, one of the basic reasons for the friction between creative workers and the service personnel was that 'the riggers and so forth couldn't understand people that were sitting around and batting at their typewriters and not doing a good day's work according to their lights.'

". . . Although the indoctrination of service personnel is a matter that can and should be taken care of during an orientation period, it is relevant here as a reminder that service workers, if not because of their native qualities, then as a result of indoctrination, must be men who are capable of grasping the meaning and importance of psywar in its varied manifestations. With this in mind, the propaganda chief already quoted suggested that a high school education be considered a minimum requirement for psywar service personnel.

"An understanding of psywar is essential not only to ensure cooperation on the part of the service workers, but also to guard against the 'sense of futility' that overcame some of the workers. Inevitably, the service workers will be struck by the difference between the war with symbols and the war with guns, as well as with the difference between the type of work they and the creative personnel are doing. This may easily result in a morale problem. An orientation course pointing up the significance of psywar and, at the same time, the importance of their jobs, might give service personnel a sense of belonging, and so help to smooth over the obvious differences between them and the psychological warriors.

"(2) *He should be a mature individual.* Age appears to be another factor that must be taken into account in selecting support personnel for psywar. There is some indication that the youngsters who were drawn into the service units showed no particular interest in the activity.

". . . The service personnel must also be sufficiently mature to appreciate, and work harmoniously with, people with different backgrounds from their own. Young servicemen of limited experience did not always show adequate understanding of older men with European backgrounds. This is not to say that the European men did not themselves sometimes contribute to the tensions by their obvious lack of appreciation for the American-born service personnel. Actually, the situation was quite complex. The service personnel were often frustrated at not being in a fighting group, and they especially disliked being identified with 'a bunch of screwballs.' These dissatisfactions were further aggravated by the strong

differences within the outfit between themselves and the European intellectuals. The prejudices at work on both sides in this situation indicate the futility of relying solely on 'orientation lectures' as a means of reducing the tensions between these two groups.

". . . Since the older, foreign-born personnel contribute skills that are essential to the operation, the service personnel must be men who can establish and maintain good working relations with Norwegian bankers, Austrian writers, or Russian refugees.

"The possibility of getting men whose experience has brought them in contact with individuals of varied origins would, it appears from the above, be increased if the service personnel were not recent high school graduates, but men of more mature years, perhaps with some business experience.

"In any case, care should be taken in selecting the drivers and cooks who are to work with psywar operators. The service worker will apparently be a better member of his team if he does not fall below the average of intelligence, if he has completed his high school education, and if he is mature in outlook as well as in years.

"Once again, it should be mentioned that the man who is likely to serve in a battle area, regardless of his job, must be in good physical condition. This qualification was evidently taken for granted by the respondents, because the service men during the last war had been taken from Army pools, which meant that the men had already satisfied the military's physical standards.

Some Over-all Considerations in the Selection of Psywar Personnel

". . . There are two additional points that should be kept in mind in applying the resultant criteria:

"To promote high morale among psywar personnel, and to guarantee optimum use of their talents and skills, care must be taken that the men selected for positions in psywar be individuals who really want to work in it. This point was made by respondents who had participated in many different phases of psywar during World War II. A former executive officer of the 4th MRBC stated that the psywar worker must have a 'liking for the job. He's got to live the job, to really want to work. . . . He's got to give his all.' His remarks embody the consensus on this point among the interviewees.

"When it comes to the actual selection of personnel, the standards discussed in preceding pages need not be rigidly applied. Psywar end products represent the combined efforts of many people; they are, that is to say, the result of team-work. This fact leaves room for a certain degree of flexibility in the choice of personnel for most psywar operations.

"The criteria described here are meant primarily as a guide to the selection of a group of individuals capable of performing together the over-all psywar job. The important thing, as far as recruitment is concerned, is to seek individuals each of whom will fit smoothly into a unit, and who will provide a needed part, however small, of the complex of skills required, rather than to try to match individuals to sets of job qualifications." (pp 22–71)[16]

PERSONNEL PROBLEMS OF OWI ASSAM PSYWAR TEAM*

By an OWI Psychological Warfare Team

Members of psychological warfare team assigned to operate against Japanese forces in Burma, in World War II, recorded their observations of "what makes a successful propagandist tick."

The complexity and geographical diffusion of the [Assam OWI Psywar] team's operations and the heterogeneous nature of its staff made administration a very difficult and an especially vital part of the over-all direction of the work. In addition to a sizeable base establishment, there were never less than two and often as many as five forward units to be supervised. Efficient routine had to be coupled with a flexibility that could adjust the entire organization instantaneously to the requirements of military developments that often require staff members to work through the night. But probably the unusual human factors involved in fusing a staff with 12 distinct racial or language groups into a smoothly operating organization were the most challenging and certainly were the most interesting elements of the administrative task.

The team was fortunate in having as its Executive Officer a man with many years of administrative experience, the majority of them spent in India. He had a fluent command of the language and an intimate knowledge of the customs of the country that were of immense value to the organization and to the maintenance of the physical establishment. His qualifications made it possible for virtually all administrative responsibility to be delegated to him, leaving the Chief and the Deputy Chief [of the Psywar Team] free to give concentrated attention to the propaganda job itself.

The American staff, which included newspaper reporters, advertising men, missionaries, artists, radio engineers, teachers, and mechanics was sufficiently diverse to tax administrative ingenuity to achieve the desired degree of team work. Add to this group such additional elements as a Shan prince, a British bishop, a Rangoon lawyer, Indian Moslems and Hindus of various castes, Chinese radio monitors, Japanese-educated Chinese, and a Kachin agriculturist and it will become apparent why we regard the democratic team spirit which was generated as one of the most enriching aspects of our total experience.

By the end of 1944, the Assam staff included 28 American civilians, 10 attached American and British Army personnel, and 25 others whose diversity of background is indicated in the foregoing paragraph. Most of these persons were directly engaged in the propaganda activities of the team — a comparatively small group handled the complex tasks of administration, services, and supply.

The propaganda staff grew steadily during the team's operation. The original nuclear group of American civilians was augmented frequently during 1944 and early 1945 — one or more men arriving during almost every month. In assimilating the frequent new arrivals, in training and adapting men to new tasks, in maintaining both discipline and enthusiasm within a wholly self-contained group — in these tasks, the leaders of the Assam team found some of their most serious problems.

On the whole, the Assam Propaganda Staff functioned well, enthusiasm continuing to the last day of the operation. But along the way there were a number of disappointments, some of them bitter. Mistakes were made, both in original

* Extracted from an OWI report, "Combat Propaganda in Burma, Apr 1945.

personnel selection and in personnel handling in the field, mistakes that in the light of present experience might have been avoided.

In the following discussion, personnel have been divided for convenience into two groups: *propagandists* (chiefly executive, intelligence-liaison and editorial personnel), and *specialists* (language, arts, reproduction, and air liaison personnel).

THE PROPAGANDISTS

Executive, Liaison and Editorial Personnel

One need was apparent early in the operation, and passing months only served to underscore its importance. This need was for men with a full understanding and interest in the entire propaganda assignment.

The chief and the deputy chief of the operation, the liaison men working with Army headquarters, the editors in charge of leaflet production, the leaders of forward PW units, the chief of air liaison — all these men, to do their jobs well, needed a full knowledge and interest in the entire propaganda operation — plans, intelligence, editorial production, targets.

The Assam team received sixteen Americans who might have fitted this need, who theoretically were equipped to handle one or another of the key propaganda jobs. Actually, of the sixteen, nine men filled such key positions quite successfully, seven less so. It should be useful to examine the points of difference.

Those Who Worked Out

The men who worked out successfully as combat propagandists had much in common. Most of them were young — thirty was an average age. All had held writing jobs before joining OWI — six in newspaper work, three in radio and advertising. All had had several years of successful experience in their own professions. While the men differed individually, as a group they were emotionally stable and politically mature. They were, on the whole, energetic and enthusiastic about their work.

Recommendations

Executive, liaison and editorial personnel can be discussed as a group. While responsibility and duties vary, the qualifications for all key propaganda positions, in the Assam operation, are basically similar.

The qualifications listed below may seem high, yet from the Assam experience, they are necessary. It is reassuring that a majority of the OWI men sent to Assam for executive, liaison, and editorial positions met most, if not all, of these requirements.

1. *Experience:* A background of successful professional experience is necessary, several years of it if possible, including:
   Professional *writing* experience (persuasive writing, for publications, journals of opinion, advertising agencies, seems a better preparation for PW work than academic writing, fiction, movie writing).
   Executive or administrative experience.
   Demonstrated ability to work within a group as well as under supervision.
   Also important, although not essential: knowledge of graphic arts production, knowledge of radio production, military training.
2. *Personal Background:* Should be a mature person, well informed, with considered social and political opinions. Detailed knowledge of the Far East and of Japan, knowledge of the Japanese language or other Far Eastern languages,

   while extremely valuable, is not essential. [Note: remember that this statement was prepared about April, 1945, while we were still at war against Japan, when it still looked as though the war against Japan might continue for a considerable length of time.]
3. *Personality:* Several traits proved all-important:
   a. Ability to *get along* with people, being reasonably thick-skinned, tolerant, and stable.
   b. Ability to *work with people,* subordinating personal opinions to group decisions.

      These two points were the cause of serious personnel problems in Assam. Men otherwise qualified would not fit themselves into the group. Such traits are admittedly difficult to uncover in personnel selection, but they are as important, perhaps more important, than professional training.

   c. Enthusiasm and curiosity.
   d. A reasonable appetite for work.

Another personnel problem in Assam concerned application. A number of the men approached their jobs half-heartedly, took it easy, refused to assume and exercise responsibility. The results of this lethargy became increasingly serious as the staff grew. Part of the fault lay with conditions at the Assam base, and perhaps with the team's handling of new arrivals. But a part of the fault also was with the men. Personnel screening certainly should have taken into account this fact — irresponsible men, no matter how skilled, become a liability in the field.

Those Who Did Not Work Out

The men who did not prove adaptable are somewhat harder to analyze. A few had excellent qualifications; their original engagement and overseas assignment are entirely understandable. Yet in Assam, these men did not readily adapt themselves to group living. They may very likely be successful in their new outposts — they do have the necessary qualifications. Part of the blame for the difficulties in Assam certainly rests on other members of the team.

A larger portion of the men in this group, however, should never have been sent overseas. Inexperience in the case of some, deep personality difficulties in the case of others, should have disqualified them. Although the shortcomings of these men seemed sufficiently evident to have been detected, they were not discovered, and the men served chiefly as a burden on the Assam operation.

Some Specific Cautions

The Assam experience suggests the following cautions in the selection of personnel for overseas PW work:

1. Very young men with limited experience are more likely to need continuous instruction and supervision, even though they may work out well in the field.
2. Lone Wolves. Psywar field operations are essentially group operations. Men preferring to work alone, disliking or resenting supervision and coordinated activity, can be expected to handicap a field operation. Even if such men are highly skilled, it will be difficult to fit them into PW combat work.

3. People who were unsuccessful in their regular civilian work. This point may seem obvious — it is made here only because such people have sometimes been sent overseas.

4. People who are highly emotional. This characteristic may be difficult to judge, but it is important. A record of frequent job changes and indications of dislikes or grudges against previous employers, if investigated, might reveal an unstable emotional condition.

5. Personnel returned from other outposts. Those persons should be investigated as carefully as new personnel before being given a new overseas assignment. This investigation should include, if possible, a frank off-the-record report from the previous outpost. The same caution should apply to personnel in OWI's home offices who are being considered for overseas assignments. The Assam team received one or more persons in each of the above categories, who were unable to adapt themselves to field operations.

Specialists

The language, art, reproduction, and air liaison staffs presented a somewhat different problem in Assam. Here, specific specialized skills were more important, grasp of over-all propaganda operations less so. However, most of the points made above, with regard to experience, personality, and background, apply equally to the specialized PW personnel.

Language Specialists — Japanese

Japanese propaganda can only be as good as the Japanese in which it is written, and writing Japanese well requires a considerable amount of formal Japanese education and practical experience. For these reasons, most of the Japanese-speaking Americans are unqualified as Japanese writers. Even most Nisei [American citizens of Japanese parentage], having spent all or most of their lives in America, are unqualified to write propaganda in Japanese.

Nisei engaged as writers should, if possible, have been educated in Japan, preferably being graduates of Japanese universities, and if possible, graduates of Japanese military schools. Practical writing experience is important. Men who wrote for Japanese language newspapers in West Coast cities or in Honolulu, or who have other professional writing experience would be particularly valuable.

Candidates for PW work should be reviewed by someone having a thorough knowledge of Japanese, preferably a Japanese who is himself a qualified writer.

The Japanese language man must have an intimate knowledge of Japanese psychology. This requirement can probably be filled only by men who have lived in Japan. Preferably, they should have lived in Japan in recent years. Without this personal knowledge, the language man cannot be expected to write propaganda that will provoke a positive response from a Japanese audience. The language man should also have a knowledge of recent Japanese history and of political developments in Japan in the last fifteen years.

Radio men (*i.e.*, announcers) need not have advanced Japanese education. The main requirements are a good accent, a good voice, and delivery. (For front-line loudspeaker work, the requirements are somewhat higher. A man is needed who is naturally articulate, well able to *ad lib*, and thoroughly familiar with propaganda techniques and objectives.)

Japanese-speaking Caucasians can form an extremely valuable addition to any PW staff. Their function, however, will usually be limited, in a language sense, to interrogation, translation, and propaganda guidance.

Other Language Specialists

Only a few suggestions are necessary here. Language knowledge and familiarity with target areas are vital to any propaganda operation. In selecting area and language specialists, these points should be kept in mind:

1. *Recent* knowledge of the target area is important. Guidance based on knowledge ten or more years old is of limited value.
2. Knowledge of customs, political organizations and conflicts, racial, and economic problems is as important as knowledge of language.
3. Knowledge of the *people* in the target area is important. Missionaries, educators, and some governmental people might be expected to have this knowledge — commercial people might not have it.
4. Men who will write or translate propaganda messages should be *experts* in the language. A "working" knowledge of a language, while useful for interrogation and simple translation, is never enough for the preparation of effective propaganda messages.
5. A background of newspaper or other professional writing experience in the language of the target area is most valuable.

Area Experts as Propagandists

One fact the Assam team learned early in its work: qualifications as a language or area expert do not necessarily make a man a good propagandist. These qualifications frequently, in fact, handicap him as a propagandist.

Too often, the area men tended to base their views on their own personal experience, rather than on impartial evidence. Personal beliefs and theories tended to replace objectivity.

Men approaching the work purely as propagandists, even though they had no personal specialized knowledge of the target, were better able to achieve objectivity. In Assam, evidence obtained from refugee interrogations often proved to be more useful than the advice of the team's well-qualified Burmans. The evidence of POW interrogations and captured documents was needed to supplement the advice of those members who spoke Japanese and had lived in Japan.

The area "experts" and language men made an invaluable contribution to the work, but the Assam team found it advisable to check that contribution against other sources with more recent and less limited knowledge of the target. With one or two exceptions (in the team's Japanese language staff) none of Assam's area and language experts developed into well-rounded propagandists.

Air Liaison Men

Requirements for most PW air liaison assignments should not be difficult to meet. Personality of an individual is probably the most important. A man should be interested in the Air Force, and have a personality which will enable him to get along well with men who are engaged in daily combat operations. It is also important that the air liaison man believe sincerely in the value of propaganda operations, and have some knowledge of propaganda planning and operations.

A chief air liaison man, in charge of target planning and leaflet distribution, is another matter. Qualifications for this assignment should be considered much the same as the qualifications for any other key post in a propaganda organization. He should have a thorough knowledge and understanding of the planning, intelligence, and editorial, as well as air, operations.

Artists and Art Directors

The Assam team had on its staff at various times eight different men who were assigned as artists or art directors. An examination of their qualifications is interesting. Of the eight, only four could draw well. Two could do simple visualizations, two could not draw at all. Several of the men were extremely well-qualified, with years of experience. Three men, however, had no layout experience. One man had no apparent experience at all — he was unable to complete his first leaflet assignment, and was eventually transferred to other work.

Before outlining personnel recommendations in this field, it might be helpful to explain the terms "artist" and "art director," as used here. An art director is somewhat similar to an editor. He supervises and directs the preparation of art work. He designs leaflets and makes layouts. He may or may not do the finished drawings himself. An artist is primarily an illustrator, not a designer or layout man. The two functions, artist and art director, become somewhat interchangeable, in the field. In the commercial art profession, however, they are quite distinct.

Most of the qualifications, in personality and experience, that were listed for editorial men, apply just as strongly to art men. Professional experience is essential, several years of it. Energy, and the ability to get along with all of the staff — these are also essential qualifications. The art men will usually be under pressure from both editorial and reproduction staffs — skill, speed, and an easy temperament can mean everything.

A PW artist, when he gets in the field, must immediately face one disturbing fact — he is on his own. The former advertising man will have no art studio and paste-up boys to fall back on, no photostat service to help out corners. Frequently he may have to do the whole job himself, from initial design to the final layout.

In selecting art men for overseas work, these points should be kept in mind:

1. Advertising *art directors* have better background for PW work than most newspaper artists, commercial artists, illustrators, etc. The reason for this is a fairly simple one. In the field, versatility, knowledge of layout and design, and knowledge of reproduction techniques become all-important, and these qualities are all a part of the advertising art director's regular work.

2. The PW art man must be able to *draw*. (This may seem odd, but actually, many art directors and commercial designers are layout and idea men only; commercial artists are hired to finish their designs.) Ability to present simple visualizations of people, situations, weapons, buildings, etc. is a minimum requirement.

3. When *artists* or illustrators are hired, they should be selected with extreme care. Most successful commercial artists have carefully specialized, limited styles. The limitations of some artists' styles may handicap them for PW work. Versatility, in this case, is an important attribute. Artists who have styles similar to popular Japanese art styles can be most useful. Nisei artists, particularly Nisei who have had commercial art training in Japan, would be particularly valuable.

4. Commercial *lettering* men and advertising agency *renderers* having several years of professional experience, can provide a valuable reinforcement to any PW art staff of more than two or three men. A good renderer is capable of doing perhaps 80 per cent of the work required of a PW artist — all the finished lettering, retouching, and paste-ups. In filling these functions, he can relieve the PW artist for more important work.

Reproduction Men

Here, the recommendations can be extremely simple: professional printing experience is essential. Men with a few weeks' or months' training cannot be expected to operate even Davidson presses under field conditions. The Assam team was in operation a full year before competent reproduction men arrived. Only then was continuous leaflet production possible.

While the recommendations in this section may seem difficult to fulfill, the writers of this report can only point out that field experience has indicated their importance. Men who can do capable work at home may not do equivalent work overseas under conditions of group living, in remote, lonely, and even dangerous areas. Discipline, which can be enforced in Army organizations, must be replaced by friendly cooperation in OWI field units.

SELECTION OF INFORMATION SERVICE PERSONNEL IN OCCUPIED GERMANY*

By David M. Levy

A psychiatrist describes the type of test used to screen indigenous personnel for service in the American Information Control Division.

. . . The need of a screening center became evident after a brief experience with the problems of selecting Germans to fill posts that were under the jurisdiction of Information Control Division. One of their functions was the granting of licenses in the United States Zone to applicants for a variety of enterprises summed up in the words "information media." The "media" were books, newspapers, magazines, music, radio, movies, theater. Applicants for licenses included publishers, newspaper personnel, orchestra directors, producers, and many other employees in the field of entertainment. This licensing power is very important because it involves the selection of people who have a big share in shaping public opinion in Germany.

According to the principles used by the Information Control Division in granting licenses, consideration of the candidate's personality, experience, and ability in his vocation is necessary, besides his political and military affiliations. Since this important work was, and is, done largely by non-professionals, although in some instances they became quite expert, the idea of a consulting center where key people might be sent for thorough study was received with enthusiasm by the chief of intelligence (of Information Control Division).

The method of investigation at the Screening Center in the United States Zone differed from that employed in the Office of Strategic Services center in Washington in its concentration on the lengthy three- to four-hour interviews for political and psychiatric examinations, and in the use of political attitudes tests. After the founding of the Screening Center, the British organized a similar service in

* From D. M. Levy, *New Fields of Psychiatry*, W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1947, pp 106–117. Reproduced with permission of Dr. Levy and W. W. Norton & Co., Publishers.

their zone. It was larger than ours, examined key people in every phase of political and cultural life, and resembled more closely in method the Office of Strategic Services stations.

In our own center, the political analyst was a key figure. He reviewed all the preliminary reports of the candidates. He had expert knowledge of Nazi party, of military organization, and of the political history of Germany. The director of the old Office of Strategic Services government school functioned in that capacity. He investigated the entire political background of each candidate and finished his report with a summary statement of the candidate's political classification.

Psychiatric and psychologic studies were made to determine the mental status of the candidate, especially important in Germany where the long reign of Nazi terror had produced much psychic illness. This held true also for those who were not victims of physical brutalities. The psychologic effects of the twelve-year Hitler regime are seen most commonly in a variety of anxiety states, cautious manner, apprehension, diminished energy, reduction of social contacts, a host of psychoasthenic symptoms, and exaggerated submissive attitudes. The Nazi regime especially intensified those personality adjustments that help to make survival possible in a tyrannical state — obeisance, opportunism, constant purposive thinking at the expense of spontaneity and phantasy, resulting from the necessity of always watching your step, sizing up every individual you meet, allying yourself with people who count, ruthless separation from friends to the point of denunciation when they might in any way imperil your safety. The centralization of German psychic energy into channels of this variety has resulted in an enormous cost in terms of creative thinking in the arts and sciences, in normal emotional responsiveness, and in mental health. At the Screening Center, study of the emotional damage traceable to life during the Nazi period was an absorbing task. We had an opportunity to study also people who suffered from direct violence and brutality.

The evaluation of mental status as a factor in the recommendation of a license was quite flexible. Generally, if other findings were satisfactory, only severe aberrations were given weight. A candidate for a license to publish an agricultural magazine, a member, in his day, of a Catholic political party, had been beaten almost to death for active opposition to the Nazi party in 1933. A long hospital internment followed. When examined at the Center he showed disturbance in equilibrium and evidence of the kind of intellectual difficulty one sees in organic brain damage. Nevertheless, because of his past record, his special knowledge of the field and the fact that his memory was intact, license was recommended with the suggestion that he work in close association with an assistant.

A candidate for a publisher's license who claimed to have organized a resistance movement in Germany, for which he gave as evidence numerous photostats of documents, was found to be a pathologic liar and swindler. This psychiatric finding was later confirmed by political investigations. I cite this case not as an example of the dire results of the Nazi regime, but to illustrate a function of the psychiatric investigation in determining mental status. A number of candidates were referred to the center previously primarily for that reason.

A second function of psychiatric studies was the determination of character, of personality structure. In line with the policy of the Information Control Division, as part of the problem of security, regardless of political reliability, our purpose was to keep out of position candidates who were found to be domineering,

militaristic, brutal, on the one hand; or overly dependent, passive, and suggestible on the other. Such candidates were considered too grave a risk in that they might actively or passively perpetuate the type of psychology sympathetic to aggressive wars. On the other hand, we favored all those who gave evidence of broad sympathies, who could tolerate and accept criticism, who were generally democratic in the sense of respecting their fellow men.

Some candidates who were politically acceptable were referred primarily for personality study. Thus a candidate for a license to run a publishing house revealed in our investigation an adjustment to a despotic father so remarkably passive that it seemed impossible, however inwardly antagonistic to authority, that he could have withstood, as he claimed, Nazi party pressure. Later it was revealed he had made numerous concessions. Politically and personally, he was not suitable to a job that involved so many important questions of policy.

Another publisher was not acceptable for a license because though politically at least gray, if not white, he was so rigid, pedantic, and authoritarian that, however efficient, he could not be recommended for a top position.

Personality study represented the major activity of the psychiatrist. Along with determination of mental status, they required most specifically, psychiatric training. The determination of Nazi and anti-Nazi attitudes, as also the determination of special qualifications for the job, in terms of leadership, superior endowment, etc., two other functions of the Center examinations are well encompassed in the psychologist's training. A fifth function, in which psychiatric, psychologic, and political studies were linked together, consisted in the determination of the reliability of statements made by candidates, the crucial issue in the investigation of certain cases.

A summary of the findings in one record will illustrate the cooperative nature of our enterprise. In this enterprise a successful integration of psychiatry with other fields was fully achieved. The final report was a true synthesis of three types of investigation.

An engineer applied for a license in the field of publication. He was one of a group of five candidates who arrived at our Center, then situated an hour and a half's ride by jeep from the city of Frankfurt. Like the others, he had already been screened by American investigators. Dossiers of all the preliminary investigations and recommendations were handed to us by the driver. The candidates arrived on Sunday evening. They were all prepared to stay the three-day period of the study, until the following Wednesday. For that entire period we lived in the same house and had our meals in the same room. The atmosphere was always friendly. Methods of intimidation were never employed. Our studies required an attitude of cooperation. Subsequent investigations revealed the fact that candidates looked back at their experience in the Screening Center as a happy one. Several wrote, "I wish we could have stayed there three weeks instead of three days." There were several reasons besides the friendly atmosphere — American food and comfortable surroundings.

Monday morning was devoted to group tests. They included intelligence tests, political attitude tests, and essays on various phases of the Hitler regime and on the German attitudes toward the war. The tests were designed to reveal aptitudes, intelligence, personal, and political attitudes.

In the afternoon the long interviews began, first a three- to four-hour political, later a three to four-hour psychiatric. Those not scheduled for interviews were

given tests by the psychologists — the Rorschach and other tests of that variety. By Tuesday evening tests and interviews were nearly over. That evening, starting around 9:00 P.M., staff and candidates assembled for a social get-together. Refreshments were served. Around 10:30 each candidate was asked to tell a story, any personal experience he cared to talk about, something preferably non-political. Such stories, apparently chosen at random, were often very revealing. By midnight the session was over, the candidates retired for the night. The staff then assembled at midnight to consider each candidate in the light of the story he told, the behavior he revealed to us and all others, in correlation with the findings of all tests and interviews. After breakfast the next day, Wednesday, candidates were given a novel opportunity. They were asked to evaluate each other. They were asked to answer questions about the other candidates; for example, which candidate they found most friendly, which one most trustworthy, most dogmatic, etc. Usually by noon the candidates left. During the afternoon the staff members tried to complete their reports. On Wednesday evening another batch of candidates arrived. The Screening Center provided a very busy, exciting, and highly concentrated type of experience.

Let us follow our engineer into the political interview. The political analyst, as usual, carefully considered every item in the military questionnaire and other reports in the dossier, to derive leading points of inquiry for his interview. The kind of thinking and knowledge involved in this process will, I am sure, claim your interest. Sleuthing the record requires a type of intellectual activity similar to historical criticism. Every item is judged in terms of its specific meaning and historical background.

Take, for example, the item of religion. If it is designated as *gottglaubig* (God-believing), it signifies most likely an official separation from a previous religious denomination. If this separation took place in 1933 or thereafter, the presumption arises that it was done to gain advantage in the Nazi party. Questionnaires of Nazis show many more such designations than non-Nazis. There are, of course, numerous separations from the church for other reasons. There are also a few German pagan sects who used this designation before World War I. In any case, it is an important point of investigation.

Consider the item, vocation. As an engineer our candidate was a member of the Union of German Engineers (*Verein Deutscher Ingenieure*). During the Hitler regime, all professional bodies were absorbed in the Nazi scheme, reorganized, and renamed. In this transformation each professional group had its own history depending on how important it was thought to be in relation to war and propaganda, and on such accidental factors as the particular personalities involved. The engineering group was affiliated with the National Socialist Federation of German Technicians (National Sozialist *Bund Deutscher Technik*). All of those who retained membership became members of the Nazi party in 1934 to 1937. Furthermore the most important group in the Bund of technicians, after 1937, was the Union of German Engineers. Hence, when it was clear to the engineer that the political analyst had at his command the facts about the engineering group, he made a hasty correction, after preliminary denials, and added his membership in the NSBDT to the list in the questionnaire, thereby exposing his connections with the Nazi party. That fact made clear a number of contracts he had during the war, otherwise quite puzzling. This same type of knowledge is applied to every organization and to all other biographical data.

Reports of candidates include concise statements under four headings — biographical, political, psychological, and recommendation. Reference has been made to the biographical section.

In the political section, the points of investigation from which one drew conclusions about the engineer concerned the relation of his organization to the Nazi party, the significance of a position he had in the armaments industry, and of certain valuable contracts his firm managed to obtain. All these data added up to the fact that the engineer had been closely involved with Nazi officials and had various connections with the Nazi party which he concealed.

The political analyst made notes on the behavior of the candidate, besides his response to questions. He noted, for example, that when the crucial point was brought up about the relation of his engineering society to the Nazi party, the engineer emptied his pipeful of fresh tobacco. As you know, tobacco is a highly valuable item in present-day Germany.

In the psychologic section only those findings derived from the psychiatric interview and test procedures were utilized which had direct bearing on the problem of licensing. In regard to the engineer it was noted that he had always been a very anxious individual, and had had a series of nervous breakdowns.

A physically weak, only child, he was brought up in aristocratic style by an indulgent, widowed mother. He became a member of very select social groups. As a young man he had the trying experience of meeting the requirements of a responsible executive position, made possible by family connections.

His severe anxieties intensified the struggle to accumulate wealth and maintain a position of social importance. This required a good deal of scheming, of soliciting favors from relatives and politicians. In turn, these activities generated conflict anew because his early training in life had adapted him to the role of one who dominates and demands, of one who never bends the knee. The psychologic picture was consistent with the findings in the political interview and explained also the manifest personality characteristics of an unusually obeisant manner with an occasional break-through of arrogance.

In the report cited, I selected a case in which the political interview is more important in determining outcome than the psychiatric. Previously I presented brief illustrations of case studies in which the psychiatric findings play a primary role. As a rough estimate, I would say that in little more than half the consultations at the Screening Center, the political analyses were of primary importance; in somewhat less than half, the psychiatric. In the majority of cases the various psychologic, psychiatric, and political examinations all helped to supplement each other.

In order to maintain a high level of competency in the Screening Center in Germany, research work was conducted concurrently with the practical program. New events were constantly turning up in Nazi archives. A special library was important. Candidates were themselves sources of new information. Psychologic research in testing methods went on repeatedly. Candidates were quick to inform their friends of the methods we used. Increasing numbers became test-wise, thus lessening the effectiveness of the tests. To illustrate one which every so often needed revision, a political attitudes test may be used. It contained forty incomplete sentences. For example, "Only that kind of art and literature should be allowed in the new Germany which —." Three blank lines follow. The completed sentences varied from such replies as "which agree entirely with democratic prin-

ciples," to "which express the honest intent of artist or writer." The differentiation of sincere from clever, placating replies required careful analysis. It is quite interesting that with any effort to fake a "democratic" answer, candidates easily fall into a Nazi type of reply, especially when the sentences were outside the realm of politics.

In screening candidates for military missions at the Office of Strategic Services in Washington, or German candidates for licenses in Germany, a reorientation of the psychiatric examination had to be made. In the Office of Strategic Services, the primary consideration was the ability of the personality to function according to the special requirements of a mission. In Germany, the primary consideration was the ability of the personality to function in constant resistance to Nazi, to military, and to authoritarian influence. . . .

Utilization and Activities of Personnel

Modern propaganda operations to be maximally effective require in personnel a combination of skills, knowledge, and experience rarely if ever found in full measure in Americans, even among those who may have emigrated in years past from the land of a particular target people. During World War II, in the Korean campaign, and in the postwar operations of the USIA and its predecessor agencies, ample precedents have been established for the employment of prisoners of war in times of armed conflict and personnel indigenous to the target area in peacetime.

Relatively little has been written concerning the pitfalls to be avoided and the conditions to be observed in the employment of indigenous personnel. However, with respect to the use of prisoners of war we are somewhat more fortunate for there have been a number of official and unofficial accounts of their employment. Two such accounts are presented on following pages.

The Employment of Prisoners-of-War in Psychological Warfare Operations. Two case studies drawn from World War II experience in psychological warfare operations against the Japanese are presented to suggest a number of the more important "do's and don't's" to observe in order to ensure the most effective use of such individuals. The story concerning "Kobayashi" describes how an extremely effective worker was smothered by kindness and attention from American service personnel and thus was weened away from his primary interest of persuading other Japanese to desert. As Kobayashi learned to drink American beverages, to play cards with American soldiers, etc., he became significantly less effective as a psychological warrior against his former comrades in the Japanese armed forces.

The second account, "Use of Japanese Prisoners of War," is taken from a report prepared by an OWI field team in Burma, during World War II. It is believed that this team made especially effective use of such individuals. The records from the European theater and the military operations in Korea, although noting that prisoners were used, do not suggest in any way the attainment of the same degree of effectiveness as was reached in Burma in 1944 and 1945.

Wartime Activities of American Personnel. Two accounts are reproduced to show some of the range of activities that occupied the attention of personnel engaged in the World War II psychological warfare effort against Japan. "Indoctrination of Friendly Troops" was dictated to the editor by a military officer who served in the psychological warfare organization in the Southwest Pacific Area in World War II, and in that of the Far East Command, during the Korean Campaign in 1951 and 1952. At the time his account was recorded, the officer was on the staff of the Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N. C.

This officer's account of his World War II activities suggests that it may have been more difficult to produce effective results in psychological warfare in the struggle against Japan for the reason that military leaders knew less about the capabilities and limitations of the subject; many of the officers and men held erroneous ideas about Japanese motivations and sense of values; and few were sufficiently sympathetic with the objectives of combat propaganda to adopt a course of action that made the effective use of psychological warfare possible. Yet, even though this situation may have improved in recent years, it was found that many of the same prejudices, doubts, etc., existed in the Korean struggle as existed 5, 6, and 7 years earlier in the war against Japan. Thus, this account may be more relevant to future operations than the casual reader may think.

"Personnel Utilization for Psychological Warfare Evaluation" describes the organization and activities of the personnel who served in the Washington-based offices of the Foreign Morale Analysis Division (FMAD) cosponsored by the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff and the Office of War Information.

Activities of US Civilian Personnel Abroad Who Are Engaged in Foreign Information Work. Two studies are presented to illustrate a possible range of activities performed by US civilians sent abroad to further the objectives of the information program. The first study, "USIE Korea — An Experiment in a Wartime Operation" describes a few of the problems and some of the frustrations that information personnel had to face in a wartorn country like Korea in 1950 and 1951.

The second study, "The Public Affairs Officer," is a more prosaic account of what a typical information officer, operating under somewhat "normal" peacetime conditions, may be expected to do. The military officer would do well to project this description of what a civilian does at a peacetime overseas post against the situation, conditions, etc., that

prevail at a field army or military corps headquarters. It is believed that a close parallel may be drawn between the range and general type of activities undertaken by a Public Affairs Officer on an Embassy or Legation staff and those that may be undertaken by a unit psychological warfare officer on the headquarters staff of a military unit — division, corps, or field army.

KOBAYASHI*

By Gordon Cotler

The effectiveness of a prisoner of war as a psychological warrior was greatly lessened by American personnel smothering him with attention and unnecessary favors.

According to newspaper dispatches, the North Koreans have been dropping a series of propaganda leaflets over the American lines by plane. One of these leaflets was in the form of an open letter from three captured American officers and three enlisted men, urging their comrades to surrender to the "People's Army." It began, "Dear friends of America. We all prisoners are very happy and free than you who are not yet captured," and went on for seven more paragraphs with approximately the same incidence of grammatical error. Another such open letter started off, "Immediately oppose our intervention in the internal affairs of Korea!" and contained the arresting sentence "I have quite regulated our lives from the dark fear of death." Obviously, the Korean Communists have fallen short of quite regulating their propaganda, and unless they can line up a cooperative American, their inadequacy in this department will continue.

In the war with Japan, one of my duties as an Intelligence officer (with a limited knowledge of the Japanese language and culture) was to persuade enemy soldiers to surrender, so I know in a general way what the North Koreans are up against. The Japanese were so vigorously opposed to the idea of surrendering that some of them still haven't given themselves up. Every now and then, I read of the Navy's dropping Tokyo newspapers on some Pacific isle in an attempt to convince the diehards that the war is over. It was tougher in my day, when the war *wasn't* over, but I was in a better position — at least for a while — than the Korean Communists are now. I had a cooperative Japanese.

I was stationed at a base in the Marianas that had been captured months before. My section conducted loudspeaker campaigns against enemy troops hiding out in the mountains on our island and on others nearby. We also helped with the preparation of leaflets and radio broadcasts that were directed against Japan's home islands. A few of the Nisei in the section were highly proficient in Japanese, but they all thought as Americans, and we needed somebody who understood the Japanese mentality and how to appeal to it. We eventually found him in the person of Second Lieutenant Kobayashi. He was about thirty, broad, and short, even for a Japanese, and he had learned English in school. He had a worried look

* Reprinted from *The New Yorker*, pp 50–53, 26 Aug 50, with permission of the author and *The New Yorker* magazine, the copyright holder.

when he was brought in by a patrol that had been making a routine sweep, but it was not the usual anxious look of the new prisoner. He seemed, instead, to be a perpetual worrier.

Kobayashi had been living in a cave, subsisting on snails and writing poetry on American V-mail stationery he had salvaged from an Army refuse dump. I read some of his poems later and found them very hard going. They were in the seventeen- and thirty-one-syllable Japanese literary forms that have as their subject some static situation in nature. Kobayashi told me that after he had watched the number of American ships in the harbor increase steadily month by month, the supply dumps on the beaches grow, the giant bombers fill the whole sky, he suddenly knew, as well as he had ever known anything, that the Americans were going to win the war. And so he had come out of his cave and surrendered.

In the husky voice that indicates sincerity among his countrymen, he said that since Japan was going to lose the war, it was best that she lose it as quickly as possible, so that the suffering of his country would be minimized and it could turn to the task of rebuilding. If there was anything he could do to help shorten the war, he would like to be put to work at it immediately. He had always been an advocate of a more democratic Japan, and perhaps a national defeat would bring about an opportunity for people who thought as he did.

We took him into the hills with us for our next loudspeaker broadcast, and he delivered an eloquent appeal for surrender. He did not mention democracy. Instead, he skillfully made it seem that if anybody was going to lose face by the surrender of the Japanese in those hills, it was the Americans, who were obliged by the International Red Cross to provide for their prisoners. He could testify that his food, clothing, and shelter were superior. The Americans were proud of what they had given him. The more Japanese the Americans had to take care of, however, the greater the strain on their resources. Kobayashi appealed to his comrades to come and help strain our resources. His response wasn't bad. Soon we had him broadcasting almost every day.

Keeping Kobayashi at the prisoners' compound was too much of an administrative problem, and after a few days he was moved to a tent near our office. The other occupants of the tent, some Signal Corps men, promised to keep an eye on him. We put him in Army fatigues with a big black "PW" on the back of the jacket, and he went around with his face straight ahead, his eyes downcast. We set up a makeshift desk for him in a corner of our office. Between broadcasts, he wrote propaganda leaflets. He was a demon worker. We practically had to pull him from his desk when the office closed at night. He was ready to broadcast at any time and would tramp up and down hills, speaking for hours.

Kobayashi wrote English passably, and I never saw him at a loss for an ideograph. Our conversations were always about business until one day when, after we had returned from a particularly hot and dusty session in the hills, I asked him into my tent for a can of beer. He accepted it with a short bow and sat stiffly on a foot locker, holding the can in both hands. He told me that he was the son of an "important official," unmarried, and a graduate of Waseda University. I asked him how he liked American beer, and he said it was delicious but not quite as good as Sapporo beer. Sapporo is the Milwaukee of Japan.

After observing several of Kobayashi's broadcasts, I stopped accompanying his party into the hills, in order to attend to other business of the section. His work

continued to be extremely valuable for many weeks; it is hard to say exactly when he began to change. I realized that something was wrong only after I became aware of a difference in the attitude toward Kobayashi of the GIs and sailors who came into the office. One of my jobs was to clear military souvenirs for shipment to the States. Troops from all over the island and sailors from passing ships were continually turning up with everything from swords to Japanese love letters. At first, such callers ignored Kobayashi, sitting stiff and alien and hard at work in his corner. One morning, three men in succession went up to his desk and asked, "Is this where the souvenirs are checked?" I took a good look at him; he no longer seemed out of place in the room. He was sitting hunched over, with one elbow on the desk and his chin resting in his hand, chewing a wad of gum. I picked up the weekly report of the broadcasting expeditions and saw that the yield of prisoners from Kobayashi's appeals had dwindled alarmingly.

During the next two or three days, I kept a close watch on him. Occasionally he braced his feet against the front of his rickety desk and tilted his chair back. He was ready to leave when the rest of us were, and sometimes he would knock off work early to read one of the Armed Services miniature magazines. I found out he was sitting in on late poker sessions with his Signal Corps tentmates.

I decided to observe one of Kobayashi's broadcasts, and selected a day when a new area was to be tried, a valley in which large numbers of Japanese had made their presence felt. The loudspeakers were set up on a high ledge, and the microphone was handed to Kobayashi. It was immediately apparent that he wasn't the Kobayashi of some weeks earlier. The formal pattern of Japanese speech-making had been replaced by the slick, easy, intimate manner of the American disc jockey. He spoke mellifluously, instead of in the hoarse voice that indicates Japanese sincerity. The content of the broadcast was worse than the delivery. It had to do with free speech, which, Kobayashi explained, was guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States. Any Japanese who surrendered was exercising his right of free speech and would be placed under the protection of the Constitution. There was a great deal more, and it revealed very clearly that Kobayashi had seen too many American movies, listened too attentively to the Armed Forces radio, read too many American magazines, and associated too closely with those Signal Corps boys. If the Japanese in the hills comprehended any of his talk, they probably went deeper into hiding.

When we returned to the base, I again asked Kobayashi into my tent for a beer. This time, he accepted the can without bowing, sat down on my cot, and said casually, in English, "What's up, Lieutenant?"

I told him I was disappointed in him, that his work was slipping.

"To say the truth, Lieutenant, I have noticed the same thing," he said. "I am not as interested in Japan any more. To say the truth, I don't care about going back there. What I would like to do after the war is open a small fruit stand in Los Angeles or San Francisco. There's pretty good money in that. I am trained as a lawyer, but I haven't much interest in the law at this time."

I said that it would be impossible for him to go to America.

"Aren't all the prisoners sent there?" he asked. "I would like to arrange to stay on in America."

I told him why I thought that would be impossible.

"How about Hawaii?" he asked.

Again I told him no.

He was silent for a moment, staring at his beer. Then he drank it down and said, "That's good beer."

I said I was going to send him back to the prison compound.

He nodded slowly, in agreement.

"It's a rough war, eh, Lieutenant?" he said.

USE OF JAPANESE PRISONERS OF WAR*

By an OWI Psychological Warfare Team

A psychological warfare team in Burma, in World War II, made effective use of a group of POWs as a consultative panel to pretest leaflets and to discuss propaganda ideas.

One of the most fruitful experiments carried out by the Assam psychological warfare team has been the formation and development of its Japanese prisoner-of-war group.

In the Pacific, individual POWs have occasionally been persuaded to write surrender appeals or to broadcast to enemy troops by loudspeaker, but no attempt was made to organize and train a picked group of POWs for continuing propaganda activity. In Assam, the POW group has been made a permanent, working part of the team, and while it probably only scratches the surface of the potential use of Japanese prisoners in psychological warfare, the resultant improvement in our propaganda output alone has been great enough to make the experiment thoroughly worth while.

More important, the successful functioning of the group amply demonstrates the practicality and value of setting up similar groups in other theaters where OWI is carrying on propaganda against the Japanese. Should this be undertaken, it is hoped that the material contained in this section will provide a useful background of experience on which to build, and a preliminary and suggestive guide as to methods of selection, training, indoctrination, and work.

Formation of the Group

The original setting-up of the POW group came about not by design but as the outgrowth of a fortuitous combination of circumstances.

Throughout the Hukawng Valley campaign in the spring of 1944, there was but a meager trickle of Japanese prisoners back through Ledo. In the small, rat-infested POW ward at the 20th General Hospital, there were never more than four prisoners at any time. But with the fall of Myitkyina early in August, the trickle suddenly became a torrent. POWs filled two new large wards at the hospital, and a special POW enclosure set up at the Ledo MP stockade was jammed with as many as 170 able-bodied prisoners.

Because of the rapid influx, G-2 and OWI Nisei interrogators had a hard time merely keeping track of new arrivals. In order to relieve them of this burden,

* Extracted from "*Combat Propaganda in Burma*," an OWI report, Apr 45. This account is from a classified study officially declassified in 1956.

three POWs headed by a lieutenant were chosen to perform clerical duties and take charge of the internal organization of the stockade. These three men eventually became the nucleus around which the POW group was formed.

At this stage of the operation the job of prisoner interrogation was of primary importance because we were still groping for the most effective lines of propaganda. Direct interrogation, however, did not always produce completely frank expressions of view, particularly on such basic subjects as Bushido and attitude toward surrender. The Nisei interrogators therefore hit upon the idea of promoting *zadankai* (group discussions) among the POWs themselves with no OWI personnel present. The plan was put up to the lieutenant, and he and his assistants agreed to cooperate. Several discussions were held with different groups of POWs participating. They covered Bushido, the future of POWs, postwar Japan, Allied propaganda and its effectiveness. A complete record of each discussion was taken down by one of the lieutenant's assistants and afterwards written out and placed in the interrogator's hands. Outside of the clerical group, however, none of the participants knew that they were talking for the OWI record, and the discussion was therefore frank and illuminating.

Later, a different kind of group discussion was organized. By now, these discussions indicated that a small number of POWs seemed particularly willing to cooperate with us. Thereupon the idea occurred of setting up a permanent group to assist us in propaganda work. One of the OWI (Nisei) interrogators, a graduate of the same Japanese university as the lieutenant, first broached the idea to him and the two other members of the clerical group. Three additional men were then tentatively selected, and a meeting of all six, in addition to Sgt ——— of OWI, was held to discuss the proposal. The members of the group decided that they would work for us, subject, however, to four conditions:

1. That in helping to overthrow the militarist-financial clique in Japan, its members would not be asked to do anything involving disrespect toward the Japanese Imperial House;
2. That their six names would be stricken from the official Allied list of Japanese prisoners of war;
3. That they be excluded from any future exchange of prisoners of war; and
4. That they be permitted to make new lives for themselves in the United States or in American-governed territory after the war.

On the first point, we were able to offer them satisfactory assurances on the basis of established OWI policy. On the other three conditions, however, we had to explain that these matters were outside of our authority, and that the best we could offer was the promise to refer the problem to Washington and do what we could to assure the future security of the group. This promise was not much of an offer, but the group decided to accept it. As a precaution against their identity becoming known to other Japanese POWs, all six of the men decided to adopt assumed names.

With these essential preliminaries out of the way, it was now necessary to legalize the retention of the group in the Ledo stockade. A complicating factor was the existence of an official arrangement whereby POWs taken by the American command in North Burma were to be handed over to the British as expeditiously as possible. When approached on the matter in September, Colonel ——— (the G-2) officially declined to authorize retention of the men at Ledo in view of this arrangement, but unofficially consented to our keeping them on an informal basis.

Later in September Colonel ———, who had become theater psychological warfare officer, made an attempt to regularize our retention and use of the POW group by drafting a memorandum which was issued as a theater letter on September 15. This letter set forth the limitations under which POWs might be used for propaganda work. Although it was couched in terms of what we could *not* do, it, nevertheless, was intended to authorize our use of POWs subject to two principal limitations: (1) that we do not use them in a combat area; and (2) that no propaganda exclusively done by the POWs be directed to Japanese combat troops. These prohibitions barred the use of POWs for front-line broadcasting, but they did not limit leaflet propaganda inasmuch as the production of all leaflets involved the use of OWI production facilities.

Despite the intent of the letter, it was interpreted at NCAC headquarters as blocking our use of the POWs, and thus, Colonel ——— (G-2) was even less willing than before to permit us to retain them. On October 24, therefore, ——— wrote a letter to Colonel ——— (Theater Psychological Warfare Officer) asking specific theater authorization for the retention of the six men. This request was approved on October 26 in an indorsement from Theater Headquarters signed by the Assistant Adjutant-General by Command of General Stilwell, addressed to the Commanding General NCAC. It said:

"Inasmuch as the six POWs mentioned in basic communication are contributing materially to the work of the OWI in that area, it is requested that they be allowed to continue on that work. . . ."

This statement constituted the final written authority on which the POW group was established as a permanent adjunct to the Assam (Psywar) team. On receipt of this communication, Colonel ——— officially recognized the project as a legitimate and regular procedure.

General Composition of Group

The POW group comprises one second lieutenant who acts as the leader, three corporals and two superior privates. All were from various units of the 18th Division (Kiku Butai), which was the main Japanese combat force in the 1944 battle of the Hukawng and Mogaung valleys, and all came from Kyushu, the southern island of Japan. Their ages range from 23 to 32, and their periods of army service from 1½ to 4½ years. In civilian life the lieutenant was an electrical engineer, two of the men were office clerks, one was a factory worker, one a school teacher, and one a truck driver. Only the lieutenant is a university graduate. Two of the men had no more than the minimum of eight years primary schooling. The others had varying degrees of intermediate education. The school teacher was the only member of the group who voluntarily surrendered. The others were captured in the Kamaing and Myitkyina campaigns.

Personalities, Motivations and Capabilities

Lieutenant ——— ———, assumed name, Takayuki Yoshikawa: He is 30 years old and a graduate of Waseda University, one of Tokyo's two main privately-owned colleges, in electrical engineering. Before entering the Army, he worked in the Japanese Mazda Lamp Company factory near Tokyo. He had 3½ years of army service and was commissioned after attending officers' candidate school. Quiet and soft-spoken, he is the antithesis of the usual Japanese young-officer type and is genuinely sincere in his anti-militarist convictions. He forms the ideological backbone of the group and provides it with an efficient leadership

based on the complete respect and loyalty of the men rather than on any attempt to "pull his rank." His intelligence is keen and practical, and his propaganda judgment sound, but in writing ability he is mediocre. He understands spoken English fairly well and is competent to handle English written copy.

Corporal ——— ———, assumed name, Juji Aso: 32 years old, he is a normal school graduate and former school teacher. He had served 2 years in the army and, while in China, was assigned to propaganda work. In North Burma, he served as a machine-gunner until, near the close of the Myitkyina siege, he deserted with a younger comrade and walked over to our lines. Paradoxically, he made no secret of the fact that before the war he was an extreme nationalist, and he whimsically told of how, as an Army executioner in China, he had lopped off 29 Chinese heads. Although his conversion to anti-militarist thinking may have been partly opportunistic, he handles anti-militarist arguments with skill and apparent conviction. Because of his questionable background and the circumstances of his surrender, he was made the object of an especially careful security check. Nothing was found to indicate the slightest unreliability, and it was even learned that he devoted his spare time to giving anti-militarist pep talks to the two least-convinced members of the group while no OWI interrogators were present. ——— is the principal writer of the group. He is fertile and original in his propaganda ideas and a willing, hard worker. His only fault lies in his school teacher's propensity toward a difficult, literary style of writing far above the heads of the average Japanese soldier. To keep him down to a level of easy understanding requires constant prodding. He is also the best calligrapher in the group.

Corporal ——— ———, assumed name, Renya Usami: 23 years old, he graduated from middle-school in Japan and then spent 3½ years in North China where he worked part time for the Japanese-run North China Railway Company as an office clerk, spending the rest of his time attending the Japanese College in Peiping. He speaks, reads, and understands Mandarin fairly well. He has had 1½ years in the Army. ——— is the group's artist. He has had no formal art training but took it up as a hobby. His technique is still amateurish, but he has great artistic talent, versatility, and eagerness to learn. He also has good, original ideas for propaganda visualization, and he accepts criticisms and suggestions readily. He is proficient in grass-writing (free flowing shorthand style for writing Japanese) but he is not as good as ——— for regular, printed-style calligraphy. He does not seem to have done much thinking about political matters previously, but now appears genuinely converted to anti-militarist ideas.

Corporal ——— ———, assumed name, Teruhiko Kosho: 26 years old, he is a graduate of a commercial school, worked as an office clerk before the war and was 4½ years in the army. Of quick intelligence and happy disposition, he is a general handyman and good at administrative and clerical duties. Besides being the internal manager of the stockade, he transliterates all *Domei Romaji* copy into Japanese characters and keeps an up-to-date, classified file of *Domei* news reports. He also is a fair calligrapher and takes an active part in the discussion of proposed leaflets. Like Usami, he joined the group without any strong political convictions but seems to have absorbed a certain amount of anti-militarist indoctrination.

Superior Private ——— ———, assumed name, Shinya Takiguchi: 25 years old, he had only 8 years' primary schooling, was formerly a truck driver, and has served 4 years in the army. Before entering the army he had some semi-professional experience as a story-teller of the kind commonly appearing in popular Japanese

vaudeville houses and will be useful both for radio work and recording scripts for front-line public address. Uneducated politically, he joined the group largely out of a desire to stay with Lt Yoshikawa but since has probably been influenced to some extent by the thinking of the others.

Superior Private ——— ———, assumed name, Hideo Nakano: 26 years old, he also had only 8 years' education, owned a small shop selling dried fish products in civilian life, and has served five years in the army. He possesses average intelligence, is politically naive and probably represents the ordinary type of Japanese soldier better than any other member of the group. He and Takiguchi are valuable to the group primarily as a sounding-board for leaflets and propaganda ideas. Also, they perform KP and other internal duties, freeing the others for the creative side of the work.

Life in the Stockade

Since January, 1945, the POW group has been quartered in a newly built enclosure within the Ledo stockade, about a 20-minute jeep ride from Psywar Team headquarters. Surrounded by the usual barbed-wire, it measures approximately 25 yards in length and 10 in width, allowing adequate space for two tents, a separate screened-in kitchen and mess hut, and a small sanitary latrine. The only drawback is that it does not afford adequate space for physical exercise and games, which would help keep the men fit and give them a much-needed form of recreation.

One of the two tents serves as living quarters and is furnished with six army cots. The other is used as the office and has been completely equipped by OWI with tables, chairs, filing cabinets, reference books, maps, art supplies, and other requisite paraphernalia of work. Both tents are fitted with electric lights. The POWs keep their own files of propaganda material, captured Japanese publications, news and news-photos, and leaflets. Documents with a security classification that are temporarily placed in their hands — such as captured documents and propaganda material — are kept locked up in a foot-locker. A work chart on the sidewall of the tent shows what jobs are in progress and who is assigned to them.

The men spend most of their working hours at work. There is little else to give them an outlet for their energies. Whenever an OWI staff member dropped in unannounced, he would find them engrossed in their work. Only the two cooks might be amusing themselves in a game of *hana-fuda* with home-made cards. ——— devotes his leisure moments to practicing calligraphy on sand. ——— is always busy with his paints and brushes. It would be difficult to find anywhere a group more enthusiastic in its application to the job.

Despite being surrounded by the barbed wire of a prison the men have often remarked that they have a strange new sense of freedom. In the Japanese army their thoughts as well as their acts had to conform to the prescribed pattern, and even human feelings had to be suppressed. Now, their bodies are imprisoned, but their minds are free and they can express themselves. They feel as if the spiritual shackles that bound them have been broken.

It has been found of primary importance to develop close, friendly personal contacts with the group. This not only facilitates a mutually valuable exchange of ideas but makes the men feel that we accept them as human beings, that we are anxious to give them a real place in the organization and do not regard them merely as propaganda machines to be exploited for our own purposes. It must be remembered that the POW who works for us, however convinced he may be that

his course is morally right and for the best interests of his country, is extremely sensitive because he knows that to most other Japanese he seems a traitor. He must therefore be treated with sympathy and understanding and never be given to feel by any thoughtless remark that we regard him simply as a tool.

We have tried to develop personal contacts with the men by having various members of the staff, both Nisei and non-Nisei, visit the stockade frequently for informal bull sessions and propaganda discussions. Besides, occasional Sunday dinners were arranged, the stockade cooks preparing Japanese-style dishes with extra food materials bought and furnished by the office. The Nisei and other staff members attended these dinners, occasionally bringing along a portion of their beer rations to liven the party.

As far as personnel limitations permitted, one of the Nisei team-members was assigned more or less exclusively to work with the POW group. He spent most of his time at the stockade, often eating his meals there and maintaining a constant directive supervision over the work. We found it essential that the man chosen for this task be someone personally liked and respected by the POWs. He must do everything he can to strengthen his personal relations with them.

Working Procedures

The part played by the POW group in the propaganda work of the Assam PWT developed and expanded gradually. In the initial phase, which lasted from its formation in August until December (1944), its function was largely consultative. The group criticized and made suggestions on draft leaflets thought out and written by the PWT staff, but it did no real creative work of its own. It did, however, have a large share in the preparation of the new standard Surrender Pass that improved and supplanted the original one produced in April. On this project the group worked under the close direction of the Japanese-language section, but it was responsible for the central idea of couching the surrender appeal in a dignified military language considered proper for a message by a high commanding officer, and the text itself was written by the group. All prisoner reactions obtained on the Surrender Pass have indicated that this appeal was considered by Japanese troops highly impressive and moving. During the initial period, one other leaflet originally produced by OWI Chungking was re-written almost entirely by the group for our own distribution.

In the second phase beginning in December, the group began to do a complete creative job. With the guidance of Sgt ——— (Nisei), then in charge of work at the stockade, the group originated, thought out, discussed, and wrote up draft leaflets complete with original art work by Cpl ———. The first completely POW-done leaflet was "Castaways" (an adaption of SWP's leaflet "Ships"), followed by the "New Year Greeting," a series of new prisoner-treatment leaflets, a novel cartoon leaflet called "Amusing Comfort-Kit," the first and second issues of "New Life" — a stockade newspaper by and for POWs, and two long-range leaflets for distribution in Lower Burma and Thailand.

In addition to these, the group produced other leaflets along lines suggested by the Japanese-language and editorial staffs, and all leaflets drafted in the office were submitted to them for revision before being put into final form. By the close of the operation, no leaflets, other than brief news extras, were being produced without passing through the POW group.

The regular procedure followed in the production of leaflets at the stockade may be summarized as follows: First, the ideas are thought out and discussed among

the principal members of the group and members of the OWI Japanese-language staff, then either ——— or ——— undertakes the writing of the original draft, while ——— undertakes the preparation of the art work. Second, the draft text and art work are discussed by the entire group, and if changes are agreed to be desirable, a new draft is written and revised art work prepared. No leaflet to which Pvts ——— and ———, the least educated and most typically GI, react unfavorably, or which they find difficult to understand, is passed. Third, the leaflet then goes to the Japanese-language editor, who translates it for the consideration of the other members of the PWT editorial staff. If further changes are found necessary, it goes back to the stockade for a final revision and finished calligraphy. The art work meanwhile has gone to the PWT Art Director, who either redoes the final drawings himself or sends them back to the stockade with suggestions, allowing ——— to complete the finished art.

Leaflets prepared by the PWT staff are usually translated or written up in draft form in Japanese and then placed before the POW group, with or without art suggestions. From then on, the working procedure is the same as for leaflets originated by the group.

Besides leaflet work, the group performs other useful functions. All leaflets received from other theaters are submitted to them for criticisms that they write out in brief and attach to the leaflets. Had it not been for inadequate translation facilities, this could have been developed into a service useful to all OWI outposts engaged in Japanese leaflet work. The group also goes through captured Japanese material, culling out items of propaganda value. It has prepared scripts for front-line broadcasting and given detailed suggestions on the types of music suitable for both PA and radio. The group would have been useful for radio work had personnel limitations not prevented the projected expansion of the Japanese-language news broadcasts over North Burma Radio.

Re-education and Indoctrination

The Assam team has never been adequately staffed with Japanese-language personnel to undertake an ambitious and systematic program of POW re-education such as has been done in Yenan. However, the necessity for this was to some extent obviated by the fact that we started out with a small, selected group, of which the leader and at least one other of the principal members were inclined to accept our anti-militarist idealogy. Their thinking, which has grown stronger since the group began functioning, has conditioned and guided the thinking of the whole group.

Nevertheless, we did make some contribution to the re-education process. At first, informal discussions between Nisei staff-members and the POWs were the main medium, and the study and discussion of our leaflets also served a similar purpose. At the same time, anti-militarist materials from Yenan were made available to the group. A daily newsfile was also provided, including both Domei and Reuters so that they could compare the news from both sides.

During the final phase of the operation, regular semiweekly discussion meetings were held at the stockade. At one of these, a member of the Japanese-language staff gave a complete round-up of the week's news, pointing out developments in the war situation in the various theaters on maps and explaining their strategic significance. Whenever films were available the news resume was supplemented by the showing of OWI shorts, newsreels and Army combat bulletins, with a member of the Japanese-language staff explaining the films orally as they were run off.

These films had to be viewed in advance in order to make sure that they contained no scenes of such a nature as to wound the sensibilities of the group.

The other semi-weekly meeting was reserved for discussion of new propaganda approaches and techniques, new leaflet ideas, OWI policy, and American aims with regard to post-war reconstruction. These meetings were attended by members of the Japanese-language staff and at least one non-Nisei member of the editorial staff, whose function was to lead the discussion and answer the questions put by the group.

Despite the somewhat haphazard methods used, at least a working minimum of re-education and re-indoctrination has been accomplished. It is hoped that the process will be continued if the group is attached to another OWI outpost for further propaganda activity.

Physical Treatment

One of the thorniest problems which the Assam PWT had to tackle in connection with the POW group was that of explaining to the Army the necessity of according the minimum degree of good physical treatment required to keep the POWs in a contented and cooperative frame of mind. Ledo being just a temporary stopping-place for POWs on their way back to British prison camps, there were no regularized arrangements for taking care of them. The food provided was insufficient and often so spoiled that it was inedible. Clothing and shoes were not issued. There was no provision for cigarettes. The G-2 authorities nominally responsible for the treatment of prisoners were uninterested, and the MP officers at the stockade unsympathetic. Efforts by OWI personnel to obtain an improvement often met flat rebuff on the ground that a civilian agency had no jurisdiction in Army affairs.

For a considerable period the PWT Nisei personnel solved the problem by obtaining cigarettes and whatever small necessaries were available from the Red Cross, giving the POWs their own castoff clothing and shoes, and buying out of their own pockets toothbrushes, toothpaste, soap, towels, a regular supply of fresh vegetables, and occasionally candies and meat. Eventually these expenses were taken care of by the creation of a POW fund donated by members of the PWT staff on a wider basis, but in the future it is essential that regular funds be made available for such purposes.

In January (1945), a vast improvement was finally secured through the efforts of ——— ———, who after joining the team had been entrusted with all dealings with the Army concerning the POW group. ——— went about this task with vigor and a conviction that the group was vitally important to our operation. By fortunate coincidence, he had travelled across the Atlantic on the same plane with Lt Colonel ———, the newly appointed Provost Marshal for the entire Ledo and North Burma area. ——— explained to Colonel ——— why the POW group needed treatment consistent with their importance to our operation. Upon Colonel ———'s orders, the new officers in charge of the stockade immediately saw to it that the POW enclosure was improved, electric lights installed, and the food and clothing difficulties solved.

At various times subsequent to the formation of the group, the question was raised with the army of setting up a special enclosure adjacent to PWT headquarters, so that the delays and inconveniences of having to travel back and forth between the office and stockade would be eliminated. However, both NCAC headquarters and the theater ruling on our use of POWs insisted that army security regulations be strictly observed, which meant that a complete detail of MPs would

have had to be assigned to guard the enclosure on a 24-hour basis. As the MP detachment in Ledo was already inadequate, this could not be done.

Earlier, in August, a group of POWs had been brought to PWT headquarters in Powai under guard, by special arrangement with G-2 and the stockade authorities, to make some recordings for frontline broadcast purposes. Owing to the impossibility of setting up an enclosure close to the office, a renewal of this arrangement on a regular 3-times-a week basis was proposed by ——— ——— to Lt Colonel ——— in January. Colonel ——— was willing to go further; he said that it would be much simpler to put the POWs on parole so that they could leave the stockade daily, without armed guard, to come to PWT headquarters, and he promised that, if we would write a formal request to this effect, he would place it before General ———, CG of Base Section 3, with his endorsement. This proposal, unfortunately, was turned down both by General ———'s office and by Colonel ——— (G-2).

This did not eliminate the alternative of having the POWs come to PWT headquarters under guard, but Colonel ——— (G-2) and Major ——— at NCAC strongly advised against it on the ground that, in the event of an escape attempt or any other untoward incident while the POWs were in our hands, our authorization to use them would be ended regardless of the fact that guarding them was officially the army's responsibility. In actual fact, the risk of such a happening seemed so small as to be almost negligible, but that is where matters stood at the close of the Assam operation (April, 1945).

Conclusions and Recommendations

The success of the Assam experiment has given additional and convincing proof that POWs can make a vital contribution to psychological warfare against the Japanese. They assure that our methods of approach and the tone of our propaganda will be the right methods and tone to be effective on the Japanese GI mentality. They assure us that we will talk to enemy troops in authentic Japanese GI language, and at the same time in Japanese which is both grammatically acceptable and not in a phraseology which is an obviously mechanical translation from an English text. As regards art work, they assure us that our illustrations will be free of ridicule-provoking errors of detail such as showing incorrectly wrapped puttees on a Japanese soldier or a Japanese *ojosan* (unmarried lady) wearing the hair-dress of a married matron. Furthermore our art should possess that indefinable something known as "Japanese quality." Above all, the employment of POWs reduces to a minimum the danger of putting out leaflets — as we did earlier, and as other theaters have done — which in the judgment of our POW group "will do more harm than good."

The Assam experiment, furthermore, demonstrates the practicability of forming new POW groups for employment elsewhere to function as an integral part of OWI psychological warfare teams.

The Assam experiment opens the possibility of setting up an American-sponsored POW organization on the Yenan model, which will make propaganda to the Japanese in its own name as a Japanese organization committed to the overthrow of the present militarist government. As Yenan's achievements indicate, this can be a most effective form of psychological warfare against Japan.

As the situation now stands, the Assam POW group is highly proficient in propaganda techniques, enthusiastic and efficient in its work and anxious to expand its efforts. When ——— ———, chief of the OWI Psywar detachment in Kunming,

visited Ledo in March, he was deeply impressed by the spirit and capability of the group and returned to China determined to secure its transfer to Kunming and to provide the best possible conditions for the continuation of its work. Since then, the Delhi office has initiated steps at India-Burma headquarters to facilitate the transfer from this end, and the initial response has been encouraging.

In the event that the transfer is successfully effected, there are a few suggestions which we think might be useful to Kunming in enhancing both the effectiveness and the contentment of the group:

1. If possible, the physical arrangements should be such that the POWs will have access to the OWI office, at least to the Japanese-language department, to facilitate work and to give them the feeling that they are a trusted part of the organization.
2. Within the limits of Army security regulations and consideration for the POWs' own safety, the Provost Marshal's office might be approached regarding the possibility of a parole system whereby the POWs could occasionally leave the stockade for specified periods of time during the day for recreation or other purposes, accompanied by a member of the PWT staff.
3. If possible, better recreation facilities should be provided and movies including entertainment features, shown to the group at least once a week.
4. The process of re-education should be continued at least to the extent of the regular news and propaganda discussions initiated in Assam.
5. The group should be allowed as much initiative as possible in leaflet work. They get a great boost out of seeing their leaflets produced without too much emasculation, and it is wise to respect their judgment as to what approach is the most effective.

In the event that additional POWs are added to the existing group or new POW groups formed, the selection of the men is vitally important. Nisei staff members through personal contact, will be best qualified to form a reliable estimate of the POWs sincerity and trustworthiness, and when new groups are formed, it is essential that at least the leader be a man with genuine and strong anti-militarist convictions. Once the leader is found, he will be able to assist greatly in picking out other POWs who are cooperative and can work harmoniously together as a propaganda unit. When adding new men to an existing group, the group leader should be permitted to make the final decision as to whether individual candidates are acceptable. Always the POWs approached should be given a full understanding of the nature of the work and its consequences for them, so that they will not undertake it lightly or merely out of a desire to obtain better treatment. They must be prepared to face the fact that their action, temporarily at least, places them in the category of traitors to the present Japanese government.

In any new group, it is highly desirable that one or more of its members be able to read and understand some English. It is also important that the group represent different levels of education in order to assure that its propaganda will be pitched at the right level of understanding for the audience. As far as possible, different professional backgrounds should be represented as well.

Finally, the Assam PWT feels that the matter of guarantees of future security to POWs who undertake to work in such groups requires consideration and decision on the highest level in Washington. What is needed is the authority to give concrete assurances to these POWs that they will not be returned to Japan as prisoners of war at the close of hostilities, unless they so desire. They share the common attitude of nearly all Japanese prisoners that they are disgraced, and on top of that they have the added fear that, should their activities become known,

they will be denounced at home as traitors. Actually, when the war ends and the militarist regime is overthrown, the vast majority of the Japanese POWs will probably desire to return home as soon as they see that conditions are such that they can do so without stigma. However, we must expect that many POWs will hesitate to undertake psychological warfare work for us unless the assurances mentioned above are given to them in advance. In view of the contribution they can make to our war effort, we consider that such guarantees would be not only reasonable and just but pragmatically sound.

INDOCTRINATION OF FRIENDLY TROOPS*

By W. E. D.

The indoctrination of front-line officers and men of the 1st Cavalry Division led to greater cooperation and thus to increased effectiveness of psychological warfare in World War II.

The practice of detailing military personnel, trained in psychological warfare, to staff duties in the lower echelons was not widespread in World War II. For the most part, in North Africa and in Europe, psychological warfare personnel were assigned to a division for a specific mission and were withdrawn as soon as the objective was reached. The contact that psychological warfare officers had with front-line and service personnel was limited largely to those occasions when loudspeaker broadcast missions were conducted in or near the front lines. Occasionally these missions aroused the enemy's ire to the point that artillery shells were returned in retaliation. Such experiences did not serve to increase the American infantrymen's sympathy for or understanding of the mission of the combat propagandist.

In the various subareas, or military theaters of responsibility in the Pacific, in the war against Japan, the practice of assigning psywar personnel for duty within combat divisions varied greatly. In a few divisions staff officers permanently assigned to the unit were designated to perform duties essential to psychological warfare on a part-time basis. This same practice was almost universally followed in the American divisions of the UN Command in Korea during the years 1951 and 1952. In still other divisions in the Pacific area, in World War II, psychological warfare specialists were dispatched from corps and army headquarters on temporary duty assignments for service during specially designated periods of time or for specific campaigns.

Since psychological warfare on the tactical level was not a highly developed activity there was neither a doctrine nor an SOP to guide personnel assigned to psychological warfare duties in the lower echelons. The nature and extent of the work preformed by lower echelon psychological warfare personnel depended largely on the enthusiasm, interest, and knowledge of the enemy possessed by the designated personnel.

It appears to be axiomatic that units whose troops best understand the requirements, limitations, and potentialities of psychological warfare achieved the most effective results in its employment. The following account was prepared by an

* Adapted from an original account dictated by Major David Tuke stationed at the time at the Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N. C.

officer who served in a psychological warfare capacity with a combat division during World War II, as well as on the planning staff of a psychological warfare agency in the UN action in Korea. The story he tells well illustrates how he utilized his equipment and time during the war against Japan to inform the combat troops why it was essential for them to cooperate in the psychological warfare effort launched against enemy troops.

"During World War II, I was lucky enough to be in at the beginning of the American psychological warfare campaign in the Southwest Pacific. I was lucky because I learned a lesson in psywar operations we were not taught in the psywar school classes conducted in Brisbane, Australia, in August of 1944. It was a lesson I recently found to be still as necessary to know and to practice in the Korean campaign as it was throughout World War II. In Brisbane we were taught that our target was the mind of the Japanese soldier. We were taught how to operate against it, and how to use the necessary equipment, such as leaflets, loudspeakers, etc., in order to accomplish the assigned mission. We were then sent back to New Guinea, believing that we understood the fundamental necessities for waging an effective psychological warfare campaign against the enemy soldier.

"My sergeant and I were assigned to I Corps in September of 1944. I Corps at that time was busy mopping up isolated pockets of Japanese soldiers remaining in the area around Hollandia. The sergeant and I offered our services but the troops were too busy to make use of the combat weapon about which they knew little and cared less. The troops had been told nothing about psychological warfare, and quite naturally they looked upon us with suspicion for we carried a bizarre and fantastic name which to them would have appeared to be more at home in the Pentagon than in combat. We were looked upon as a nuisance by those in command and as something of a hairbrain joke by the enlisted personnel.

"I understood then, that we had only been taught the last lesson in the book, that is, how to reach the mind and win the will of the enemy soldier; about how to conduct an effective operation in a psywar campaign we were not told. The first lesson had been completely neglected. Absolutely nothing had been mentioned on how to reach the minds and win the wills of our *own* soldiers so that they would cooperate fully in the program. It was obviously impossible to hit the enemy target effectively if the minds and wills of our own men were either ignorant of the mission or apathetic about it.

"The 1st Cavalry Division was slated to make the D-day invasion of Leyte Island, in the Philippines, in October 1944. I therefore requested an assignment to that division as the psychological warfare officer, and when my request was approved spent the rest of my time with I Corps Headquarters making up orientation displays and briefings suitable for combat troops. I joined the 1st Cavalry Division in the Admiralty Islands just in time to make the invasion armada. Throughout the long sea voyage to Leyte, my sergeant kept our psywar leaflets constantly on exhibition and I periodically briefed both officers and men on the purpose and potential usefulness to them of psychological warfare. We neither persuaded nor impressed anyone.

"By the time we hit the beach at Leyte, I knew that we had at least two missions to perform. *First,* we would have to begin our indoctrination by associating psywar with something that our own troops could identify, or associate with themselves. *Second,* psywar would have to prove its usefulness. In Tacloban, capital city of Leyte, we got our chance to start work on the second mission. The town of course, was in a state of total confusion, the Philippine people were bewildered about just what to expect of us, and just what we expected of them, and because our two-man psywar unit had the only loudspeaker equipment available, the Provost Marshal called on us to broadcast a dozen times a day, both in Tacloban and in the surrounding villages, directing refugee traffic, keeping the main highway arteries open, issuing directives, and telling the people just what to expect of us and just what we expected of them.

"The mission worked both ways, in the way the Provost Marshal expected and in the way we hoped it would work with our own troops. We became known throughout the division, down through the regiments, in the companies, and even in the platoons. Our potentialities slowly began to be understood, the potentialities inherent in the use of psychological warfare.

"We installed ourselves in the G-2 office and followed closely the situation maps and the intelligence reports. We submitted daily recommendations as to just where we thought our leaflets could be dropped most effectively, and where loudspeaker broadcasts might bring results. On occasion, General Mudge, the Commanding General, called on us for a specific mission.

"When the 1st Cav established its permanent headquarters in Leyte, we got our first opportunity to work on the second half of our mission, that is, relating psychological warfare to something our own troops were hungry for, news of the world, news of the campaign in Leyte, the same kind of information we were disseminating to enemy soldiers in our psywar leaflets, in our news sheets, and more briefly in our loudspeaker broadcasts. By this time we really went to work on our own troops. Using a loudspeaker unit mounted on a weapon's carrier we really put the show on the road. We made daily visits to every outfit in the division, tying in the operations with our broadcasts to the enemy. We played jive music, gave daily newscasts in English to the 1st Cav troopers, and displayed prominently on the side of our weapon's carrier copies of our psywar news sheets, designed for use against the Japanese. After each newscast, we announced briefly that this was exactly the kind of broadcast we were just about to give, or had just given to the enemy. News was given of American victories in Leyte, throughout the Pacific and Europe and Japanese defeats on both land and sea. The troops got the idea and thus began to volunteer assistance. They helped us by packing leaflets and news sheets in artillery shell, by bundling leaflets for air drop, by giving us cover when in and near the front lines. From there on out in every single loudspeaker broadcast, directed against the enemy, psychological warfare to them was no longer a weird and improbably activity, dreamed up by impractical Pentagon pen-pushers. They had seen it in action, they had seen it clean out caves in which isolated but desperate enemy soldiers were holed up. Often this was accomplished without the loss of a single

American life. In time we lost that improbable name, psychological warfare. We became known with the usual kidding affection soldiers reserve for other outfits for whom they have developed a healthy respect as the 'paper bullet guys.'

"This indoctrination program provided us the opportunity to convince our own front line soldiers that we were with them to assist in doing a necessary job — that is, to inflict defeat on the enemy. However, as we pointed out, in order for us to help them to the utmost, it was necessary that the troops first help us in various ways. It was necessary that enemy soldiers attempting to surrender be treated in accordance with the terms we promised in our loudspeaker broadcasts and in the leaflets disseminated to them. Second, intelligence of value to an effective psywar program, such as can only be collected in the front line areas, was always needed, and should be gathered and promptly transmitted to the rear where it could be employed in reducing enemy resistance."

PERSONNEL UTILIZATION IN STRATEGIC PSYWAR EVALUATION*

By Alexander H. Leighton

Personnel trained in various academic disciplines and with varying vocational experience were fused into a team to conduct strategic evaluation and intelligence studies for the OWI and the military services during World War II.

PURPOSE AND TASK OF THE RESEARCH UNIT

During the war [World War II] an acute need was felt in many quarters for a better understanding of Japanese social and psychological characteristics as they related to military morale on the battlefront and to civilian morale in Japan. It was recognized that knowledge of Japanese thought and behavior was essential for dealing with the Japanese both as an enemy during the war and as a defeated nation in the postwar international world. The need for better understanding was felt particularly by those agencies charged with conducting psychological warfare against Japan. The Foreign Morale Analysis Division (FMAD) of the Office of War Information was organized to see how these problems could be illuminated by the application of social science methods and procedures to a particular body of wartime source materials made available by Allied military and civilian agencies.

The research was centered on two fields of interest — first, military morale at the battlefront and, second, civilian morale and internal social conditions on the homefront. The analysis of military morale was first concerned with clarifying the character and mainsprings of the Japanese soldier's morale, with determining whether the traditionally accepted picture of uniformly high and impregnable morale was a true one, and if not, with discovering its vulnerable points and the conditions under which it had wavered or was likely to weaken or break. The research unit explored the question, for example, of whether Japanese soldiers

* From A. H. Leighton, *Human Relations In A Changing World*, E. P. Dutton Co., Inc., New York, 1949, pp 295–311. Reproduced with permission of Dr. Leighton, the copyright holder, and E. P. Dutton Co., Inc., publisher.

inevitably lived up to their ideal of suicidal, last-ditch resistance, of how their patriotic and religious indoctrination had been achieved and maintained, of the circumstances under which resistance weakened and surrenders took place.

The study of civilian morale and internal social conditions in Japan was likewise carried forward with the purpose of discovering any variations in civilian morale and support of the war effort and of estimating vulnerable points. FMAD was prepared to investigate critically the assumption of a populace uniformly and effectively mobilized in support of the war. It was interested in determining the effects of increased food shortages and physical hardships, of air raids, evacuation, and the disruption of normal life. It wanted to know how these hardships affected the capacity for war production and how they might influence the will to resist in the event of Allied invasion of the homeland. It gathered data on tensions existing between classes or factions within Japan — industrial workers, farmers, women, students, intellectuals — and asked whether any of these groups showed signs of uncooperativeness or dissatisfaction with the war. Current information about such internal social conditions and attitudes of the people was felt to be of immediate importance during the war and of long-range significance for the occupation and administration of a defeated Japan.

These military and civilian fields of interest were not so sharply divided as might at first appear. The average Japanese soldier came from, and could be expected to return to the civilian population. His military and patriotic indoctrination was part of the larger Japanese ideology. Even the professional soldier represented an element in the greater Japanese community. From both fields it was hoped to obtain information that would throw light on Japanese cultural patterns of thought and behavior that appeared so baffling and incomprehensible to the Western mind.

Military and civilian intelligence reports were the source material upon which the research was based. These documents were brought together from all battlefronts and from a variety of civilian agencies. As it was received, the information of social and psychological importance was mingled with other kinds of operational or strategic data concerning order of battle, military installations, and economic or political affairs. The initial task of the research unit was to devise methods and procedures for handling this great volume and variety of source material and for systematically culling out, recording, and cataloging the data pertinent to its special interests. This recording, extracting, and analysis had to be managed under wartime pressures at a time when it was necessary not only to keep abreast of the continuous flow of incoming documents but to have the results of analysis immediately available. Also the recording had to be carried on in a way which would give time perspective and show current developments against the background of previous conditions. The review of documents and systematic recording of data were of such dimensions that they required a team of analysts. Uniform procedures for recording and extracting had to be worked out so that processing of a given document could be done by any one of the team of analysts with comparable results.

On the basis of the system which was developed, the research unit was prepared to supply information about Japanese morale and internal social conditions to military and civilian war agencies whenever it was requested or when it was thought that it would be helpful. In practice the specific activities and aims of the research unit became channelized along certain lines. As an OWI unit one of its primary aims was to provide information of use in the central planning of Allied psychological warfare policies and programs. Its analyses of military morale were based

on comparative source materials from all battlefronts and were thus strategic in character and supplementary to tactical analyses of similar but more localized material made by operational units in the field. (Such tactical units did not, however, employ social science methods and concepts.) Thus it was possible to supply an over-all picture which often gave perspective and comparisons to those in particular theaters. The use of the information was not limited to OWI units but extended also to the military and to such civilian agencies as OSS and the State Department. Aside from this specialized aim of the research in psychological warfare, the unit proposed as far as possible to supply other intelligence of a strategic nature, particularly for the War Department, as it was requested or as the research itself revealed significant leads. Although these two information and intelligence functions were primary, the FMAD also participated in training programs for overseas Civil Affairs and intelligence (OSS) personnel. Despite the wartime pressure to provide information of immediate utility, throughout the research the importance of the findings for occupation and reconstruction policies was taken into consideration.

The social scientists who conceived and directed the research project brought to it the point of view and accepted methods of the social sciences in general and of sociology, psychology, social anthropology, and psychiatry, in particular. They were impressed with the usefulness and necessity of applied social science and the utilization of scientific methods in the clarification of the social and human problems of our own civilization. A basic premise of the research was that social phenomena are susceptible of scientific analysis through systematic observation and classification and the consequent formulation of inductive generalizations. The body of general social science propositions about the nature of society and the behavior of its members formed part of the background of the research. Commonly accepted techniques of definition, classification, and measurement of social phenomena were used as far as was permitted by the limitations of the data and by the compromises and adjustments made necessary by their quality. The acceptance of the possibility of generalization about social phenomena from specific instances opened up a further field, that of prediction. It was a major concern and expectation of the research unit to be able to foretell the effect of changing factors in the morale picture and to estimate trends in time.

Among the fundamental propositions of social science, two were considered of basic importance to the research. The first was the assumption that certain uniformities exist in the behavior of individuals and in the operation of social groups due to common human and social factors. Equally important, on the other hand, was the recognition that between different social and national groups there exist certain contrasts in belief and behavior which are culturally conditioned and which can be understood only in terms of the cultural context of the groups in question. The importance of this comparative point of view cannot be overestimated for the study of morale and social conditions in a culture so different from our own.

How the various aims and demands were met by the research unit is described in the remainder of this report.

ORGANIZATION

The FMAD operated as an OWI unit under a cooperative arrangement with MIS (Military Intelligence Service) of the War Department. From both agencies in varying degrees it drew personnel and equipment, and through both it had access to the military and civilian intelligence documents that were used as source material. As an analysis and information unit it served both OWI and MIS by means of reports and representation at conferences.

The research unit was established under OWI in the spring of 1944 and began working with the nuclear personnel of a chief and three analysts. From the beginning this staff worked in space provided by the War Department and with access to MIS intelligence sources. In these first months, attention was centered primarily on problems of military morale. During the fall of 1944, the staff was gradually enlarged to an over-all personnel of seventeen, with part housed in the War Department and the other part in OWI offices. With increased personnel and facilities it was possible to turn attention to social conditions and morale on the Japanese homefront while further developing and refining the study of military morale.

By the beginning of 1945, the OWI personnel consisted of the division chief and co-chief, ten analysts, two translators, and three secretaries. From time to time additional temporary personnel was made available from OWI for special tasks. (The author of this report has included Navy members with the OWI group. This is done because they were assigned by the Navy to OWI.) The permanent staff represented a wide range of experience and training in the social sciences and psychiatry. The division chief had directed a social research project in a Japanese Relocation Center, following the evacuation of West Coast Japanese and Americans of Japanese ancestry, and had brought with him from the project four analysts and a secretary, all of Japanese ancestry. Ten members of the total OWI staff of seventeen (plus two who were later contributed by the Army) were persons of Japanese ancestry with linguistic or other special qualifications for working with Japanese materials. Another of the senior analysts had also had experience as head of social research in a Japanese Relocation Center. In all, a large proportion of the staff had had first hand knowledge of Japanese culture either through personal or research experience or through both. In addition to these special qualifications the remainder of the top personnel had had training and wide research experience in sociology, social anthropology, and psychology.

As an OWI operation the research unit was known as the Foreign Morale Analysis Division. It had two sections — the group housed in the War Department engaged in analysis of intelligence material made available through military sources, and the staff in the OWI office working on translation and analysis of other material available through non-military sources. In the War Department office, emphasis was on analysis of military morale, but data on homefront conditions were also assembled. The work of the staff in the OWI office was concerned with translation of current materials from the Japanese, independent background research on Japanese cultural and psychological characteristics, and the coordination of activities of the research unit with OWI psychological warfare policies and operations. Needless to say, there was free interchange of materials between both of these sections; joint meetings were held; and the data accumulated by one was accessible to the other.

As a War Department operation the research unit worked in cooperation with the Sociological Branch of MIS, had access to MIS intelligence materials, was assigned space and personnel by it, and prepared reports for it on request. The cooperative arrangement with MIS went through several stages. Under the final arrangement, completed in the spring of 1945, the cooperative research unit was known as the Joint Morale Survey. The JMS was comprised of the FMAD staff and the following personnel assigned by MIS: a joint chief of the unit correlative with the OWI divi-

sion chief, three civilian and three military research analysts, plus occasional other professional workers and clerical assistants. The JMS was divided into two sections — the morale research unit and a propaganda section concerned primarily with analysis of Japanese radio propaganda. The latter section was mainly an Army operation distinct from the morale research unit except for the loan of one OWI analyst to it and the utilization of its radio material by the research unit.

The results of the research were presented to policy-making and operational units in OWI and to the War Department essentially through two media — formal reports and memoranda, and in formal and informal conferences. The series of reports issued by the research unit, on subjects ranging from over-all studies of military morale and effects of Allied propaganda to reports on special topics, were circulated to policy-making units in OWI and the War Department. These formal reports reached a relatively wide audience of military and civilian agencies, and proved to be particularly useful to certain offices in OSS, the State Department, the Navy, and a British liaison unit concerned with morale problems. In addition to the regularly circulated series of reports, special memoranda were prepared in response to specific requests from MIS or when it was felt necessary. Although the subjects of the reports were in general geared to the known interests of OWI and MIS, suggestions and impetus for following certain lines of investigation also came from the research unit and from leads provided independently by the data.

Probably quite as effective as a means of presenting the point of view and results of the research to persons in key positions were the formal and informal conferences carried on with members of OWI, MIS, and other agencies. Representatives of FMAD participated regularly in policy-making meetings of the Far Eastern Division of OWI. Early in the summer of 1945 the co-chief of FMAD left to become director of an OWI over-all planning and coordinating unit for psychological warfare to Japan and provided a strategic link between the research and planning programs. Communication with War Department policy-making officials was likewise maintained through participation in conferences, principally on the part of the Army chief of the unit.

Conferences and particularly informal contacts, not only in OWI and the War Department but also with key persons in other agencies, were of great importance in establishing the research point of view, in communicating the results and in indicating the usefulness of social science research methods in this context.

SOURCES

The source material upon which the research was based covered a wide range of intelligence documents, both civilian and military. Military intelligence materials included documents obtained through collection, translation, and interrogation agencies of the Allies, principally American, British, Australian, and Chinese. The military intelligence documents were, of course, the principal source materials for analysis of Japanese military morale, but they also provided data not elsewhere available on internal social conditions and civilian morale in the Japanese homeland. Of the military documents, the most useful were prisoner of war interrogation reports, and the methods devised for their systematic analysis will be discussed later in detail. In addition to POW interrogations a variety of other types of strictly military intelligence sources, such as captured diaries and enemy military publications and orders, also provided rich data for the study of morale.

Intelligence materials from non-military sources and containing data on homefront conditions and morale were made available through MIS and civilian war

agencies, principally the following: OWI outposts, for translation and summaries of Japanese publications (OWI outposts also furnished special POW interrogations on psychological warfare subjects); OSS, for background material and special translations and interrogations; IDC (Inter-Departmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Publications), for translations and summaries of newspapers and periodical articles; and FCC, for translations of Japanese radio broadcasts. Except for certain types of materials, such as Japanese newspaper and radio broadcasts, the sources of data on internal social conditions were less uniform and less susceptible to measurement and systematic analysis than those for military morale. However, the greater variety and wider range of topics in this civilian data opened up unexpected and interesting possibilities. These intelligence documents, both military and civilian, were received currently insofar as translation and transmission facilities permitted. In general, the military documents were forwarded to Washington headquarters from the field with higher priority and became available for analysis more quickly than did civilian documents. As a result, it was possible to keep the analysis of military morale more up to date than that of the civilian data.

One disadvantage in the use of all of these materials for FMAD's research purposes was the inability of the research unit to participate in the gathering of the data and its lack of control over the sources. The materials had originally been collected for a variety of purposes — military, technical, economic, political. In many cases the original observations and collection of data were not made for sociological, psychological, or morale purposes. Except to a very limited extent in some POW interrogations, the research unit was not able to determine or influence the range and quality of field observations or the methods of collection of morale data. It used the materials gathered by others, often with different ends in view, as they were presented to the unit. Despite this lack of control over its origin and collection, much of the material proved to be useful and rewarding for the research purposes. In the following description of specific types of documents utilized, more attention will be given to military than to civilian sources, since their nature and the possibilities for their use are presumably less well known.

POW Interrogations

Interrogation reports were the richest sources of information on Japanese military morale and the most susceptible to systematic analysis. In volume they formed about half of the intelligence documents that came to the unit. POW interrogations, although conducted primarily for military information of operational value, contained other kinds of data useful for morale analysis. Almost all interrogations, except some on specialized subjects, enumerated at least a minimum of personal background items about the prisoner, such as his age, rank, home residence, education, and occupation. Statistics on such background items were essential in describing the "total population" of Japanese POWs. The principal data on morale resulted from direct questioning on such subjects as the state of discipline and military spirit in the POW's unit, attitudes toward last-ditch resistance and suicide, or the effects of Allied propaganda. Much could be inferred about the morale pictures from less direct questions on such topics as circumstances of capture, health and food conditions in the unit, supplies and reinforcements, training and patriotic indoctrination. In several series of interrogation reports the POWs were routinely questioned about homefront conditions.

The extreme readiness of Japanese POWs to talk under interrogation and their willingness to cooperate with their captors have been matters for surprise on the